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THE DIALECTICS OF WAR AND PEACE

IN the course of a discussion relative to the Geneva Protocol of 1924, M. Briand defended this instrument of peace, in these words: "The Protocol runs up against difficulties mainly because of the fact that it speaks a good deal of war. . . . Perhaps! But peace, to my eyes, is, in practice, nothing but the absence of war. . . . After all, an institution turned toward peace, if it wishes absolutely to maintain peace, is obliged to preoccupy itself with all the ways and means that may be the most proper to prevent war." At first sight it seems that common sense and practical wisdom were flowing from the lips of the French Minister: war and peace are in opposition to one another as two contraries; they exclude one another like night and day; to prevent the birth of war is to make peace perpetual. At least, there is temptation to believe that this is so. If we reflect on the conditions of international life and seek the why of war and peace, it seems then that

these represent less the terms of an alternative—either war or peace—than they do two events of international life bound one to another by the bonds of a dialectic proper to them.

How define war, without assigning peace as its *raison d'être*; and how stabilize peace without giving it force as the ultimate guarantee of its duration? War is an interval in a policy of peace; that is why military command is subordinated to the civil power; the military staff commands on the battlefield, but those who govern conduct the war. However, peace in its turn, is assured only if the state supports it by accepting the eventuality of war. Without going to the point of: *Si vis pacem para bellum*, it seems evident that the peace of states, and the states themselves, die in the face of the non-acceptance of the idea of war, for this idea is the ultimate guarantee of the maintenance of a just peace, and it is, under a defective peace, the supreme hope of peoples aspiring toward justice.

This is the dialectic by which the mind goes from peace to war and from war to peace, as a ball is batted back and forth between two rackets. It is a dialectic which runs all through history, leaving in its wake battles, havoc and heroisms. It explains the perpetual new beginnings, and it undoubtedly excuses men for never having been able to renounce war, which they damned, or for not having had full confidence in peace, which they recognized as the condition of happiness. It is this dialectic which we propose to study, facing it, by preference, from the viewpoint of juridical sociology. Is this dialectic the immutable result of the necessities of political life, or is it the reflection of a historical social state which has imposed it for a time, and which, with it, will transform itself to the point of disappearing? If the latter be true, what is the true nature of this peace toward which the international community tends today?

I. THE DIALECTICS OF WAR AND PEACE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF
CLASSICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW

In this study we shall confine ourselves to modern times. In fact, it is in modern times that the state appears in the form in which we know it today, and it is in modern times that the heritage of International Law which we have received is constituted. Of course, the period which preceded the Middle Ages also had its concept of war and peace. An interesting doctrine of the right of war was elaborated beginning in the fifth century, under the impetus of theologians and canonists, and if it did not always exercise an efficacious influence on the conduct of Princes, it nevertheless so profoundly penetrated the conscience of peoples, that today they still generally require that a war be just, and they try indefatigably to submit this calamity, at once voluntary and abhorred, to reason and morality. But, however important may be the spiritual legacy of this period, it has not left us any clear and unchangeable definition of war. Such a definition does not even seem to have been sought. This lacuna, strange at first sight, explains itself if one considers the manner in which the problem was stated at the time.

War can be viewed in two ways: either in an objective manner, which is the manner of philosophy of history and of sociology (war is then a human fact, an international phenomenon of which one observes the nature and the import) or from a subjective point of view (we enter then into: the soul of those who wage war—State, Prince, or Soldier). War provokes to homicide and to the destruction of the goods of others; can it be other than a mistake? This is the question which the authors of the Middle Ages asked themselves, long before Saint Thomas and even after Suarez. Moralists all, they asked themselves under what conditions one may wage war without sin, and they did not seek to know, as philosophers and as sociologists, what war is. Has modern International Law been more preoccupied with defining war?

In this period the theologians no longer have the say. In

the sixteenth century, they were the announcers of the new science, but they were quickly expelled from it, and it was not necessary that an angry angel forbid them re-entrance in the lost domain, for after Suarez they made no serious effort to re-enter.¹ Natural Law now replaces theology. As the dictate of right reason (*Dictamen rectae rationis*), it reflects the laws inscribed by God in the nature of things and of men. This nature shows us that there is a universal human society which embraces all civilized peoples under rules of law. Hugo Grotius and the School of Natural Law are the promoters of this conception; it persists, with a few variations, in Puffendorf, in Wolff, in Burlamaqui, and in Vattel. But inside this society, each state is sovereign. This constitutes a second idea, one no less fundamental than that of the *Civitas Maxima*, and one which the new International Law will develop abundantly.

With Grotius, the sovereignty of the state has not yet taken on the absolute sense which his successors will give it. But very rapidly the doctrine models itself on the aspirations of states to independence, and it imitates the selfish policy of the Princes. In the interior, sovereignty is conceived as the right to decide in the last resort, and to impose on individuals and on intermediary bodies a will superior to theirs—that of the Prince, or that of the state. On the exterior, it is the attribute of an authority which recognizes no superior, and which, from this fact, enjoys in international life a freedom of decision which is unlimited as long as it does not impose limits upon itself through accords made with other powers. The state is, therefore, its own proper end in the international order.

It is in Vattel that we shall find the already perfect expression

¹ Undoubtedly because of the weakness of political thought during the modern period, since Vitoria there have been no original thinkers among theologians or, at least, none who surpassed in ability Jean Bodin or Grotius, or even Wolff, Burlamaqui, and Vattel, and who knew at the same time how to interpret better than these authors the needs of modern states. This failure is all the more regrettable because International Law was destined to remain faithful to Natural Law for a long time, and because the community of the *jus gentium* was to be made up solely of Christian states.

of this sovereignty, which will become a dogma in the nineteenth century and which, favored by the individualism, liberalism, and materialism of this period, will penetrate as profoundly the mentality of peoples as that of jurists and statesmen. For Vattel as for his predecessors, the nations form a society whose immutable laws are founded on the nature of things and on the nature of man. But if the first of these laws prescribes that each nation contribute with all its power to the happiness and the perfection of all the others, the second desires that each be left "in the peaceful enjoyment of the liberty it holds from nature." "It is for each nation to judge what its conscience demands of it, of what it can or can not do, of what it should or should not do, and consequently to examine and to decide if it can render some office to another without failing in what it owes to itself,"² he writes, in formulating a Golden Rule of the doctrine of sovereignty. If each state is subject to the *jus gentium*, this consecrates and protects the natural liberty of the state and the autonomy which makes it judge of its own cause, responsible to its own conscience alone. "All the tranquillity, the happiness, the safety of the human race rests on justice, on the obligation of respecting the rights of others," writes Vattel, but justice is the respect for rights which flow from sovereignty, and one can not even say that the range of the rights of each is limited by the equal liberty of another, for, in the concrete, each state, sovereign judge of its own rights, is, by that very fact, sovereign judge of the limits of the rights of others. The only obligations binding upon it are those in which it has voluntarily engaged itself by treaty with other sovereign states.³

Thus, the modern state is aware that it forms with its equals

² *Le Droit des Gens ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des Nations et des Souverains*, M. de Vattel, Londres, 1758, pp. 8-9.

³ From this flows the importance that the faith due treaties takes on in the theories of International Law. "This firm and sincere desire, this faithfulness in fulfilling the obligations which one has taken on in a treaty is . . . holy and sacred between the nations, whose salvation and rest it assures, and if peoples are to be true to themselves, those who breach their trust must be branded as infamous," says Vattel, *op. cit.*, p. 434.

a society regulated by International Law, but this society does not have as its legal foundation a solidarity which would unite the states by subordinating them to a good superior to each and profitable to all. It has for its foundation a "state of nature" which confers on each of them the liberty and the autonomy which sums up the word sovereignty. No organic bond exists between the states, but solely a moral bond, a reciprocal obligation of justice, of which the fidelity due to treaties and the respect of mutual independence are the principal elements. What dialectic of peace and war results from such a conception of international life?

Since Grotius recorded the rules of International Law for his time in *De jure belli et pacis*, peace-time relations and war-time relations seem to offer this science its normal division. Peace and war alternate; the situation of persons, the application of treaties, the conditions of the domain can all be studied successively under the two regimes—peace and war—those two states which share equally the juridical life of peoples. The notion of peace is simple and well-known, and needs no definition; it is the normal situation of states. A state is at peace when it is not at war with anyone, and when it is not troubled in its tranquillity, that is, in its enjoyment of its sovereign rights by the violence which another would exercise against it.

It is from this point of view of the state that we consider peace, and not from the point of view of an international society. We mean by this that peace does not appear as a condition of the international community—the tranquillity of a social order—but as an individual condition, and the non-troubled possession of subjective rights. Like the messenger of ancient Rome, the sovereign state always cloaks peace and war under the folds of its mantle; they belong to her, and they depend on her. Of course, peace is also conditioned by external factors; from the outside come the dangers which menace peace, or the guarantees which protect it. But the menaces imperil the duration of peace, and the guarantees give it security; the menaces do not constitute war, nor do the guar-

antees constitute peace. If there existed an international community which constituted a body, of which the several states were the organic parts, peace would result from the organisation of this society and would confound itself with the functioning of its institutions; but this society does not exist. The states are sovereign, and the law which regulates their contacts has for its essential end the assurance to each of the enjoyment of its liberty. Peace is the tranquillity of an order where sovereign rights are not subject to any restraint or compulsion. It is simple, in this sense that it does not have the complexity of an organic social order; it manifests in the factual order the sovereignty which the political doctrine attributes to the state.

The divisibility of peace is the first consequence of such a conception, by opposition to the indivisibility which the evidence of facts imposes upon us today, and which the League of Nations already recognized. For as long as it does not carry arms against anyone, a state is at peace, without having to worry whether the world surrounding it is at peace or at war. The belligerent state is at war with its adversary, but it remains at peace with all the others; nothing illustrates better than this the partitioning and the fragmentation to which leads the sovereignty of the state. There are as many wars and as many peaces as there are states deciding for the one or the other.

The theory of neutrality, whose development begins in the eighteenth century, and which takes on so much importance in the nineteenth century, consecrates this divisibility of peace. It is its fruit. War, in which two states are engaged, concerns but those two states; the other powers are not formally affected by their decision, if their personal interest does not induce them to intervene in the conflict. Their "neutrality rights" are the foundation for their pretension of reducing to a minimum the inconveniences to them resulting from the war of others, all the while making maximum utilization of the favorable opportunities which it offers to their peaceful commerce.

This peace is an armed peace. The indivisibility of peace entails the disarmament of individual states; its divisibility demands their armament, for this is the condition of their security. If peace is a condition of international society, if it is the tranquillity of the order reigning in its bosom, the security of each results from the functioning of the societal organization. If peace is a condition proper to each sovereign state, it is entrusted to its own vigilance, and its security reposes in itself. The state draws from its own strength the assurance of not being injured, or of being re-established in its rights if these have suffered any attainer. The state relies upon its arms potential to maintain itself at peace.

If the notion of peace seems simple, that of war holds greater difficulties for jurists. As a matter of fact, in the system of modern International Law, these difficulties have brought the jurists to an impasse, and in attempting to escape it they fell into contradiction. It is good that war is viewed in relation to the international juridical order. On the one hand, the *jus in bello* is an important part of International Law. On the other hand, one can not deny that war creates new juridical situations in the heart of the society of states; it confers rights upon them, it delimits their respective spheres, it fixes their frontiers, it resolves their disputes. But, to do all this, it has recourse to force, which is a pure fact. Neither force nor fact belong to the juridical order; this order is rational, and it begins with an ideal conception, for instance the idea of justice. In war, force becomes the *ultima ratio*. But force is not a reason. Therein lies the contradiction introduced in the very heart of the system.

To escape this contradiction, some consider war as a simple fact, but a fact which has juridical consequences. It remains outside of the juridical order, but its consequences belong to this order. Is this an issue that resolves itself in an impasse? To admit that war engenders juridical situations, is to recognize it as a valid means of creating rights. It is, therefore, not just a simple fact, but a means of creating rights, and it remains

to be understood just how a fact of greater force, an irrational thing, can be admitted as a juridical means.

The objection will be raised that this case is not without analogies and that it frequently happens that events which are in themselves pure facts engender juridical situations; thus it is, for example, in the birth or the death of an individual. But it is easy to see that in this case, either the fact is but the condition or occasion of a right or of its exigibility (it is not the death of the *de cuius* which founds the right of the heir, but the will of the deceased or the relative) or it is susceptible of a juridical definition and it is under this formal aspect that it takes its place in the juridical order. The old saw transmitted through generations of lawyers (What is death, as viewed by the Administration of Hospitals? A manner of legitimate departure from the hospital) is but the caricature of a truth. A fact, in its stark reality belongs to several different orders: physical, psychological, juridical; it produces its effect in each order on the condition of its belonging to it. If war determines rights, as would the sentence of a judge, or if it is the foundation of rights, as in the case of an annexation ratified by the peace treaty, it is because in both cases international society accepts the fact that war is a means of creating rights. It sees in war an instrument of the juridical order; it is in this capacity that it resolves disputes, changes legal relations, and legitimatizes possession. In any case, those who believe that war can be considered as a simple fact unanimously recognize that the conduct of war is regulated by International Law, by the *jus in bello*. If there is a legal way of conducting it, it must be licit; there is no legal way of committing a wrong.

Also, does not the most constant doctrine raise the objection that war draws its legality from the principle of state sovereignty? All the authors are forced to admit it, explicitly or implicitly, and the entire system of Classical International Law bears testimony to it. The state having recourse to war makes use of a right, and this right is an attribute of its sovereignty. Ultimate warrantor of justice, but also sole judge of its decisions in those affairs where its interests and

its rights are involved, the state has the power of using force every time that it shall judge it necessary and prudent to do so. Regardless of the conditions regulating recourse to war, such recourse is a right, the greatest of all rights, since it flows directly from sovereignty, and since it is the supreme guarantee of the respect of all. War, therefore, is well integrated in the juridical order, inserted directly, one might say, in the keystone of the edifice which is the sovereignty of the state. But the juridical order pays dearly for this assertion. By recognizing the right of war as an attribute of the sovereignty of the individual state, it admits that a recourse to force which is neither decided upon or controlled by the international community, and which is therefore arbitrary from the viewpoint of that community, is nevertheless legal and legitimate in the eyes of the individual state, since it is the exercise of a right and since it creates of itself new situations of right. Therein lies the contradiction of an asocial act, which is yet recognized as a right, in itself and in its effects.

The first consequence of this doctrine will be to reduce to a legitimate defense all wars which seem founded on right, and few indeed are the peoples and the states capable of resisting this temptation. How can the state, judge of its own cause, not hold as just the ends of its political policy? How, if the state has the absolute worth of a sovereign being, would it not have as many rights as it has vital interests to defend? Moreover, it is never with a light heart that a state decides to have recourse to war—so costly in men and money. If it does so, it is because recourse to force seems necessary to surmount obstacles which prevent it from exercising its rights, or pursuing its essential interests. In its eyes, war will be but the just reaction brought about by the hindrance unduly brought to bear on a legitimate activity. The state will then be conscious of defending itself while attacking. In the eighteenth century Vattel was writing: "The enemy who unjustly attacks me, without a doubt, gives me the right to repel his violence; and whosoever opposes me with his arms when I am demanding

but what is due me, becomes the veritable oppressor by his unjust resistance."

The moralists have favored this confusion by the manner in which they state the problem of war. They have also placed themselves, for the most part, in the position of viewing the state as a moral person, and they have considered war as the means of maintaining and enforcing a state's rights. This subjective point of view is so similar to the one imposed by the theory of the absolute sovereignty of the state that the moralists, when adopting it, have re-enforced a doctrine whose excesses they otherwise reject.

In fact this deformation was inevitable. If the moralists have been able to fix with precision the limits of legitimate individual defense within the framework of the state, it is because, within this framework, the public power has assumed the care of rendering justice and of protecting the lives and the goods of individuals. The right of self-defense for the individual reappears only in the case of the accidental insufficiency or impotency of a society otherwise strongly organized. But to admit that States are sovereign and that the right of war is one of their subjective rights, is to deny the existence of an international society, which would have a monopoly of the defense of rights and of the use of force. It is committing to the individual himself—to the sovereign state—the defense of rights; it is putting one's self outside the conditions allowing for a definition of legitimate defense. That this conception of the right of war leads to an exaggerated confidence in the efficacy of moral philosophy in preventing wars or in humanizing their course may seem paradoxical; yet, are we not even closer to the truth in saying that the doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of the state opened the door to Machiavellism and to arbitrary state policies in general, while closing it to moral philosophy?

It is clear that in arbitrarily separating politics and morals, positivism enlarges the domain of the former to the point of expecting from it services which should have been rendered by Public Law (*le droit public*). Since sovereignty forbids

entrusting the maintenance of the peace to international institutions, which could exercise coercion on the states, and since the obligations of the *jus in bello*, destined to humanize war, result, as all International Law, from conventions freely accepted by the States, it is to their moral sense and their good will that one will have to appeal if we are to have but just wars on this earth, wars conducted according to the rules of humanity. But the realization of this hope has no other guarantee than the individual morality of the states; the conscience of the state is the sole rampart opposing itself to inhuman wars, and this rampart is not strengthened by that which international organization and its social sanctions could add to it. The fate of humanity rests on the sense of justice which the state will manifest. Thus, everything must be done to make the state moral.

Morality will reign according to the degree in which the state is, on the one hand, impregnated with the effluvia of a humanistic and Christian civilization, and, on the other hand, to the degree that its liberty will not be inconvenienced by these preachments. Do not these latter confirm the existence of its sovereign rights by the fact that they try to moralize its exercise? We must also not be surprized if the International Law of this period seems to certain authors richer in moral values than our own, which, as they would have it, has lost its moral and philosophical foundation, has withered and become petrified, and "has favored all the aberrations and all the political crimes."⁴ But the moral philosophy of the modern period has taught the states an individual morality and not a social morality, a morality founded on the mutual respect of their rights and not on the rights of the international society and the demands of the common good. It could not be otherwise in a system founded on the principle of the absolute sovereignty of the state. Events have shown that little confidence is merited in a regime in which peace is protected against war only by the virtue of the states, and where one

⁴ N. Politis, *La morale internationale*, ed. La Baconnière, Neuchâtel, 1943. P. III.

strives through individual morality to attain results that can be obtained solely through the respect of social morality, and where finally, between the sovereign states on the one hand, and war and peace on the other hand, there does not exist the solid reality of an organized international society.

It is this organization which began to make its appearance with the creation of the League of Nations in 1919, and the United Nations in 1945. These mark the end of an era and begin the transition to another. But before leaving the heretofore closed cycle of the former, we must consider what war has really been, independently of the deformed representations which have been given it by the practice and the theories that we have just recalled.

II. TOWARD A DEFINITION OF MODERN WAR

We have already called attention to the fact: the most striking theorists of the classical period hardly mention the international community in their definition of war. They consider war as an armed conflict between two or more states to settle a dispute which has arisen among them, or they consider it as a group of acts by which a state or a people enforce respect for their rights by bearing arms against another. This strictly inter-state and inter-individual conception of war is in harmony with the state of civilization which has given birth to it. As Mr. Erich Hula would have it, the international community considers itself "as a society of equal Nations *superiorem non recognoscentes*,"⁵ a formula which, while it gives exact expression to the thought of a period, nonetheless has a strange ring. What can a society be whose members do not recognize, *de facto*, the superiority of the social body and of the law of the group, if not a contradiction in terms and a phenomenon never before seen in history? Even in a world where states have a thousand reasons to believe themselves independent and sovereign, this conception has not been in

⁵ Erich Hula, "The Revival of the Idea of Primitive War," in *Thought*, Sept. 1946, p. 409.

conformity with reality, and war has been everything but an inter-individual conflict.

One need but observe the facts to become aware of this. They show that every war involves a social will,⁶ that is to say that the belligerent pursues a social end, and that he aims at affecting the status or the state of the international community. To wage a purely defensive war is to seek to maintain an international situation considered as already existing and as having received the sanction of law, since it has already served as a basis for the juridical relations between states. For the state to seek the rectification of a frontier, the opening of new outlets, or the recognition of its independence, is for it to seek to create new situations that are recognized as *de jure* by the community, and that, as such, can assume their place in the international order. Conquering a province does not entail occupying territory and maintaining one's self there by force. Many lands are annexed which were not first occupied by victorious armies; many lands are not annexed though the victor has occupied them. To conquer is to force acceptance of a new international juridical situation; it is to inscribe in a treaty of peace or to have accepted by customary law a new division of state jurisdictions. From Saint Augustine to the contemporary jurists, one hears: the purpose of war is peace. Perhaps Vitoria in the sixteenth century but sought to be more precise in saying: the purpose of war is victory. One can unite the part of truth contained in both aphorisms by saying that the purpose of all war is to establish a statute of the international community which defines in a certain manner the juridical situations of the members of this community. Until this result is obtained, victory is not attained, and peace is not made. The purpose of the war is only realized at the moment when the character of law is socially recognized in those situations defended or created by the belligerent. That is truly the formal object of its undertaking; it is in this sense that the end of all war is societal and statutory.

⁶ We refer the reader to our study: "La notion juridique de la guerre," in *Philosophie*, Cahier III, Ed. du Lévrier, Ottawa (1945), pp. 149 ff.

It may be objected that this is taking an accessory of war for its essential element. The only thing which the belligerent seeks, it is claimed, is to assure himself a personal advantage: to extend himself, to enrich himself, to dominate. The rest he cares very little for, except as a possible means, and he would not trouble to inscribe his new possession in the international statutory order were it not the condition of the peaceful enjoyment of his conquest.

Undoubtedly, but it does not worry him. He is caught in the network of social life and obeys its necessities. The objection confuses the subjective motives of the belligerent and war itself. The belligerent seeks his own interest and he sees in war but a means to serve that interest; but he must for this modify some international relations, relations of force and relations of right, and this is what war does. No one, neither the theologian, moralist, or statesman, neither individually nor collectively, can think of war without reference to the right of war, that is to say, without seeing in war a social and juridical reality, and the use of war by peoples and states shows very well that it is a procedure destined to inscribe a juridical situation in a general international statute. The International Law of the classical period would say: "The state has the right of war because it is sovereign"; but a right, whatever be its foundation, is the power to perform socially valid acts. The right of war is the power to create situations of law in the international community through the use of arms. Continuing: war is one of the means—the ultimate means—of solving international conflicts. But bringing about the solution of conflicts is a social function, of which society acquits itself by the institution of procedures and techniques, varying with the development of the society, as is shown by the history of law.

We might even say that in an international society which recognizes the right of war as an attribute of sovereignty, all the blows exchanged between belligerents have an effect on the entire community; they forge in some way a new order, while they are bringing victory to the stronger or the more fortunate. The neutrals accept the final result of the conflict through

their pledge of neutrality which binds them to practice abstention and impartiality toward the belligerents. Thus, the true nature of war is not that of an inter-individual act, but of a social act, which can not be conceived or defined without an appeal to the idea of an international social order. Even in the anarchical society of the modern period, it is a "procedure," a group of ways and means admitted by society to fulfill a function and to produce effects which, in its eyes, have the sanction of Law.

What is this function? To what social need does this procedure correspond? This is a most important problem. It is because they failed to resolve it that the moralists of the sixteenth century, after having contributed to the birth of International Law, remained without influence on its development and allowed it to orient itself toward state absolutism.

They emphasized only the legal function of war. When Vitoria, for example, recapitulates the motives for a just war and assigns as its end the defense of one's person and one's goods, the recovery of something ravished, and the punishment of an injustice, is it not to the legal function of society that he attaches those of its causes which distinguish it from legitimate defense? Cajetan and Suarez develop an analogous idea: "Whatever were their differences concerning the character of this right, Vitoria and Suarez agreed on its content. Princes have authority not only over their own subjects, but also over foreigners, so far as to prevent them from committing wrongs."⁷ "On the basis of this authority they may commence against the wrong-doing state an aggressive war in order to inflict punishment upon it. On this basis, too, they may, if implicated in a defensive war, punish the aggressor once victory is won. The wrong-doing state is subject to their criminal jurisdiction *ratione delicti*."⁸ The doctrine of the writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries on this point would be in perfect accord with that of the authors of the sixteenth century.⁹

⁷ Vitoria, *De Indis et de Jure Belli Relectiones*, Classics of International Law, Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917, p. 172, par. 19.

⁸ Eric Hula, *op. cit.*, p. 427.

⁹ Cf. Robert Regout, *La doctrine de la guerre juste de St. Augustin à nos jours d'après les théologiens et les canonistes catholiques*, Padone, Paris, 1935, pp. 293-294.

For example the Jesuit Laymann writes: "In the absence of a judge and superior justiciar, the state, or the prince, who himself has, or whose subjects have, suffered any injury, draws from natural law and from the *jus gentium* the competence to judge and to punish crime." Then the Salmanticenses: "aggressive war is a sentence of death which the assaulting Prince pronounces against another Prince." Now, Billuart: "Aggressive war is the supreme act of vindicative justice."¹⁰

There are two reasons to explain the position adopted by the moralists. On the one hand, the lack of profundity of their sociological analysis on this point. The need of a judge is the first need to manifest itself in an embryonic political society,¹¹ and the international society which was before them was in the embryonic phase of its development. On the other hand, the conception of the sovereignty of the state, which they had the tendency to accept along with everyone else of their time, made them tend to absorb the function of war in the judicial function. Since it is admitted that the sovereign state is judge and party in its own proper cause, and that by itself it measures the extent of its rights, it is clear that it decides to go to war only after having judged its claims and after having recognized them as just. Thus, the conviction spreads that all conflicts which provoke a war could, at bottom, be settled by a judge, and that all war is bound up with the exercise of the judicial function.

This is, perhaps, the gravest of the errors common to this whole period in the matter of war and peace. Admittedly, it is true that the striving toward justice has at times induced peoples and leaders to unleash war, but it is an error to think that in a society this striving can only be satisfied by a judge;

¹⁰ R. Regout, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

¹¹ "Law is born of judicial law, litigation is its root," writes Cornelutti. However, the author pushes truth to the point of paradox when he adds: "(Of the) four pieces of the (political) machine one alone is truly essential: the judge. The legislator and the administrator may be left out without compromising law. Even the police function can be exercised by the judge. These three organs are certainly useful, but not necessary: only the judge is necessary. . . . Even when the legislator is above him, the judge always remains the cell of the State." Francesco Cornelutti, *La Guerre et la Paix*, Rome, Azienda Libreria Italiana, 1945, pp. 64, 60.

the legislative and the police functions are also called into play. Modern war is more often a legislative procedure and an executive procedure than it is a judicial procedure. It is a polyvalent procedure; not only does it make up for the absence of a judge, but also for the absence of a legislator and of an executive organ.

Thus, the peace treaty which puts an end to the war is not a bilateral contract which determines on a commutative basis the situation of the signatory States. It is a treaty-law *par excellence*. To change the frontiers of a state is to institute a new division of state territories valid for the entire community. To impose economic or financial burdens on a state, to regulate its armaments, to intervene in the rule of its minorities, is to establish a judicial order which is an integral part of that of the international community, and which refers itself at least implicitly to some political principle generally recognized by society: the principle of equilibrium, the right of self-determination, the right of conquest, the interdependence of peace and of democratic institutions, international security, the rights of the human person, etc. . . . Notably, the wars which have been waged as civilization grew: the Thirty Years' War, the wars of the French Revolution, that of 1914, and that of 1939, were followed by treaties which inaugurated a veritable new constitutional order analogous to the one instituted by the constituents in the heart of the particular states. Likewise, the revision of treaties is an international legislative work. If clauses that have been inapplicable or unsatisfying provoke war, the latter evidently fills in the absence of legislative organs which could have peaceably corrected the lapsed treaty-law. Every time that war has as an end the making of law rather than the pronouncing upon it, the modification of law rather than the enforced application of it, it is the *ultima ratio* of a legislative procedure. Due to the lack of qualified organs to make law, social need manifests itself in a *conflict* which brings to grips the states most directly interested, and the war which will resolve the conflict is a procedure of legislative substitution.

Other wars have the manifest character of a police task. The international community maintains in its bosom a public order which is as necessary to it as it is to the state, but unlike the state, it does not have differentiated organs, a police force, for instance, capable of imposing by force the exterior order necessary to society. Because the police or executory function is not fulfilled, the states that are the victims of international disorders array themselves against the disturbers, and at the same time as they protect their interests, they assume functions which, in an organized society, would devolve to the forces of international society. There is no doubt, as we see things, that the intervention in September, 1939, of Great Britain and France in favor of Poland, victim of an aggression following upon the assaults made upon European public order by the Hitlerian policies, had in its origin and in certain of its aspects, the character of an experiment in international policing.

One can say without paradox that less and less frequently does war fill in in the absence of judicial organs. If the international disputes seeking to be resolved by the application of law are numerous, they are not the ones which today carry the greatest threat of war. In these cases, law exists; it need only be affirmed. It is the normal work of the judge or the referee to do so. A conflict contains the elements of a trial; it is only a question of setting forth the cause of action and bringing it to an international tribunal. Due to the lack of appropriate organs, war still seems to be the *ultima ratio* of justice and akin to an armed plea, but it is in this domain that international organization has made its most manifest progress. In conflicts between states, it has become classic to distinguish between differences in the juridical order, in which the warring parties mutually contest a right, and differences in the political order. Disputes of the first type normally go to a judge or a referee, and the progress of legal means, particularly those of arbitration and of judicial ruling, by assuring the parties a peaceful solution, renders less likely recourse to war by either of the parties. Who would, however, dare to say that today war is still not a final method of pleading in the international forum?

We can see how erroneous was the method used by the doctrine of the classical period. Taking as the point of departure for its considerations the independent state, deducing from its sovereignty the existence of a right to war, asking the moralists then to determine the conditions in which this right may be exercised, all this could not bring about satisfactory results. As a matter of fact, this method brought about bad results in the main. Even in this period, the states lived in society. If the dogma of sovereignty had not led minds astray, they would have recognized that war was a procedure, to which was attached a triple function of substitution—legislative, judicial, and executive. The initial error, common to statesmen, jurists, and moralists, pertains to the nature of international society, whose organic character was misunderstood to the profit of the sovereignty of the states. This error led to a misunderstanding of the true nature of war, and this second deformation of truth constrained International Law to accept the contradictions that we have pointed out above. War, a social procedure, was considered as the exercise of a subjective right by the state, a sovereign person, all the while it fulfilled a social function. Polyvalent, it has been considered monovalent and bound up essentially with the judicial function. In these conditions, moral philosophy has found itself incapable of supplying the principles of justice which must serve as the basis of peace. It sought it in individual justice, whereas it should have been seeking it in social justice and in societal organization.

The modern period ends with the unleashing of the war of 1914. Two documents already mark the steps accomplished in the course of the new period: the League of Nations Pact and the United Nations Charter. What modification do they bring to the judicial and sociological conception of war?

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(To be continued)

HOPE AND CHARITY IN ST. THOMAS

[Conclusion]

III. AFTER ST. THOMAS

MANY modern theologians do not conceive the disinterestedness of charity in the same way as did St. Thomas and St. Augustine before him. To-day, and for some time past, theologians tend to exclude from charity all self-regarding love and to bar from it not only the desire or intention to acquire anything created from charity but also the will for union of God, our last end and final beatitude. In this view, surrender to God only would constitute the pure love of charity, while love of desire of God would belong to hope. This is commonly stated as follows: the formal object of charity is the absolute goodness of God, *bonitas Dei absoluta*; the formal object of hope is God's relative goodness, *bonitas Deo relativa*, God good in Himself, or God good for us, respectively. Where did this swerving from St. Thomas's doctrine and from the traditional teaching set in? How did it succeed in becoming wide-spread as it did? The answer to these questions will further illustrate St. Thomas's teaching on hope and charity.

It is Scotus who began the new conception of hope and charity, or at any rate who built up a systematic theory of it, though he had some precursors in the originators and exponents of the ecstatic theory of love and charity. And it is mainly Suarez who is responsible for spreading the new conception. We must then consider the theories of Scotus and Suarez on hope and charity, always from the angle of the particular problem we are studying: whether the desire of God is hope or charity. After exposing and criticizing their theories, we shall briefly indicate some authors of the Thomist tradition,

and lastly point to the present-day return to the traditional positions.

1. SCOTUS AND SUAREZ ON HOPE

In his *Opus Oxoniense*, Scotus, after enumerating different views and theories on hope, exposes his own: "I say that hope is a theological virtue, one and distinct from faith and charity. This can be proved this way. We experience in ourselves an act of this kind, namely, to desire that the infinite Good be in us as our good, and this through God giving Himself to us in liberality; not, it is true, as a first move on His part, but on account of something else that is agreeable to Him and that is directed to this self-giving of God, as on account of merit. Such an act is good, because it is vested with the required circumstances. There can, therefore, exist a virtue that inclines to it" (And this is hope).¹⁵⁹

For Scotus, then, hope is the virtue that inclines to desire the infinite Good as our own good, that is, the desire for God, giving Himself to us in liberality, on account of merit. Its act we know from experience. It is a good or virtuous act. It is also theological, "because it regards God as its immediate object. For, all other formalities that are added to the object do not take away the nature of the object, insofar as it is object. In fact, the circumstance that I desire the object for myself, or for such or such a person, does not do away with the fact that I desire it as an object. Consequently that on which the act of hope bears, is the infinite and eternal Good. Hope, therefore, is a theological virtue."¹⁶⁰ So, the fact that I desire the infinite Good for myself does not, according to Scotus, affect the theological character of this desire, because its object is God. And it is not true to say that, "to desire

¹⁵⁹ 3 *Sent.* d. 26, q. un., 10, Dico quod spes est virtus theologica unica et distincta a fide et caritate. Quod persuadetur sic: experimur in nobis hunc actum, scilicet, desiderare bonum infinitum in esse nobis bonum, et hoc a Deo seipsum nobis liberaliter conferente; non quidem primo, sed propter aliquid acceptum sibi ordinatum ad illud ut propter merita. . . .

¹⁶⁰ *Loc. cit.*, 11, Quia respicit Deum pro obiecto immediate, nam per omnia alia quae adduntur ipsi obiecto, non tollitur ratio obiecti. . . .

a good for myself changes the formal *ratio* of the object, because it transforms an honest good into a useful one.”¹⁶¹ Because, “to desire something for myself expresses only a relation to the will. . . . that is, a respect of reason . . .”;¹⁶² and of such a respect it can be said that it is caused in God when I desire that the infinite Good be good for me. That is, the desire of God as my own good means in God only a relation of pure reason, *respectus rationis*, not a real change, nothing real. It does not therefore change the nature of the formal object.

That this theological desire of God is neither charity nor faith, and therefore is hope, Scotus proves in this manner: “To desire that the infinite Good should be my own good, is not a love of friendship; nor is it the most exalted act, because the object exists in a more exalted manner in itself than in another, or when compared with something different from itself. Consequently, the act of desire which we have proved to exist above, is not an act of charity” (which is only love of friendship and its most exalted act).¹⁶³ Scotus’ reason, therefore, for saying the desire of union with God is not charity, is that charity is only love of friendship and the most noble love in man. We shall examine this conception of charity later. Now we note only this: because there is no room within the virtue of charity for the desire of God as our good, and because there is a desire of God which is a theological act, hope must be the theological virtue by which we seek union with God as our supreme Good.

In previous remarks Scotus had proved, mainly by refuting the traditional teaching on hope, that the additional formalities of the object of hope, an absent or arduous good, “do not suffice to specify a virtue”; thus against Henry of Ghent who placed hope in the irascible part of the will. The notion of arduous, Scotus argues, can have no meaning except as “a

¹⁶¹ *Loc. cit.*, 13, *Desiderare mihi bonum non variat formalem rationem obiecti.*

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, *Quia desiderare mihi non dicit nisi respectum voluntatis . . . i.e. respectum rationis tantum.*

¹⁶³ *Loc. cit.*, 15, *Desiderare bonum infinitum esse bonum meum, non est amor amicitiae, nec est nobilissimus . . . igitur istud desiderare non est actus caritatis.*

valuable and appreciable good, that is, lovable to the extent that it surpasses all that is contrary to it." But this, he says, is exactly the object of charity, which virtue "regards God under the aspect of appreciable, because it regards Him under the aspect of infinite Good."¹⁶⁴

This conception of hope, opposed to the doctrine of both St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas (and Scotus is not unaware of it),¹⁶⁵ has not only been accepted in the Franciscan school that follows Scotus, but it has also made its way into many modern schools of theology, owing especially to the influence of Suarez who has adopted the Scotist view on hope and read it into some texts of St. Thomas.

We find Suarez's idea of hope in his *Questiones Disputatae De Spe*, where he treats of the formal object of hope. After mentioning two theories which he rejects in full or in part, he continues: "A third opinion asserts that the object of hope is God as the supreme Good lovable with a love of desire and, so to speak, to the advantage of the lover."¹⁶⁶ This, he says, is held by St. Thomas but he is aware that many followers of St. Thomas do not understand his texts in that sense ("whatever others may say"). He tells us that this idea is more clearly expressed in Scotus, (3 *Sent.* d. 26 and 27).¹⁶⁷

The main reason why this desire of God as our Good, although supernatural and theological, is not charity, Suárez states thus: "That this love is distinct from the the love of charity is evident, because one is a love of desire, the other a love of friendship."¹⁶⁸ That is, because charity is only love of friendship, not love of desire. We shall presently consider further this idea of charity. Suarez is aware that his idea of hope is not traditional. He himself formulates the objection: "This

¹⁶⁴ *Loc. cit.*, 6, Bonum absens arduum non sufficit ad specificandam virtutem.

¹⁶⁵ *Loc. cit.*, 19, Contra viam istam quae ponit desiderare actum spei, arguo . . .

¹⁶⁶ Suarez, *Q. Disp. De Spe*, sect. 3. c. 4, Tertia sententia asserit obiectum spei esse Deum ut summum bonum amabile amore concupiscentiae, quasi commodum amantis.

¹⁶⁷ *Loc. cit.*, Quidquid alii dicant; clarius Scotus.

¹⁶⁸ *Loc. cit.*, Quod hic amor sit distinctus ab amore caritatis, patet quia alter est concupiscentiae, alter amicitiae.

seems to be against the common way of conceiving hope. Hope is wont to be defined as the expectation of the future beatitude: this is evident from the Magister (in 2 Sent. dist. 26); but to expect is not the same as to desire." He answers: "I deny that hope, though in reality the same thing as desire, can not be called expectation, as in fact it is called. Rather, if we pay attention to the ordinary way of conceiving, we shall see that to expect something is nothing else but to desire that it comes, supposing the judgment that it will come."¹⁶⁹ Suarez endeavors to explain away the difference between desire and expectation, and thus to reconcile his idea with the traditional one. Does he succeed in this?

To the objection, also met by Scotus, that the arduous good is the object of hope, Suarez replies that the arduousness belongs to hope but not as its formal object or "the reason why one tends to such object," but only as a condition.¹⁷⁰ And so, the formal object of the theological virtue of hope is God "as He is our supreme Good";¹⁷¹ and here lies the difference between hope and charity. It is therefore not God's omnipotence.¹⁷² This idea of hope, of both Scotus and Suarez, is intimately linked up with their conception of charity as excluding the love of desire of God.

2. SCOTUS AND SUAREZ ON CHARITY

Scotus calls charity the "habitual *supreme* love"; and since the love of friendship is *superior* to the love of desire, charity naturally inclines to love with a love of friendship, and not with the more imperfect love of desire.¹⁷³ How then does Scotus conceive this love of friendship so as to exclude from

¹⁶⁹ *Loc. cit.*, 12, Videtur esse contra communem modum concipiendi de spe: solet enim definiri expectatio futurae beatitudinis . . . expectare autem non est desiderare.

¹⁷⁰ *Loc. cit.*, 15, Ut conditio vel occasio.

¹⁷¹ *Loc. cit.*, 20, Deus ut est summum bonum nostrum.

¹⁷² *Loc. cit.*, 21.

¹⁷³ Cf. Scotus, 3 *Sent.* d. 26, q. un., 17, Caritas est suprema virtus affective . . . amor autem amicitiae est simpliciter perfectior amore concupiscentiae, igitur caritas inclinatur ad amandum simpliciter amore amicitiae.

charity all love of desire? He states that the distinction between charity and hope lies in this; hope desires the good of the lover insofar as it is his profit; charity tends to the object in itself and would tend to it even when—an impossible supposition—the object did not bring any advantage to the lover. Charity is the virtue that perfects the will insofar as the will possesses the affection of justice; hope perfects the will according to its affection of advantage.¹⁷⁴ In other words, charity loves the Other as other; hope desires the other as one's own.

The reason why charity excludes the love of desire, or the self-regard that seeks the lover's profit, is because "it regards God under the aspect of the most perfect loveableness"; and for that reason its formal object can not be God "as beatifying Good."¹⁷⁵ Nor can you say that charity includes in its formal object, next to the infinite goodness considered in itself, the aspect of beatifying good, because, "it is not possible that there be a twofold object of one and the same act."¹⁷⁶ But does not love of friendship seek for union with the friend? Scotus' answer must be weighed. When determining the formal object (*ratio obiectiva*) of the act of charity, he considers this object in three ways: 1) as the object that terminates the act (*ratio terminandi*); this is God in Himself (*ratio Dei in se*) in no way considered under some relative aspect or other; 2) as the object of the act that invites to love, prior to and provoking the act of love; this is God "insofar as He is a convenient good that communicates itself to the lover," that is, God considered as the desirable good of the lover; 3) as the object that in a way gives the act of charity its completeness, without specifying it; this is God "as the beatifying good

¹⁷⁴ 3 *Sent.* d. 27, q. un., 2, Haec virtus (caritas) distincta est . . . similiter a spe, quia actus eius non est concupiscere bonum amanti, inquantum est commodum amantis, sed tendere in obiectum secundum se, etiamsi per impossibile circumscriberetur ab eo commoditas eius ad amantem. Hanc virtutem perficientem voluntatem, inquantum habet affectionem iustitiae, voco caritatem.

¹⁷⁵ Cf. *loc. cit.*, 5.

¹⁷⁶ *Loc. cit.*, 6, Eiusdem actus non videtur duplex formalis ratio obiectiva.

of the lover.”¹⁷⁷ For Scotus, therefore, what is the proper act of charity has for its formal object God in Himself without any consideration of a relation to the lover. This act is preceded by what attracts man to love God in that way, that is, God as desirable, and it is followed or accompanied by what crowns the act of charity, God as beatifying object. These last two aspects of the object of charity do not enter its formal act. The first of them leads to the act of charity, but it is not that act itself. The second is following the act of charity, it is no longer itself an act of charity. These two aspects may belong to the formal object of charity in a broad sense, as conditions that will always go together with it, and without which charity could not exist. But they do not make the act of charity what it is.

Scotus's explanation of the love of self which belongs to the virtue of charity confirms this idea. In the very act of love of self through charity, man tends towards another; “In this act of love man tends to another, because he tends to God as to the principal object of his act; yet he really loves himself out of charity, though not as final object, but as a proximate object directed to the last object that is distinct from it.”¹⁷⁸ The other, as other, is the formal object of charity. In further explanation of this idea he says, “The acts by which I love my neighbor and myself are reflex acts through the medium of which I tend to the infinite good that is God.”¹⁷⁹ They are the secondary acts of charity. One object only, God, is loved first, as good in itself; then charity “wishes that He be loved and in love possessed by any one else, as far as charity

¹⁷⁷ *Loc. cit.*, 7, Ratio obiectiva actus caritatis et habitus, potest intelligi tripliciter. Vel prima, quae secundum se accepta nata est per se esse ratio terminandi; vel secunda, quae est aliqua ratio praecedens actum, propter quem natus est actus elici circa obiectum; vel tertia, quae quasi concomitatur. Prima ratio est proprie ratio obiectiva et non alia, stricte loquendo, et haec ratio obiectiva est ratio Dei in se.

¹⁷⁸ *3 Sent.* d. 29, q. un., 2, In hac dilectione tendit in alterum, quia in Deum tamquam in principale obiectum actus.

¹⁷⁹ *3 Sent.* d. 28, q. un., 2, Actus reflexi . . . mediantibus quibus tendo in infinitum bonum quod est Deus.

goes; because the perfect and well-ordered love of God consists in that; and by wishing this, I love myself, and my neighbor."¹⁸⁰ So, it is precisely because the love of God in Himself requires that I desire Him to be loved and possessed in love by all, that charity implies secondarily the love of myself and of my neighbor; but the formal reason of this love is God, not my advantage. What is willed in it, is not the possession of God in *my* good; that would be the affection of advantage (*affectio commodi*). What is willed is that God be loved and possessed by all as He should be, "that is simply the goodness proper to justice."¹⁸¹ And so, "in the same act I wish for God and wish you to wish for God, and in this precisely I love you out of charity, because by it I wish you the good proper to justice."¹⁸²

These secondary elements of charity, extrinsic to what is formally its act, differ from the love of desire which is hope. They are not a love of desire; the aspect under which they view the object of the self-regarding love, is God Himself, the other as such. In hope, the aspect viewed in the object of the self regarding love is the appeasing and beatifying power of the possession of God. Advantage (*commodum*) and justice (*iustitia*) express, according to Scotus, the two different formal objects of hope and charity.¹⁸³

When asking under which formal aspect God is object of charity, Suarez, less subtly and more unmistakably than Scotus, states what has become the more common opinion of modern theologians. The formal object of charity is God "under the aspect of the supreme Good lovable for its own sake."¹⁸⁴ The moderns express this by saying, "the absolute goodness of

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.* Velle eum diligere et per dilectionem haberi a quocumque.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.* quod est bonum simpliciter iustitiae.

¹⁸² *Loc. cit.* 3.

¹⁸³ Scotus hardly analyses the aspect of the theological virtues by which they are essentially the principles of our supernatural finality, of our effective orientation to God as our supernatural end. This idea of the end comes in at most as a side-consideration, whilst for St. Thomas it constitutes the central reality of the theological virtue as such, and of charity in particular.

¹⁸⁴ Suarez, *Tr. 3 De Caritate*, disp. 1, sect. 2, Sub qua ratione formali Deus sit obiectum caritatis. Sub ratione summi boni, propter se amabilis.

God." Its difference from the object of the love of hope or of desire is plain: hope loves God "as the supreme good of the lover," charity loves Him "for His own sake."¹⁸⁵

Yet, the love of benevolence which is the proper love of charity, though it does not tend to its object as to the good of the lover, requires and seeks some union between the lover and the beloved. "Hence it further follows that the object of benevolence or well-wishing, though it is loved for its own sake, yet is loved in such a manner, that at the same time union with this object is sought. For that belongs to the perfection of friendship."¹⁸⁶ Charity, then, which loves God in Himself, and not as the good of the lover, seeks union with Him, because this union is the connatural perfection of friendship. Is this desire of union with God a love of desire? And if so, is it an act of charity different from the act of hope? Suarez does not explicitly answer this question.

We find some indications, however, when he explains the love of self which charity commands. Of this latter he says, "Charity after the love of God, inclines more to love the lover himself (than anything else)."¹⁸⁷ And he explains: "The formal object of charity is to incline the man in whom it resides to the love of God and to unite man with God. Consequently in the primary inclination of charity is included to some extent a relation to the lover himself."¹⁸⁸ Charity seeks union with God, because it can not love God in Himself without seeking this union. But it does not seek this union as the good of the lover, but for God's sake. For we read: "The proper act of charity is to love God Himself, that is, so that the love by which God is loved as our good, is excluded from it. For, although this love is right, it is not elicited by

¹⁸⁵ *Loc. cit.*, for hope, ut summum bonum diligentis; charity, diligit Deum propter se.

¹⁸⁶ *Loc. cit.* 6, Hinc fit ulterius ut obiectum benevolentiae, quamvis propter se ametur ita tamen amari, ut simul appetatur coniunctio et unio cum tali obiecto: hoc enim requiritur ad perfectionem amicitiae.

¹⁸⁷ *Loc. cit.*, sect. 4, 8.

¹⁸⁸ *Loc. cit.*, Rursus effectus formalis caritatis est inclinare hominum, in quo est, ad Dei dilectionem, et coniungere hominem Deo.

charity, as is clear from the theory of hope.”¹⁸⁹ For Suarez, as for Scotus, to seek union with God as our own good, is hope, not charity. The formal reason why God is loved in charity and why union with Him is sought through charity, is “the good of God, stopping at that,” that is, not considered as our good.

When dealing with the question, “Whether the intention of obtaining a reward is sufficient for strict merit, or rather opposed to it,” Suarez has to answer the objection, that to work for a reward is a mercenary love, whilst “charity loves God for Himself and directs all other good to him for His glory.”¹⁹⁰ In answering he shows how the love of charity in one way excludes and in another includes the desire for union with God. “Man can wish beatitude for himself from a love of charity for God for His own sake, and he can try to obtain it through his works: because by loving for himself the good of the beatitude as his proximate object, he does not exclude the relation it has to God as to the last end.”¹⁹¹ Such a desire of the eternal reward is virtually an act of charity for God: “Finally we can say this: by the very fact that a just man by working in a right and virtuous manner, intends the eternal reward, he has as his first intention, virtually at least, the glory of God, because all that he wishes tends to the glory of God and is directed to God as its last end.”¹⁹² But this desire of the eternal reward that is included in, and is only a form of, the love of charity or of the love of God in Himself, is not the same as the love of desire which is hope. Hope looks for the reward of the kingdom of God out of a love of desire; charity, on the

¹⁸⁹ *Loc. cit.*, disp. 2, sect. 1, 1, Ut excludatur is amor, quo amatur Deus ut bonum nostrum, nam licet sit honestus, non est tamen a caritate elicitus, ut ex materia de spe constat.

¹⁹⁰ *De Gratia*, lib. 12, c. 12, Utrum intentio obtinendi praeium sit sufficiens vel necessaria ad meritum de condigno, vel potius illi repugnet.

¹⁹¹ *Loc. cit.* 6, Imo potest homo ex amore caritatis Dei propter ipsum velle sibi beatitudinem, et illam per opera sua procurare.

¹⁹² *Loc. cit.* 14, Eo ipso quod iustas, operando debito et honesto modo, mercedem intuetur aeternam, imprimis etiam intendere, saltem virtualiter, ut glorificetur Deus.

contrary, looks for it "for the sake of God's glory and out of love of friendship of God."¹⁹³

For Suarez, then, as for Scotus, charity is love of God for His own sake, love of benevolence or friendship; it includes a desire of union with God, not for man's sake, but for God's sake. This desire of union is not a love of desire (*amor concupiscentiae*) but only a form of the love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*).¹⁹⁴

3. CRITICISM OF THE NEW IDEAS

It is time to consider the Scotist-Suarezian¹⁹⁵ ideas on hope and charity and to contrast them with the teaching of St. Thomas. Hope, according to Scotus-Suarez, is formally the desire of God or of the infinite good as one's own supreme good. It is the love of desire, or of concupiscence, which is theological or has as its formal object God Himself, not a created goodness; but it is essentially directed to God as one's own good, not as He is good in Himself.

Charity, on the other hand, is formally the love of friendship or of benevolence which loves God for His own sake, not for the relation He may have to the individual. It is the love of God as the other, formally as He is good in Himself, not as He is good to the individual. Yet, charity does not exclude the volition of union with God. The new conception does admit in charity a desire of union. But this desire of union does not preceed from a love of desire, but from the love of benevolence or of friendship. It necessarily proceeds from this friendship because the love of God in Himself presupposes

¹⁹³ *Loc. cit.* 10, Propter gloriam Dei et ex amore iustitiae ipsius.

¹⁹⁴ We may note here for Suarez, as we did for Scotus, the almost complete absence of the teleological or finalistic viewpoint in the explanation of the theological virtues. We shall note further what this implies as differing from St. Thomas' conception.

¹⁹⁵ In this critical estimate of the new ideas we shall neglect the accidental differences between the Scotist and the Suarezian positions, and mainly consider the new conception as it has been proposed by Suarez. We may call it, however, the Scotist-Suarezian conception, as Scotus was undoubtedly the originator of it in Scholasticism and Suarez himself, as we have noted, bases his doctrine on Scotus.

or brings with it the desire of the return of love, or of God as beatifying good. Accordingly, this union with God is desired only out of benevolence for God. The formal aspect, or the inspiration, of this desire remains love of God for His own sake. It is a disinterested desire. There is a desire of union with God which is theological and flows from the love of desire of God, or from the love of our own supreme good. But this is hope, not charity.

The new conception, therefore, knows two kinds of desire for union with God, and the radical difference between the two lies in this: the desire for union with God that belongs to charity has for its formal reason or motive, or formal object, God in Himself, God's glory, God's absolute goodness. It is benevolence for God, friendship for God, selfless love of God. Of the desire for union with God that springs from hope the formal reason is God as the individual's own supreme good, that is, God's relative goodness, a love of desire or of concupiscence which essentially regards the good of the lover.

The new conception differs from St. Thomas with regard to the particular problem we are studying, in this, that it admits a twofold (theological) desire of union with God, of which it refers one to hope and the other to charity.¹⁹⁶ Does this involve a real difference in the conception of these two theological virtues? For hope the difference is apparent. Scotus-Suarez conceive hope as essentially a desire of God as our supreme good. In this they depart from St. Thomas for whom hope is not a love of desire but a reliance on God's helping omnipotence with a view to attain the heavenly beatitude.

For charity, the difference between the two conceptions is less plain. Both hold that charity, love of friendship for God, brings with it a desire of union with Him. For Scotus-Suarez this desire is not a love of concupiscence or of desire which

¹⁹⁶ St. Thomas, as noted, also views the desire for union with God, involved in charity, from different aspects, for example, as a wish for the return of the Friend's love, or as attainment of the last end. But these do not constitute different kinds of desire.

would seek God as our own supreme good, but a concomitant or antecedent to the love of friendship that can not exist without a desire of union; it is distinct from what is formally the act of charity for God, or love of God in Himself, but it is inspired by this very love; it remains altruistic. For St. Thomas, the desire of union with God that is necessarily found in charity, is a real love of desire of God, or a love of God as our own good (which love Scotus-Suarez call hope), and this is the secondary but necessary act of charity. Is this double way of conceiving and naming the desire of union with God that is found in charity more than a difference in words? The question comes to this: Is the desire of union with God which Scotus-Suarez include in charity really different from the love of desire which St. Thomas considers as the secondary act of charity (but Scotus-Suarez consider as hope)?

Scotus-Suarez undoubtedly say there is a difference between these two kinds of desire of union with God. One is inspired by a self regarding love or a search for our own good, and is hope; the other is charity and animated by the disinterested love of God which is not possible without a desire for this union. For the Thomist conception, the desire of union included in charity is formally an act of self-regarding love though subordinate to the primary act of charity, to the love of benevolence.

The radical difference of inspiration which underlies the two conceptions is evidently the double idea of love which, since Fr. Rousselot's essay, *On the Problem of Love in the Middle Ages*,¹⁹⁷ has been known as the ecstatic and physical theory of love. In the first, which inspires Scotus-Suarez's teaching, love for a person and for God is based on altruism; it is essentially the volition of the other as other, affection of justice. In the second theory, which is St. Thomas', love is based on unity, and we love the other (in charity also) because he is our good; we love God more than ourselves because He is more our good than we are ourselves. Scotus called this the affection of advantage or profit. Does this difference in the

¹⁹⁷ P. Rousselot, *Pour l'histoire du problème de l'amour au Moyen-Age*, in Bäumker's *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, 6 (1906).

underlying concept of love objectively differentiate the desire of union which Scotus-Suarez on the one hand, and St. Thomas on the other, allow in charity?

To answer the above question we must contrast the love of desire of God in which Scotus-Suarez see the essential act of hope (and St. Thomas the secondary act of charity) with the desire of union with God which they allow in charity. Both desires are the same *materialiter*, in the sense that both are a volition of union with the infinite good, God Himself. The formal aspects are said to be different; in hope it is a desire of one's own good, self-regarding love; in charity it is a desire of the good of the other, a disinterested love. Does this difference in the viewpoint, the infinite good considered in itself, or as my supreme good, constitute a difference in the formal objects of the acts and thus in reality, so that one can be hope and the other charity?

Yes, there would be a difference in the formal objects of the acts, if a dissociation between both viewpoints is possible, that is, if the one does not of necessity imply the other. No, there can be no difference in the formal objects and in the reality of things, if the conscious intention of the one necessarily implies the unexpressed but really present intention of the other. If the desire of union with God for God's sake, sought out of love of benevolence, necessarily goes together with the desire of union with God as with our own supreme good, so that the intention of the first is inseparable from the other, then the difference in viewpoint between the two desires of union is merely apparent and not real.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁸ We may illustrate this remark with an example of a similar indissociable connection between two intentions, in the condemnation by Pope Pius XII, in an allocution to the Italian Lenten preachers, 22 February 1944 (cf. *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, 1944, p. 73), of some new errors about the nature of mortal sin. Some pretend that there is a real mortal sin only when a commandment is transgressed with the express intention of offending God; otherwise, though the act is a sin against the precept, it would not entail the loss of the supernatural life. The Pope condemns this unequivocally. The faith and theology teach, he says, that every sin is an offence of God and does intend to offend God, because the inherent intention of a grave fault goes against God's will whose commandment it violates.

Now, it is not difficult to show, on Thomistic principles, that the love of benevolence which inspires the desire for union of the Scotist-Suarezian conception of charity, is inseparable from the love of desire for God which St. Thomas includes in charity. The conscious intention or neglect of the latter makes no difference in reality, since it will of its nature be implicated in the other. Union with God as supreme good is nothing but the attainment of the last supernatural end. *Finis et bonum convertuntur*. The attainment of the final end necessarily implies a double aspect: the aspect of the object or of the end, and in this regard union with God is surrender to Him; it is a love of God in Himself, as the absolute good; the union is sought for God's sake, commanded by the love of benevolence. This is the more fundamental act of charity. The other is the aspect of the subject who attains the end, and from this angle union with God is attainment of one's supreme good; it is a love of God as our own good; the union is sought for our sake, by a love of desire. Which-ever way we consider the union with God, one aspect is inseparable from the other, one is necessarily virtually implied in the other. The explicit consideration or non-consideration of one of the two aspects, logically and by nature inseparable, makes no difference as to their presence or absence. Union with God of its nature involves both an altruistic aspect, surrender to God, and a self-regarding one, possession of God. The twofold union with God as conceived by Scotus-Suarez, is in fact one and the same reality, viewed from its two different and inseparable angles.

Since this so, the Scotist-Suarezian concept of hope and charity rests on the false assumption that a theological self-regarding love of God is possible without a love of benevolence, when they conceive hope as a love of desire of God.¹⁹⁹ Their concept of charity rests on the false assumption that pure love of benevolence for God is possible without being at the

¹⁹⁹ The desire of God is supposed to be theological (whether it be conceived as charity or as hope). It may be well to recall this, for herein lies the reason why it is inseparable from charity.

same time a desire for union with Him as with our own supreme Good or last end.²⁰⁰ Psychologically in the explicit consciousness each of these two acts of love of God may *appear* isolated from the other; in reality, because of the necessary implications of each of these acts, their separation is impossible. And so the difference in the explication of viewpoints before a reality which is the attainment of the last end produces no objective difference. Union with God is both the supreme surrender and the supreme enrichment, and it can not but be both these realities inseparably.

But then the Scotist-Suarezian idea of hope is unacceptable because the love of desire of God, when it is theological, can not exist without the love of benevolence, that is, without charity.²⁰¹ As to the altruistic desire of God which they allow in charity, either this is a real and objective volition of union with God, and then, whatever view one takes of it, it is a love of desire of God as our own supreme good. It is self-regarding, though (and this is the element of truth in the Scotist-Suarezian insistence on the disinterested character of charity) this aspect is subordinate to the deeper reality of charity which is surrender. Or the desire of union is altruistic to the point that one excludes from it the enrichment following on the acquisition of our own supreme good; then we face a contradiction in terms essentially identical to the impossible desires expressed by some Saints²⁰² who declared themselves ready to be sent to hell for love of God provided only they could continue to love and serve Him there. In this latter explanation charity becomes irrational and unintelligible—or impossible. In the former, we come back to St. Thomas's

²⁰⁰ Scotus excludes this desire of union from the formal act of charity when he states that God as beatifying object can not fall within the formal object of charity.

²⁰¹ At least when this desire is not *informis* or imperfect. For, as repeatedly pointed out, the imperfect desire that is presupposed in hope can and does exist without charity.

²⁰² About these impossible desires, cf. J. Farges and M. Viller, *Dict. de Spir.* 2, 536-37 and J. de Guibert, *Etudes de Théologie Mystique* (Toulouse 1930), p. 250, n. 20.

concept of charity which is primarily a love of friendship and secondarily but necessarily a love of desire.

It should be sufficiently clear now that at the origin of the ideas on hope and charity lies a shifting of viewpoint from the ontological plane, where St. Thomas used to see and study hope and charity in their objective reality, to the psychological field where to Scotus and Suarez (as to any one else) desire and love appear distinct from and opposed to each other as interested and disinterested love, and therefore as separable.²⁰³ But the appearance of charity on the conscious level as a disinterested love of God to whom we surrender all, including ourselves, does not reveal the whole reality of it. This reality can be adequately expressed in metaphysical terms only; it is the volition of the last end. Psychologically this appears first as surrender to the final goal, but secondarily as enriching union with Him. Surrender necessarily looks, and is, disinterested; yet it is impossible without an objectively interested wish for union. Exclusion of this interested aspect of charity (except insofar as is needed to make of this desire a theological act) is unnecessary and unreal.²⁰⁴

²⁰³ Cf. J. de Guibert, *op. cit.*, pp. 249 ff. The concrete sign of this shifting of viewpoint from the ontological to the psychological, we may see, for example, in Scotus' text and it lies especially in the neglect of the finalistic viewpoint in the study of the theological virtues. The idea of orientation to the end places one on the ontological plane, whilst the experimental observation of psychological facts remains, as such, confined within the phenomenal or sensitive-rational. It is no doubt greatly due to this psychological viewpoint that the desire which, according to St. Thomas, is presupposed to hope is more commonly considered as entering the act of hope itself. The complex psychological state which reveals the act of hope shows up, among other traits, an element of desire. Considered on the ontological level, this desire is not hope but only presupposed in it. But when, because of a new conception of charity, it was no longer considered possible to include love of desire in charity, theologians, not unnaturally, were led to refer it to hope.

²⁰⁴ We may add that the twofold concept of love and charity, ecstatic and physical, is not without connection with a fundamental difference in the metaphysical conception of the finite being. When the *esse* is conceived as really limited by the essence, really distinct from it as act from potency, then the being's fundamental dynamism originating from this limitation necessarily tends to perfect the limited act; its tendency is acquisitive; we have the physical conception of love. When the distinction between *esse* and essence is not conceived as real, the

Thus viewed in the light of St. Thomas' conception of finality, it seems but natural that the new ideas on hope and charity were not accepted in the Thomist school. If many theologians did follow them, it was no doubt due to the widespread authority of Scotus during the centuries of low-level Scholasticism, the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. With the Scholastic and especially the Thomist revival, towards the close of the nineteenth century, a marked tendency appears to return to the traditional concept. After briefly noting the Thomist tradition that remains faithful to the Angelic Doctor, we shall also point to this return to St. Thomas' ideas on hope and charity in our present day theology.

4. THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT

We shall not make any attempt to sketch here even summarily the history of the Thomist tradition on hope and charity. We only wish to bring out how St. Thomas' concept has been followed by his school in spite of the Scotist-Suarezian innovation. For that purpose we shall, for each of the two periods of Scotus and of Suarez, ask two representative Thomists what their answer is to our question: "Is the desire of union with God hope or charity?" For completeness' sake we shall also listen to a partially discordant voice, the teaching of Cajetan.

1. *Capreolus*. For the *Princeps Thomistarum*, hope supposes a love of desire but is not itself a love of desire.²⁰⁵ Its formal object is God as helping us to obtain the beatitude. In his teaching on charity he takes a stand against Scotus and in unambiguous terms summarizes St. Thomas's doctrines. Three of his conclusions refer to our problem. "The second conclusion is that the object of charity is God inasfar as He is beatifying or the object of beatitude." His proof runs: "That

natural tendency of a being towards the other need no longer be a dynamism seeking to perfect the subject; it goes towards the other as other; this is the ecstatic concept of love.

²⁰⁵ J. Capreolus, 3 *Sent.* d. 26, q. 1, a. 3, § 1 ad 1 m., *Spes pertinet ad amorem concupiscentiae et ex illo derivatur; non quod spes sit amor concupiscentiae.*

aspect constitutes the formal object of charity under which charity tends to its object, that is, to God, in a manner different from other habits. But the aspect of beatifying object or object of beatitude is precisely such with regard to God, insofar as charity tends towards Him. Therefore, etc.”²⁰⁶ Another, the fourth conclusion, is “that charity inclines to love God with a double love, namely, love of friendship and of desire.” The proof: “Every virtuous and perfect friendship loves the friend with a double love, namely, love of friendship, in wishing him well; and love of desire, wishing for his presence and company. But charity is a perfect friendship with God. Therefore, etc.”²⁰⁷ Lastly, “the fifth conclusion is that in the love of God we may in some way have a reward in view”: charity does not exclude the intention of a reward. Which reward may charity seek? The reward of heaven. Here is the proof: “It does not go against charity to direct an act of virtue towards its end, namely, the beatitude. But when so directing, one intends the reward, since the beatitude is the reward of virtuous acts. Therefore, etc.”²⁰⁸ Capreolus, then, when conceiving the disinterestedness of charity does not exclude from it the desire of union with God. Charity rather includes this desire as a necessary act. This love of desire is not hope.

Cajetan’s teaching on hope and charity is strangely opposed to what we have just read in Capreolus and it is akin to Scotus’ position. Hope, he says, is desire of God.²⁰⁹ Yet, elsewhere we learn that “hope relies on God’s help”,²¹⁰ or that “to hope means to wish for an arduous possible good.”²¹¹ His position, at any rate, is not definite and clear. Of charity he says that it is “the love by which we love God for Himself, in Himself and for His own sake.”²¹² There is another love of God which

²⁰⁶ *3 Sent.* d. 27 ad 30, q. 1, a. 1, secunda conclusio.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, quarta conclusio.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, quinta conclusio.

²⁰⁹ Cajetan, *In II-II*, q. 17, a. 5 no. 8, Et sic spe concupisco Deum ipsum.

²¹⁰ *In II-II*, q. 23, a. 6, ad 1, Spes innititur Deo auxilianti.

²¹¹ *In II-II*, q. 18, a. 1, Velle bonum arduum possibile sibi.

²¹² *In II-II*, q. 17, a. 5, n. 6.

is not charity, but hope: "Charity is different from hope according to the difference of the object, absolutely, inasmuch as charity tends to the last end for its own sake, while hope tends to the last end as our good."²¹³ This is the Scotist idea; love of desire of God is hope, love of God for Himself is charity.

Yet charity itself includes a desire of union with God, as Scotus also said. "To love (men) in God solely for His sake includes to love oneself before the neighbor, because it includes the wish that God be, and consequently that He be loved as the good of the lover."²¹⁴ That is, charity implies a desire of God as our own good.

As has been noted by P. Mandonnet, O.P.²¹⁵ Cajetan who has a personal interpretation of St. Thomas on several points of doctrine, has not escaped the influence of Scotus whom he opposed in the main. We have here a concrete example of this Scotistic influence. One point to be noted is Cajetan's explanation of the theological character of the love of desire for God. He distinguishes: "to desire something for me, and to desire it for my sake; that is, for me as subject, or for me as end."²¹⁶ I may desire the end, God, for myself, but I may not desire it as a means to myself as to an end. So God can be the object of a love of desire, "because He can be desired for another not for that other's sake, but inversely, as the end of the other, since He is the other's good in that manner."²¹⁷

Perfectly faithful to St. Thomas' concept which he proposes in a personal and deep analysis, John of St. Thomas solves our problem in an unmistakably Thomist sense. The love of desire of God does not belong to hope. The formal object of

²¹³ *Loc. cit.*, a. 6, Caritas fertur in ultimum finem propter seipsum, spes vero in ultimum finem ut nostrum.

²¹⁴ *In II-II*, q. 26, a. 3.

²¹⁵ P. Mandonnet, O.P., art. *Cajetan*, in *Dict. de Théol. cath.* 2 (1905), 1313-29, La fréquentation de Scot et de son école . . . semble avoir quelquefois influé sur lui (1325).

²¹⁶ *In II-II*, q. 17, a. 5, n. 6, Aliud est concupiscere hoc mihi: et aliud concupiscere hoc propter me.

²¹⁷ *Loc. cit.*, n. 8.

hope is God's helping omnipotence that leads to beatitude.²¹⁸ Not merely the divine good, but the divine good under the aspect of attainable arduous good.²¹⁹

Does the love of desire for God find a place in charity? Yes, it does, though not as the primary act of charity, which is benevolence for God, but as necessarily connected with this primary act. John of St. Thomas brings out this necessary inclusion in three ways. First, the divine goodness, loved for its own sake as end, is loved as communicating itself.²²⁰ Secondly, love of friendship, such as is charity, is not mere benevolence or well-wishing; it wishes good to the friend who lives with us and communicates himself to us, that is, it is reciprocal well-wishing, a surrender that expects the return of the surrender.²²¹ Thirdly, charity commands the love of self, not stopping at oneself (that is only an imperfect love of desire, which may even not be theological); but referring this love of self to God, that is the perfect love of desire which can be and is elicited by charity.²²² From a threefold angle, then, does charity imply union with God: as acquisition of the end that communicates itself to us; as the return of well-wishing or of the surrender between friends; as the love of self by which charity seeks God as a man's own supreme good. The wish for union with God is charity, not hope.

The author of the *Clypeus Thomisticus*, written shortly after the time of Suarez, exposes the traditional concept of hope and charity. The formal object of hope, he says, is God's omnipotence or God as helping, not the arduousness of the

²¹⁸ John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theologicus*, *Tr. de Spe*, disp. 4, a. 1, 16, *Formalis ratio spei theologicæ est omnipotentia auxilians, seu divinum auxilium . . . quatenus constituit bonum divinum, seu beatitudinem in ratione boni ardui assequibilis.*

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, n. 9, *Bonum divinum . . . ut adipiscibile et arduum.*

²²⁰ *Tr. de Caritate*, q. 23, disp. 8, a. 1, n. 6. *Formalis ratio caritatis supernaturalis est bonitas divina amanda propter seipsam ut finem fundantem communicationem sui immediatam.*

²²¹ *Ibid.*, n. 8, *Quatenus volumus ipsi (Deo) bonum ut amico conviventi, et communicanti se nobis per beatitudinem.*

²²² *Ibid.*, n. 14, *Sic etiam fruitio caritatis potest concupiscere Deum sibi quatenus etiam secundario diligit se, sicut etiam quemlibet proximum.*

hoped-for object, nor its goodness as desirable or as lovable with a love of desire.²²³ He refutes the theory that hope is love of desire by which we love and desire God as our own supreme good. That love of desire, he explains, belongs to charity inasfar as charity makes us wish to ourselves the supreme good; it is the secondary act of charity.²²⁴ That love of desire for God does not make of God a means to our happiness; according to Cajetan's distinction, we wish God to ourselves as *finem cui*, but not as *finem cuius gratia*.²²⁵

In his treatment of charity, Gonet does not come back *ex professo* to our problem, he only mentions it as an answer to the objection: that to desire the enjoyment of the friend is not love of friendship but love of desire.²²⁶ He distinguishes: the enjoyment can be sought either as our own good, or for the sake of the friend. The first, he says, belongs to hope, and is love of desire; the second is love of friendship, and is charity. This may sound like Scotus, and seem to identify hope and love of desire, but when dealing with hope he repudiated this identification.²²⁷

As a last witness of the Thomist tradition we quote Billuart. The formal object of hope, he writes, is God's helping omnipotence, that is, giving or offering help.²²⁸ Consequently, hope is not desire. He states this explicitly. To the objection: The love by which we love God as our supreme good is an

²²³ Gonet, *Clypeus Thomisticus*, Tr. X, *De Virtutibus Theologicis*, disp. 9, a. 2, §1, n. 47, Dico, rationem formalem spei esse omnipotentiam divinam, sive Deum ut auxiliantem.

²²⁴ *Loc. cit.*, § 2, n. 55. Actus, quo nobis summum bonum optamus, est quidem amor concupiscentiae Dei, sed respectu nostri est amor benevolentiae, a caritate elicited in his qui habent illam.

²²⁵ *Loc. cit.*, § 2, nn. 31-32. Gonet may seem here to refer the love of desire to hope (quando per spem ferimur in Deum tamquam in bonum nostrum, seu amore concupiscentiae), but when treating of the formal object of hope, in the following article, he rejects the identification of hope with love of desire.

²²⁶ *Loc. cit.*, Disp. 10, a. 1, § 2, 9.

²²⁷ *Loc. cit.*, Licet spes quaerat et desideret visionem, et fruitionem Dei, inquantum est nobis bona et delectabilis, et ideo non est amor amicitiae, sed concupiscentiae.

²²⁸ Billuart, *Tr. De Spe*, dissert. un., a. 2, § 2, Obiectum formale spei est omnipotentia auxilians, id est praebens aut offerens auxilia.

act of hope, he answers: *Nego*, and explains: love is not an act of hope, but is presupposed in hope, insofar as we hope for only what we love.²²⁹ We recognize the traditional Thomist idea: hope presupposes a love or desire; it is not this love.

Is the love of desire for God an act of charity? Yes, it is. For, though charity primarily loves God as good in Himself, yet in the second place it regards the neighbor. When then man loves God as good to himself (for a man is to himself his closest neighbor), this love, with regard to God, is a love of desire, but with regard to himself, it is a love of charity, for he loves himself for God's sake.²³⁰ We find here again the interesting remark, which John of St. Thomas had already made, that the same act of love by which we desire God as our supreme good is love of desire from one viewpoint (God is desired for us) and love of benevolence or friendship from another (we wish for God out of charity); its formal object is God's good that is lovable in itself.²³¹ But this is at the same time love of God as our good.²³²

We conclude these notes on the Thomist school: Faithful to the teaching of the Angelic Doctor, except for some wavering positions such as Cajetan's, the Thomist school has solved our particular problem in the traditional sense: the theological desire of union with God is an act of charity and not of hope. Three aspects are mainly brought out: attainment of the last end, return by the Friend of the reciprocal well-wishing, love of self commanded by charity and expressed in the desire of God as one's supreme good. This desire of God is the

²²⁹ *Loc. cit.*, Amor non est actus spei, sed supponitur a spe. Cf. *De Paenitentia*, diss. 4, a. 7, §4, obi. 4 inst. 1°.

²³⁰ *Loc. cit.*, § 2, ad 2, Dum . . . homo amat Deum, ut sibi bonum, eius amor respectu Dei est amor concupiscentiae, sed caritatis respectu sui. . . .

²³¹ *Tr. De caritate*, disp. 1, a. 3, § 1, disco 1°, Bonitas increata ut est in se et propter se amabilis. His *Tr. De Paenitentia*, diss. 4, a. 7, § 1, brings out how God is object of charity: Ut est nobis amicus seu ut redamans nos, ut nobis unitus, seque per beatitudinem . . . nobis communicans.

²³² We could still quote the Salmanticenses. For them, the formal object of hope is, Auxilium Dei nos adiuvantis ad consequendam aeternam beatitudinem (*De Spe theol.*, disp. 1, dub. 3, n. 51). The desire or love for God as our own good can in the just arise from charity: procedere ex habitu caritatis (*Loc. cit.*, disp. 2, 39).

secondary but necessary act of charity. It is extrinsic to hope which is reliance on God's helping omnipotence. The disinterestedness of charity, necessary to all friendship as well, does not require that the wish for union with the Friend be absent from it. This, moreover, is impossible.

Since the Thomist revival in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a marked return to the traditional concept of hope and charity and a parallel decline of the more widespread Scotist-Suarezian ideas has set in. A few indications will suffice to bear this out.

Three Jesuit theologians, Ballerini, Palmieri, and Schiffini, agree in excluding the desire of God from the second theological virtue. They conceive hope as reliance on God's helping omnipotence. The theological desire of God they place in charity. Schiffini, for example, proves a thesis: "The adequate objective motive on which theological hope principally leans is God's helping power, that is, God's omnipotence and mercy bound by His promise."²³³ Parallel with this goes his idea of charity; he finds place in it for the theological love of desire of God: "The love of desire by which we wish God to ourselves, if it is originated by the infinite perfection according to which God is the final object of our beatitude, is to be considered as an act elicited by charity, not its primary but its secondary act."²³⁴ In other words, when the desire of God is theological, it is the secondary act of charity. This is exactly the position of the Thomist school.

Scheeben, "the greatest Catholic theologian of the 19th century," follows the same Thomist teaching. Of hope he says: "Though hope is connected with desire, yet it is not itself properly a desire; it is rather confidence, the trust to attain really and surely the desired object. This trust is properly the formal element in hope which distinguishes it

²³³ S. Schiffini, *De Virtutibus*, th. 27. Motivum obiectivum adaequatum, quo spes theologica principaliter innititur, est virtus Dei auxiliatrix. . . .

²³⁴ *Op. cit.*, th. 34, Concupiscentiae ille amor, quo Deum nobis optamus, si principaliter excitetur ex ipsa infinita perfectione . . . habendus est ut actus a caritate elicited. . . .

from charity.”²³⁵ When he considers the three theological virtues synthetically, he explains: “As the proper principle of the God-like life, or of the *virtus theologica*, appears in faith the *lumen fidei* which effects the adhesion to the eternal Truth; in hope the *virtus confidendi* which effects the adhesion to God’s omnipotence; and in charity the mysterious ardour which effects the adhesion to the supreme Good.”²³⁶

Closer to us we find the same idea of hope in Mausbach who says: “The essential element in hope is not desire as such, but the confidence that builds on this desire, that is, a strong impetus of the will towards the attainment of a high goal (*bonum arduum*).”²³⁷ Zimara’s study on hope, quoted already, concludes a historical survey of the doctrines on hope by saying: The only proper act of hope is confidence in the attainment of the beatific possession of God. The same is held by J. de Guibert, in his last work posthumously published, and he had already exposed these ideas on hope and charity in his *Etudes de Théologie Mystique*.²³⁸ The article on *Charité*, in the *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité*, to which we referred repeatedly, shows a return to the Thomist concept of charity in its systematic part signed by G. de Broglie. “Charity is the fundamental affective movement by which the supernaturalized soul adheres to God and tends towards its last end.”²³⁹ “Deceptive is the anthropomorphic mirage which claims to oppose to each other the love of God and the love of self as two essentially antagonistic attitudes . . . When we say that the love of God and the love of the spiritual self coincide with each other, we equivalently identify the love of God with the active tendency of a spiritual subject towards the end for which it is actually destined. This idea, as we

²³⁵ Scheeben, *Natur und Gnade* (edit. Grabmann, 2^o., Munich 1935), p. 276.

²³⁶ Scheeben, *Handbuch der Dogmatik*, II, 3 Buch, § 167, n. 786.

²³⁷ Mausbach, *Katholische Moraltheologie*, 2 Bd., I T., quoted in Zimara, *op. cit.*, pp. 239 ff.

²³⁸ J. de Guibert, *Etudes de Théologie Mystique*, p. 245. *Leçons de Théologie Spirituelle*, Tom. 1 (Toulouse 1946), pp. 159 f.

²³⁹ G. de Broglie, art. *Charité* in *Dict. de Spir.*, 2, 661-62.

know, is fundamental both in St. Augustine and in St. Thomas.”²⁴⁰

The gist of M. d’Arcy’s recent book on *The Mind and Heart of Love* is to bring out an identical concept of love. His study refutes Nygren’s thesis on *Agape and Eros* which declared the two loves, self-regarding and self-forgetful, radically and irreconcilably opposed, and made of the one the deformed and adulterated concept of charity found in Catholicism, and of the other the pure Christian idea of love preserved in protestant faith.²⁴¹ Father d’Arcy shows that, “Eros and Agape are not enemies but friends.” They must go together and they do so in any well-ordered love. The clue for their synthesis he finds in the idea of personality: “Even though the primary joy of the finite love of God is to be possessed by God, we are entitled by the gift of personality to possess God ourselves to some degree . . . There is no reason why this happiness (complete satisfaction in seeing God) should not be combined with self-surrender, so long as we give priority to the latter . . . There is the sheer giving of ecstatic happiness in being possessed by everlasting love, and concomitantly with this and fusing with it the joy of possessing God as He is by means of the beatific vision.”²⁴² All this is undoubtedly a marked return to the traditional concept of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. Of hope we have fewer indications. The *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* just mentioned has not yet published its article on hope. Perhaps we may see the traditional teaching on hope as confidence in the laboriously sought and expressed formula of a Catholic existentialist, Gabriel Marcel, who winds up a study on hope with the following definition: “Hope is essentially the readiness or disposability of a soul which is implicated in the experience of a communion with another, deeply enough to posit the act that will transcend the opposition of willing and knowing and in which act the

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 664.

²⁴¹ A. Nygren, *Agape and Eros, a study of the christian idea of love*, transl. A. G. Herbert and P. S. Watson, 3 vols. (London 1932-39).

²⁴² M. d’Arcy, *op. cit.*, 304 and 273.

soul affirms the living perennity of which its present experience offers both the pledge and the beginning.”²⁴³ Perhaps we may translate: Hope is the reliance on another, which makes it possible for a man to effectively strive after the end which he desires but which he knows to be unattainable for him when he is left to himself. The very act of this trusting surrender to the other gives the certainty and begins already the union which is the last goal.

Are we not entitled at the close of these rapid historical notes to conclude: For St. Thomas as for the traditional teaching before and after him (except only for the Scotist-Suarezian school), the solution of our problem, whether the desire of union with God belongs to hope or to charity or to neither of these, is that this desire is the secondary but necessary act of charity. Hope is trust in God's helping omnipotence and does not include this desire.

If, then, we wish to summarize St. Thomas' teaching on the relation of the desire of God to hope and charity, we could say as follows:

1) Hope is seated in the will which is the power of tendency and of love. It supernaturalizes a love. Under which aspect? Not by being a love itself, but by rendering possible the most fundamental act of the will, namely, the actual volition or the effective love of the last end. This it does by making unto its own, in trust, God's helping omnipotence. This reliance on God's help is the formal act of hope.

2) Yet hope presupposes a desire or love of God (just as in the sensitive appetite all acts of the irascible power presuppose the act of the concupiscible, love or desire), because hope expects only what is good. In this sense it perfects or

²⁴³ G. Marcel, *Homo Viator* (Paris 1947), pp. 90-91. L'espérance est essentiellement . . . la disponibilité d'une âme assez intimement engagée dans une expérience de communion pour accomplir l'acte transcendant à l'opposition du vouloir et du connaître par lequel elle affirme la perennité vivante dont cette expérience offre à la fois le gage et les prémices.—In our comment on this description we intentionally bring out the element of confidence, without thus giving to the viewpoint expressed by the author its own originality.

raises the will in its love of desire and not strictly in its love of friendship. This imperfect love of desire for God (in a man without charity) is an incipient charity, imperfectly theological as it is imperfectly charity.

3) Charity itself is the theological virtue which supernaturalizes all that properly belongs to the love of God. It is the effective volition of the last end sought in communion. As such it is primarily a love of well-wishing and surrender to the friend. But it is as necessarily, though subordinately, a love of desire, the desire to attain God the final Goal, or the wish of the Friend's presence. This union with God is of necessity an enrichment for the lover; yet it is essentially theological, the last end being sought for its own sake.

4) And so the theological desire of God, in its incipient and imperfect stage, precedes hope; but in its perfect form, when it is no longer *informis* but enlivened by sanctifying grace, it follows on hope and is charity. At none of its successive stages of growth, however, is this desire of God hope. This is the trust of the pilgrim on his way to God and relying on God Himself to reach Him, the final Goal.

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INTERNATIONAL CASUISTICS

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HUMAN actions and intentions at all the levels of interest and value, must be judged according to the basic norms of ethics. This is the case also for factual situations and probable events involving deliberate volitions. In order to ensure the correctness of our judgments and our decisions, we must observe jointly the requirements of several virtues. Now, an exhaustive analysis of all human virtues has been made along general lines, as well as with regard to special cases of conscience. But it has not been formally extended yet to cover fully all acts of nations. This may be accounted for partly by historical and partly by practical considerations.

When the Christian nations were closer to the Chair of Peter and looked to its wisdom and prestige for world-leadership, it was customary for the Pope to pass final judgments on their acts and their ambitions. His words, heavy with fatherly righteousness and penitential power, actually bound the conscience of rulers and nations alike; to the Roman Pontiff were left ultimate decisions affecting peace or strife among Christians, and even between Christians and Infidels as history shows. Hence theologians hardly dared to go beyond such Papal pronouncements, by establishing a positive political doctrine for their justification. As their immediate duty was to guide men towards God and eternal life, and to protect the purity of Christian doctrines and traditions, they were concerned mainly if not only with the analysis and appreciation of human actions from a strictly individual, rather than from a national or international point of view.

This situation explains why the Doctors of the Church failed to think of a positive law, which would bind nations together

by drawing distinctions between good and evil on a collective level. The eternal law being recognized as the ultimate foundation of all relations between nations, they judged from first principles any particular case affecting two or more nations. In so doing, they centered their doctrinal discussions concerning political matters on the state as such and more particularly on its ruler, rather than on the well-being of the family of nations as the expression of the common good.

The age of geographical discoveries and conquests having brought the Christians into contact with the less civilized peoples of America, it became expedient to state expressly the moral rules of their mutual relations. This led the great Dominican theologian, Francisco Vitoria, to develop the idea of a law of nations (*jus gentium*) which he defines as "the rule which natural reason has set up among nations." To be sure, he went beyond the concept of the *independence* of nations, which had been generally held before him, by stressing the wider principle of the *interdependence* of nations forming a natural society. Thus, he gave the broad lines of a moral theology of nations, by expressing the ethical structure of this natural society in a set of positive rules derived from first principles. These Christian foundations of the law of nations have influenced all subsequent thinkers, even those with a positivistic outlook, who helped strengthen and develop such a system of rules binding nations together, by analyzing and defining their mutual rights and obligations.

Today, the distinction between good and evil influences international relations more and more, as governments and citizens show a growing interest in the moral worth of acts of nations. The Roman Pontiffs encourage constantly this moral awareness, with lofty pronouncements on the conditions of a universal peace. On their part, governments endeavor to establish binding rules by which their mutual obligations are to be determined, and to prescribe ways and means for the proper discharge of these obligations. Various academic institutions and civic associations help to foster interest and

understanding among the public for these worthy and vital questions.

To be sure, the new law of charity expressed by Our Lord, now takes a wider connotation when extended to nations. By enjoining His disciples to "go and teach all nations,"¹ He allows us to think of the nations as such, as worthy of His dogmatic revelations and moral counsels. Indeed, nations will be judged as such, according to the prophet: "He shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people . . . Nation shall not lift up its sword against another nation."² And this justice of God with respect to the many nations, is beautifully envisioned by St. John the Seer when he confides: "He showed me a pure river of water of life, clear as crystal, proceeding out of the throne of God and of the Lamb. In the midst of the street of it and on either side of the river was there the tree of life . . . and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations."³ Yes, the law of charity and justice binds also the nations according to their kind. So that the greater realization of the material unity of the world today, makes it imperative for the theologian, the moralist, the legislator, and the statesman, to combine their knowledge and their experiences in order to make the world abide by the expressed code of conduct illustrated by this dutiful remark of the sacred historian: "God who made the world and all things therein . . . hath made of one blood all nations of men."⁴

Hence, it is worthy and desirable that there be universal agreement about the general norms for judging the actions of nations. The present relativity of such norms is one of the basic reasons for the miseries of the world today. For they breed injustice and intolerance between nations, by encouraging the sinful inclinations of men, and by allowing egoistic and conflicting interpretations of common rules of intercourse. Thus, the necessity of national survival narrowly or wrongly interpreted, often drives nations to make decisions and rulings harmful to the individual conscience and to international life.

¹ *Matt.*, xxviii, 19.

² *Isaiah*, ii, 4.

³ *Revelation*, xxii, 1-2.

⁴ *Acts*, xvii, 24-26.

There is a further difficulty to consider. Even nations which may acknowledge the universal rules of conduct based on the eternal law may find reasons to differ among themselves on the actual interpretation and application of these norms to particular cases. Thus a statesman conscious of the binding character of these ethical rules, may be up against one or the other of four types of difficulties, which could affect his own stand on given situations. He may have to allow for the official or the personal ideology of the other statesman he has to deal with. He may have to compromise with the national psychology of his own and other nations, a psychology which is usually rooted in long traditions and historic memories resulting in fixed customs and procedures. He may have to take into account the irreconcilable and exaggerated claims of nations suffering from the shock of a recent war or of other tragic circumstances. Finally, he may have to face the discontent of nations frustrated in their efforts to coordinate efficient means for the pacification of the world. In all these circumstances, ideal solutions based on perfect norms and imposed despotically may cause in fact more harm than would practical measures suggested by imperfect rules and applied provisionally by common consent.

On the strength of these considerations, coupled with the experiences of statesmen engrossed with international decisions, it becomes a duty for the moralist to establish an *international casuistics* in the form of organized rules for a casuistical analysis of acts of nations in so far as they are effective both within and beyond their borders. To such acts should be applied properly the rules and procedures which ordinary casuistics uses when considering the actions of individuals or personal cases of conscience. Thus the acts of nations could be judged according to practical and special norms of morality, with the further purpose of assuring the peace of mind of responsible individuals, and of counseling persons or groups about the discharge of public duties affecting international relations and the common good.

At the present time, the elaboration of an International

Casuistics becomes an urgent necessity. Because the actual circumstances of the world, in their permanent and their transitory aspects, do often induce statesmen and public opinion to deviate from the strict norms of natural ethics and moral theology, even with the best intentions to do the good. They are thus left with little means to strive for better solutions and express themselves accordingly, under conflicting pressures and circumstances beyond their control. Furthermore, they find it difficult if not impossible to discover those particular precepts which would cover such individual situations and put at ease their conscience, thus encouraging them to take steps for their improvement.

Some moralists have called attention to such a need at least in a theoretical way, though most of them have ignored it, and though none had thought of meeting it formally. The question has been stated in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* in the following terms: "Why should scientific casuistics neglect this (international) portion of the field of ethics, especially at this time when such questions are diligently analyzed, mostly in the framework of sciences which are either independent of ethics or deliberately opposed to religious ideas? . . . Has casuistics the right to restrict its investigations to the most current subjects of individual confessions? . . . Here again, we would act wisely by returning to ancient theological traditions regretfully disregarded, and by widening the horizon of casuistics beyond the more pressing needs of the confessional."⁵ Obviously, moralists are thus encouraged to attempt an elaboration of an International Casuistics, as we beg leave to call this new field of moral theology.

The burden of our inquiry will be to state precisely the spirit, the criteria, the method and the difficulties of International Casuistics. Before doing so, however, it may be useful to submit some general propositions on the common good, which is the foundation as well as the aim of the moral and political ideas which we propose to organize in the frame-

⁵ Art. *Casuistique* (col. 1863) E. Dublanchy.

work of theology as an International Casuistics. For all political actions must be motivated ultimately by the common good, as they aim at the happiness of human societies.

PROLOGUE: THE TEMPORAL COMMON GOOD

The awareness of the common good in choosing between alternatives of action, assumes or requires an understanding of its proper nature in order to be effective.⁶ Metaphysics in its own way deals with the good in itself; theology analyzes the relations of all created beings to the fulness of divine goodness. With their help, we can prove why and how the supreme good, or God, is the real and final end of man. With the same means, we can fix clearly the distinction between the spiritual and the temporal good; and guide ethics in working out a hierarchy of goods, through which runs the indispensable axis of the supreme good sustaining them all.

The spiritual common good as such is common to all persons and must be loved and desired by every one of them, on account of the immortality and spiritual destiny of the human soul. As such, it is not the immediate objective of practical politics. But it cannot be absolutely ignored in political considerations, for it transcends the temporal common good in general, and consequently the direct or immediate end of the state and of civil society. Indeed, it involves God Himself and His creation in an extended way, namely the natural rights of man, of society, and of His Church. As Pope Leo XIII says, "The enjoyment of this common good is common to all men in human society, and can not be restricted specifically to individuals, classes, races, or nations."⁷ The meaning of this text is clear; it is therefore to this spiritual common

⁶ As our purpose here is to discuss certain moral and political ideas with a practical objective, we shall restrict ourselves to expanding a few traditional statements on the common good. Hence, we shall neither mention the recent controversies among Scholastic writers concerning the common good, nor shall we set forth a detailed theory of this most fundamental concept for the philosophy of nations.

⁷ Leo XIII, Encyclical *Cum Multa*, Dec. 8, 1882.

good that all other goods are subordinate. This proposition, which is frequently repeated in pontifical documents, has always been affirmed by Christian tradition and implied in the perennial policy of the Holy See.

But even if the Fathers and Doctors of the Church conceived and determined the hierarchy of goods, they spoke only in general of the temporal common good and offered no definite theory concerning it, since none was called for explicitly by the political conditions of their times. St. Thomas perceived the general good of humanity theoretically; but he treated specifically only of the common good and the Christian virtues. In the *Summa Theologica*, where he deals at length with prudence, he enumerates three temporal goods: those of the individual, the family, and the city or nation; but he makes no mention at all of a universal temporal good.⁸ Consequently, the Angelic Doctor does not speak of a positive international law in which he would naturally include and define that good.

It is true that the principle of both these concepts is implied in his theological view of creation, as when he says that the eternal law is radiated in the mind in forms of evident imperative and morally compulsory principles.⁹ But St. Thomas sees the positive law only in relation to the civil community, whereas the natural law is concerned with the entire human family. It is clear that he distinguishes between the natural and the positive law, as they differ in the importance and scope of their directives.¹⁰ What is primary in one is secondary in the other. However he does not include the entire human race within the limits of the positive law. He ventures only so far as to discern a certain principle of nationalities and mutual relations between them. Thus, he says that in every nation there is an order of the citizens to foreigners, and that this

⁸ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 47 10, The individual common good is impossible without the common good of the family, state, or kingdom.

⁹ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 93, a. 2, Every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of the natural law . . . and all men in this respect are more or less cognizant of the eternal law.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 99, a. 3; q. 100, a. 2.

order is regulated by law.¹¹ Here again it is with the individual nation that the law is concerned.

The Dominican theologian Pierre d'Auvergne explains the thought of his master as follows: "It pertains to the legislator to consider whether there are neighboring cities, and to learn about their dispositions. He should see whether they are strong or divided; whether they are civilized or not. Then, having compared their conditions with those of his own city, he should determine the nature of the relations to establish with them."¹² It is readily seen that the question is one of relations between one multitude and another, of one nation making laws or special regulations concerning others, according to the peculiar state of each, and not with a vision of a really general good. All things considered, it must be said that St. Thomas and his immediate disciples did not visualize a relationship between two or more nations as being effected by a higher organization that would bind them together positively.

The Spanish Dominican writer, Francisco de Vitoria, was the first to mention formally the common good of the world (*bonum orbis*) which is intimately connected with the natural law and the law of nations.¹³ This universal common good underlies and regulates all intercourse between nations, in particular the right of trading and the right of access to basic raw materials. Whereas earlier writers made much of the *independence* of nations, Vitoria insists on their *interdependence* as members of a "natural society."¹⁴ To be sure, he defines the law of nations as a "natural reason among peoples;"¹⁵ and he goes so far as to take the universal good as a criterion for a just war.¹⁶ Thereafter, the temporal common good and

¹¹ *Ibid.*, q. 104, a. 4. In every people a fourfold order is to be found: one of the people's sovereign to his subjects; a second of the subjects among themselves; a third of the citizens to foreigners; a fourth of members of the same household. Cf. also *Summa Theol.*, II-II, qq. 41, 42.

¹² *Comm. Polit.*, lib. VII, lect. 2.

¹³ *Theologicae Relectiones* (edit. 1686) *De Indis* pp. 386-391.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, *De Indis*, p. 386.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 388.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, *De Potestate Civili*, pp. 203-204.

its expression in a set of international laws have been the subject of learned studies and practical considerations. Though the Reformation gave a positivist character to these efforts, the Vitorian tradition continued to influence Christian jurists and blossomed with full brilliance in the teaching of the modern Popes.

With the division of Christendom brought about by the Protestant Revolt, it was difficult for any practical ideas relative to a universal common good to come into the open. To be sure, the founders of theoretical international law, who came after the followers of Vitoria and Suarez, such as Grotius, Gentilis, Zouch, Puffendorf, Wolf or Wattel, did attach their principles of a law of nations to an ideology implying a certain common good. But they especially and continually emphasized the "natural" aspect of that good and of the international law that it justified; and they ignored systematically its elements of spirituality which were consistently held by the papacy and the Catholic world. Hence, they tried to secure peace among nations by means of pragmatic considerations that did not always bind in conscience. Moreover, the chief artisans of international law never proposed for it a code clearly defined in its details, nor did they ever encourage a moral and political criticism of the significant events of their time. The reason for these omissions is that they were not clear about the specific notion and implications of the universal common good.

On the eve of the first Conference of the Hague, it was found desirable for the participating nations to have a common understanding about certain points, in drafting rules for international relations. To that end, questions emanating from the imperial court of Russia were proposed to Leo XIII, who gave some pertinent directives. After that, the natural and the spiritual aspects of the common good tended to come closer together in the meditations of many writers. With Benedict XV, Pius XI, and Pius XII especially, these directives were further elaborated. To be sure, Roman Pontiffs make it their

duty to insist on the true appreciation of the common good as being the foundation and the final cause of international order.

Hence, we should turn towards the Popes, who express the living tradition of the Church, in order to become acquainted with the proper trends and needs of the time. Here are some clear declarations of Pius XII regarding the universal common good: "The whole world feels the need of a rebirth of order. What is the ambition of statesmen? Is it not to secure the common good in an atmosphere of temporal order in harmony with the eternal and supernatural order?"¹⁷ On another occasion he refers more precisely to the international order, when he affirms that "among men as among peoples, individual desires will never coincide with the common good."¹⁸ This vision of the universal common good appears in all his pontifical declarations; and those which refer more particularly to the national order may be easily interpreted in a wider plane.

In his first encyclical Pius XII affirms: "It is the noble prerogative and function of the state to control, aid, and direct the private and individual activities of national life, so that they converge harmoniously towards the common good. That good can neither be defined according to arbitrary ideas nor can it accept for its standard primarily the material prosperity of society; but rather it should be defined according to the harmonious development and the natural perfection of man. It is for this perfection that society is designed by the Creator as a means."¹⁹ Consequently, the first obligation of the state is to promote the common good. But in so doing, it must be careful not to harm individual or family rights, social justice, or the rights of other nations.

Indeed the common good of the state does not imply a power over society so extensive that public authority should intervene

¹⁷ Pius XII, Allocution of Sept. 20, 1942 to the Members of *Italian Catholic Action*.

¹⁸ Pius XII, Allocution *Noi Potremo*, June 26, 1940.

¹⁹ Pius XII, Encyclical *Summi Pontificatus*, Oct. 20, 1939.

in the exercise of the natural rights of man.²⁰ The state therefore, must not absorb all the activities of individuals or families, "who should be permitted to retain their liberty of action, so far as this is possible without jeopardizing the common good and without injuring anyone."²¹ Likewise, the common good of the state demands that the freedom and rights of small nations be respected by the more powerful ones, for all should share in the material and spiritual good.²² As to social justice, Pius XI teaches the common good should be taken as the norm of social justice, guiding the relations of capital and labour in accordance with commutative justice.²³ In a wider sense, "the common good in the temporal order consists in that peace and security in which families and individual citizens have the free exercise of their rights, and at the same time enjoy the greatest spiritual and temporal prosperity possible in this life, by the mutual union and coordination of the work of all."²⁴

It would be easy to transpose these wide directives on the international level; and such an endeavour would correspond perfectly with the papal intentions. Its necessity becomes evident by the pressure of international events, and by the universal recognition of a temporal good which goes beyond national borders. In order to effect this transposition, it suffices to weld the papal declarations to the common teaching of traditional philosophy regarding the universal good. Even then, the precise meaning of the term *temporal common good* is difficult for all to grasp. Yet it should be simple enough in itself to allow an elucidation of its implications.

Paraphrasing the excellent definition given by the Dominican moralist, Rev. J. T. Delos, O.P., the universal common good is what determines a set of rules, relations, and institutions which facilitate and insure a cooperation among all states with

²⁰ Pius XII, Discourse *La Sollenità*, June 1, 1941.

²¹ Leo XIII, Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, May 15, 1891.

²² Pius XII, Christmas radio address, *Nell' Alba*, Dec. 24, 1941.

²³ Pius XI, Encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*, May 15, 1931.

²⁴ Pius XI, Encyclical *Rappresentanti in Terra*, Dec. 31, 1929.

justice and charity.²⁵ This set is more or less complete, more or less coordinated, more or less compulsory. Owing to the vicissitudes in the life of nations caused by changes in national and international circumstances, this set is continually enriched and refined, without ever becoming identified with its essence.

This universal or temporal common good is the end of the whole human society, just as the national good is the end of each particular human society. Hence, there is a relation of finality between the family of nations and the temporal common good. Now, natural human society, though still unorganized, is based on the social needs of man; it is not established by mere pragmatic rules suggested by an imperative desire of avoiding international chaos. Consequently, its common good as the final cause and purpose of human society is anterior to any international organization. As such, it must be used to define and establish the principles of international intercourse.

The temporal common good in its fulness is not identical with a purely material good, even less with its own material advantages. It is rather the collective good of men, distributed in national groups, with their essential characteristics as physical, rational, social, moral and religious beings. The excellence of this collective good, which is verified mainly in the political order, includes the various aspects of man in the sense that both the national and the international communities are bound to safeguard those goods as well as the conditions favouring their pursuit by individual men. But it amplifies the individual good generally, insofar as one who is conscious of the temporal common good can not satisfy fully the conditions of his own salvation, unless one fulfils somehow his duty towards that collective temporal good.

Some systems of political philosophy eliminate the religious character of man with its consequences, and reduce morality to something arbitrary, conventional, or pragmatic. This

²⁵ "Christian Principles and International Relations" in *International Relations from a Catholic Standpoint*, p. 49.

profound ideological difference explains the difficulties of the powers in making binding agreements about definite points of international cooperation. It is also the reason why the Pontiffs urge that governments, before making contracts or treaties, should have an understanding about principles. Otherwise, as history shows, an arbitrary interpretation of the letter of a treaty might lead a signatory to refuse its execution.

Emphasis must also be laid on the unity of the temporal common good, which is essentially one. It is not an arithmetical set or a sum of particular goods, but a unique integration *sui generis* which contains but surpasses them all in the temporal order. Therefore, it is not the particular good of any nation which may be distinctly recognized as such, and it cannot admit any particular good as a substitute. The temporal common good is other than the goods ordered to it. Yet its primacy over the national, family, or individual good, does not place it in opposition to them. Just as evil often assumes an aspect of the good, in the same way the common good appears sometimes to be opposed to certain particular aspects of the national, family, or individual good, when in fact these aspects are defects covered by false appearances. In short, whatever may be the level considered, the good is always something positive and well adapted to the circumstances of that level.

Finally, the temporal common good enriches all of its subordinates in the sense already specified, just as it receives from the supreme good the value it communicates to them. Ascending in the hierarchy of temporal common goods, there is an orderly amplification of value; from the individual to the family, to the nation, to the entire human race, the common good is gradually amplified until it reaches its maximum in the temporal common good. Hence, there is no elimination of good at any of these levels; on the contrary, the common good increases the value of its subordinate goods by giving them a greater fullness.²⁶ As St. Thomas says, the common good of

²⁶ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 47, a. 10, ad 2um.

many is more "Godlike" than that of the individual,²⁷ which implies an orderly subordination of all goods to God.

This subordination is quite reasonable and natural. As regards the individual, his ultimate end is God; hence the two-fold commandment "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, and thy neighbor as thyself." Man can not attain that end, unless he observes at all levels the obligations of his state and attributes. If a conflict arises between one level and another, its correct settlement demands the safeguarding of his union with God, and not the saving of any particular good. This is why it is permissible to sacrifice one's body to save one's soul, or for the sake of values indispensable for one's salvation. The Christian understands that the immediate sacrifice of his body is only temporary, since its resurrection is a part of his full and eternal reward. The complete human person, rather than a merely material good, must be saved for eternity: hence the eventual sacrifice of a temporal individual good to the temporal common good which has a higher value, when there is a circumstantial conflict between them for the sake of one's eternal salvation. Thus personalism justifies the primacy of the temporal common good.

Indeed the eternal salvation of the person demands a respect for the temporal common good. The loss of immediate advantages does not necessarily entail the destruction of the person. There is no question here of sacrificing the person as such to the temporal common good; but rather of allowing for his salvation the sacrifice of particular aspects of his individual or national good. Here again, the primacy of the common good enhances rather than weakens personalism in its integral meaning which implies the ultimate end of man.

What is true for the individual is true for the nation, as His Holiness, Pius XII, also recalls. Indeed, the ultimate level of the temporal common good is not the nation, though earlier philosophers did not go beyond it in their positive considerations about the common good. As all men are

²⁷ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 31, a. 3, ad 2um.

children of God, the obligation of charity knows no frontiers. In the past, the Church reminded nations of the implications of this duty, when she excommunicated princes and absolved their subjects of their allegiance, and when she urged a nation to take part in a just war, or to refuse its aid in an unjust war.

In a conflict between the material good of a nation and the universal common good, the former must be sacrificed to the latter, in order to satisfy the divine plan of creation, which is essentially good. However, this is not always the case in practice, because sin may confuse the mind of the leaders of a nation, and motivate wrong and harmful decisions, which may serve immediately what appears to be a strictly national good. The main difficulty in most practical cases is to determine each time what is the true particular or national good, and to state precisely how either of them differs from a superior good. Habits acquired under the influence of nationalist beliefs based on doubtful principles often prevent thinkers from realizing and appreciating the hierarchy of goods, the primacy of the common good, its relations with the person and his salvation, and finally the special obligations it entails for individuals and nations.

Many doubts and confusions would be eliminated if we could determine precisely some signs or marks, by which the common good could be recognized as such. Perhaps we could suggest in this respect two mutually supporting attributes. The one denotes the common good as that which preserves peace and order among nations, by means which respect the natural rights of individuals and nations. The other denotes further what favors economic, social, and cultural progress, through just and efficient collective institutions. Both can be easily justified.

Peace, to begin with, is necessary to the common good. Tranquility, order, concord, harmony of wills—all these positive concepts are included in the notion of the common good. But it is not so with negative concepts, such as armistice, which aim at the common good and call for it without being a part

of it. Moreover, in forming and applying the positive concepts already mentioned, one must have an honest and upright regard for the fundamental rights of individuals and nations. In short, the true common good entails the practice of justice and charity without which it cannot be reached.

Furthermore the collective character of the means necessary to the realization of the common good is also an essential element of its notion. Otherwise, the will of one or a few nations might be imposed arbitrarily on the others against their fundamental rights. Universal consent, tacit or implicit, alone confirms the collective character of the means. Hence the theory and practice of *laissez-faire* are incompatible with the common good. For every right has a corresponding obligation; by neglecting onerous obligations the *laissez faire* policy defeats the claims of the international good. To be sure, the acceptance of collective means entails automatically a voluntary limitation of certain rights. Without a proper adjustment of the just aspirations and needs of each nation the genuine international common good could not be reached, though some narrower good might be achieved.

If we now turn to the essential conditions of the common good, we find that there are subjective and objective conditions. Among the former is the observance, by rulers and heads of state, of virtues such as justice and charity which promote and render efficacious proper pacts between states. Otherwise, bargaining and cunning prompted by particular goods may result in agreements on some temporary good at the expense of the permanent good sought by all nations.

The objective conditions of the common good cover the ability to judge the acts of nations, the authority and power to determine equitable laws and rules for all, and the possibility to enforce their observance through definite sanctions. These conditions are also those of the organization of international life. Without such an organization, a nation may improperly conceive the common good and justify an action by appealing to a superior good not explicitly specified within the accepted rules of international life. In most cases this

superior good is conceived in the narrow perspective of a national interest. This error would be avoided when the objective conditions of the common good are freely desired and actually accepted by all nations.

During the last fifty years, individuals and nations have become more and more aware of these questions. After the two Hague Conventions and the parallel efforts of the Ambassadors Conference and of other international groups, the League of Nations was established, and the procedure of the International Court of Justice determined. But this organization was neither supported by a codified international law, nor strengthened by a system of effective sanctions. These deficiencies were aggravated by the absence or relativity of the subjective conditions of the common good, as manifested by most political leaders and governments.

Stirred by the miseries of the last war and by the hopes of a lasting peace, the world has awakened to the needs and realities of international legislation, and its leaders have shown a desire to meet and respect them collectively. As a result we have had a series of international declarations and agreements, which culminated in 1945 in the important decisions of the San Francisco Conference. Taking into account the experiences of the League of Nations, and the lofty peace objectives affirmed by such international instruments as the Atlantic Charter, the victorious nations succeeded in establishing a World Charter, which implies to a large extent the objective conditions of the common good.²⁸ But all these endeavours fall short of relative perfection, insofar as they ignore deliberately the necessity of the subjective conditions of the common good, as required for the establishment of a true peace.

In spite of such capital shortcomings, however, the efforts of the nations responsible for the World Charter have been commended expressly or implicitly by the Catholic Church, which supports all sincere attempts to organize the temporal

²⁸ Cf. *The World Charter*, and other pamphlets issued by the Catholic Association of International Peace (Washington). Also, *Catholics and the Hope of San Francisco* by Rev. Graham S. J. (America, New York).

good. But in doing so, it reminds the faithful of two obligations. The first is the moral duty of nations to promote the common good, just as every citizen has the moral duty to work for the common good of the nation. Therefore, the social education of citizens should strive to extend their national horizon, by making them aware of their duty to help their nation adjust or subordinate its legitimate interests to the universal good. Various means can be used to fulfil this idea.

The second obligation concerns the sacrifices involved in actions favouring the common good. As His Holiness Pius XII declares "the State is often compelled to ask from all classes heavy sacrifices for the common good."²⁹ This duty may be required not only by the national, but also by the international common good. Just as the whole good of man sometimes demands the sacrifice of a purely physical good in protecting a moral good, and more so a supernatural good, thus certain sacrifices may be expected from individual citizens for the protection of a higher social good. Hence we face again our initial question of the subjective conditions of the common good, without which, as recent experiences show, the world will be never ready to proclaim and defend permanently a real peace.

To be sure, here is the basic cause of the current misunderstandings between the great powers, which takes the form of a so-called "cold-war," until the bitterness thus accumulated leads to either an armed clash or to a peaceful anti-climax. During the second world-war the material cooperation between the Allies gave hopes that their common miseries would bring about a change of heart, from petty considerations to a real international cooperation. These hopes having been dashed to the ground, an unavoidable intercourse between potential adversaries has to be carried on, while official peace prevails. As has always been the case in history, men of good will thus have and will have to practice material cooperation with

²⁹ Response *Las Palabras*, made June 16, 1939, to the new Ambassador of Bolivia.

a set of political leaders motivated by objectionable ideals. The analysis and moral estimation of their actions in such particular patterns are the proper and formal subjects of international casuistics, and make imperative the organization and conscious use of such an important field of moral theology.

I. THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CASUISTICS

Divine law makes all individual and collective acts relevant to moral theology. Hence, a comprehensive casuistics must cover all concrete acts involving good and evil. To be sure, moralists have considered cases of international ethics and more particularly of national morality, with respect to aliens. But, in practice, the technical business of casuistics has consisted so far in discussing individual acts and some specific cases of political action. Therefore, it is high time to extend the spirit and method of casuistics to the acts of nations as such, inasmuch as not only individuals and society, but also the family of nations as such are willed and ordained by the divine Author and Architect of the world.³⁰ In this endeavour the casuist may restrict himself to the international field, the more so as the distinction between individual and nation justifies a specific treatment of International Casuistics, which we may now define: *International Casuistics is the systematic analysis of concrete cases relative to acts of governments affecting other nations, with the purpose of giving a particular judgment on the moral character of such acts, and on the conscientious obligations of all who are directly or remotely affected by them.*

Because of the complexity of world events and the weakness of human intelligence, International Casuistics extends beyond the scope of natural casuistics and merges into scientific casuistics. With the support of common sense, it uses confidently the science of general ethical principles, and the illuminating rules of moral theology diffused through a practical

³⁰ Cf. Leo XIII Encyclical *Libertas*, June 20, 1888, condemning the liberal thesis that the collective will of men is the ultimate basis of human society.

or prudential judgment. Hence it is subordinated to theology, and as an applied science it is neither autonomous nor arbitrary. Indeed, its rulings do not depend ultimately upon the opinions of moralists and theologians, as if there were averages supplied by observation and considered sufficient in guiding action. For this would make all practical decisions and acts independent of Revelation and speculative ethics. Such a modernistic interpretation of international actions is a serious error denounced by Pius IX and his successors.

International pacts are assimilated by Pius IX to contracts,³¹ thus relating them to natural and social ethics. Again, in his encyclical *Libertas*, Leo XIII declares: "To remove the whole public and social life from the jurisdiction of moral law would amount to denying the dependence of society upon God, which is precisely the capital error of social liberalism." Likewise, the great encyclicals of Pius XI and Pius XII concerning the international order, are a protest against the autonomy of practical reason in the complex matters involving the common good. It may be added that the presumed autonomy of casuistics laid it open to suspicion. But when considered in its true perspective, casuistics manifests great importance and practical fecundity.

As the Vatican Council expressly requires for casuistics in general the support of Revelation and tradition, as well as of theological deductions, International Casuistics must be illuminated by ethics and strengthened by theology, which keeps its conclusions within the divine law. It is the science of a concrete application of ethics and theology to specific cases well determined in their individual circumstances. Such a science sometimes may propose imperfect conclusions on account of the factual imperfection of concrete national acts, and because some governments neglect or disregard the light of grace and the claims of justice. But such imperfections do not affect the legitimacy and usefulness of that science.

Casuistic judgments aim specifically at the normally and

³¹ Cf. *Syllabus*, propositions 39 and 65, particularly proposition 52 defining this similarity.

justly possible, and not at the more opportune and the nearer to perfection, as required in pastoral and is ascetical theology. Their objective is not a perfect good or a better good, but the minimum good possible under the circumstances, as ordained to the absolute good which is necessarily its final cause. Yet casuistics does not favour or require a dissociation of these levels of the good, for this would be contrary to the nature of the good, which diffuses its ontological richness in a continuous expansion of its specific levels of manifestation. Furthermore, a casuistic judgment may lead to some material improvement of the minimum good, although formally it only separates the licit from the illicit. Hence, the function of International Casuistics is to analyse complex individual cases in order to decide practically what is permissible, at least by virtue of reflex or negative principles, and what is forbidden under pain of grievous fault.

From these considerations, it follows that casuistics deals with the practical and the concrete, and not with the theoretical and the speculative as such. Hence, the knowledge of the principles of positive ethics and of the conclusions of moral theology is not sufficient in estimating every concrete act of a nation. It is necessary to use further a practical judgment, which must be just in proportion to its objective, in conformity with the eternal law. This transition from the speculative to the practical gives to casuistics its criteria, its method and its value.

II. THE CRITERIA OF INTERNATIONAL CASUISTICS.

In its own field, *International Casuistics aims at certainty*. It seeks a positive decision, even if the case under analysis is doubtful. Its subordination to theology justifies its criteria and its method, which must be derived from divine law, their ultimate foundation.

Let us state first the *general criteria*, which are directly justifiable with regard to the divine law. They are: (1) *the supremacy of the law of love*, that is the love of God and

neighbour. Next (2) *the primacy of the universal common good*, with respect to the national common good and to the natural individual good narrowly interpreted. Then (3) *the primacy of the claims of the law of love and of the universal good* in relation to the specific positive rules deduced from these two criteria. This means that the choice between two specific rules, which the imperfection of human circumstances may render mutually exclusive in a strict sense, however prudently interpreted, must be made with regard to the first two criteria which are immutable.

To those fundamental criteria, the following may be added: (4) The direct certainty of *the requirements of the evangelical law*, as given in Scripture and Church tradition; (5) the direct certainty of *the common teaching* based on Scripture and Church tradition; (6) the direct certainty of *the obligations of the cardinal virtues*, as accepted by the common teaching; (7) the indirect certainty of *reflex principles*, as accepted or justified by the common teaching. Such principles may be used only when it is impossible to have direct criteria, and when their purport and application can be connected with the law of love and the universal common good.⁸² In all cases, the casuistic judgment, which integrates these criteria with its subjective and objective elements, must aim at certainty.

The *special criteria* of casuistics are drawn from the common theses of natural law concerning society as given by the common teaching or its proper extension, provided they are justifiable by the law of love and the common good, or simply approved by Church tradition.

Here are a few special criteria which must be used in judging international questions: (1) *Primacy of the state of peace*, even if it carries grave imperfections which can not be corrected by the means at hand. (2) *Necessity of authority in the state*, even if the prince or government has a false notion of the

⁸² Here is an example of a reflex principle permitting the transition from the speculative to the practical, and characterizing the moderate probabilism admitted by the Church "Nullus ligatur per praeceptum aliquod nisi mediante scientia illius praecepti" (St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, Q. 17, a. 8).

natural law and of its execution.³³ (3) *Appraisal of the legitimacy of the prince* or of his government, in judging conflicts of authorities or the binding conditions of their actions with respect to aliens. (4) *Validity of internal and external jurisdiction* of *de facto* governments expecting to become legitimate and possessing executive qualifications recognized by custom or common doctrine. (5) *Respect for the ways of expressing the popular will*, either explicit or tacit, according to the customs or the constitution of the people, and with due regard for its culture, evolution and natural or contractual aspirations. *The principle of non-intervention*, which is related to this criterion is not absolute, but subordinated to the common good.

Many *maxims valid in international law* can be used in pertinent cases in casuistics. These maxims may be grouped under three principal heads: respect for the sovereignty of a state; respect for the rights of man as an individual and a citizen; respect for contracts and for the just conditions of their modification. However, these practical criteria should be understood with reference to the eternal law calling for peace with justice.³⁴ They are always interpreted by the Sovereign Pontiffs in this sense.³⁵ Hence, they should not be given an absolute value, as this may lead to injustice.

Casuistics, therefore, has to show how such maxims are applicable to particular cases, and whether their use conforms to the given criteria, for every shade of interpretation of the case under consideration. The application of all these criteria and maxims must not be made at random; notwithstanding the specificity of the prudent judgment involved in each case,

³³ The criteria of the primacy of peace and of the necessity of authority in a concrete situation, are not always and necessarily binding in conscience internally, if they cover serious imperfections translated in unjust and evil decisions.

³⁴ In his Response *Con la Mayor Satisfaccion* to the Ambassador of Peru, His Holiness Pius XII affirms that "international law, while leaving the sovereignty of every state safe and perfect, recognizes the principle of peace with justice as a postulate of the natural and Christian conception of law."

³⁵ Cf. Pius XII, Allocution *In Questo Giorno* (Shristmas, 1939), to the College of Cardinals.

a strict though flexible method must be followed, in order to give certainty to casuistic decisions.

III. THE METHOD OF INTERNATIONAL CASUISTICS.

Since International Casuistics is subordinate to theology, it depends on the *deductive method* for its development. The starting point of its practical judgments is the eternal law, whence conclusions are drawn about the moral value of concrete cases. The operation involves *analysis and synthesis*, for any particular case is analyzed with reference to the principles which will justify eventually the conclusion required. Induction or statistical and analogical generalizations should be used only for strengthening and illustrating conclusions already obtained deductively. Otherwise a relative and perfectible value would be given to casuistic judgments, instead of the certainty which is their aim.

In using analysis and synthesis in a case, *International Casuistics should apply all the criteria* already given to all the factual circumstances known, in order to prepare a moral decision, with due regard to the objective laws concerning such facts and their possible exceptions. On the strength of *justifiable compensations* between all these elements, one is able to form the particular judgment required, taking as ultimate criterion the law of love expressed through respect for the universal good.*

Furthermore, casuistic reasoning presupposes several subjective and objective conditions, which now must be considered in detail. The subjective conditions depend on the synthetic utilization of the virtues. Indeed, the solution of concrete cases requires more than strict reasoning from the criteria of casuistics by successive deductions in the desired direction, because each case involves a number of specific elements grouped in a unique way by the permanent and the contingent circumstances of life. Hence a casuistic reasoning must use the wisdom of all virtues, and of justice and prudence in particular, considering that the last prudential judgment obtained through deduction

is the very form of the intended action or decision. Without insisting here on the common teaching on charity, on the cardinal virtues (including their integrant and subjective parts), and on the related virtues which are constantly taken into account by the casuist, it is however proper to mention some of the distinctive features and rules of the mutually supporting virtues of justice and prudence which bind him more strictly.

Objective justice requires that a nation should be enabled or helped to keep or recuperate the material and moral goods it is entitled to, and should not be caused to suffer loss or damage in its legitimate goods. We are concerned here with the understanding of the exact order that should exist among nations, and not with the disposition of the individual will, which is subjectively necessary in assessing its due to each nation. In other words we are dealing here with objective justice between nations, and not with the subjective habit of justice in the casuist, who may be unjust in some of his private acts though he must be just in his decisions about the mutual rights and duties of nations. The name of *international justice* is given to this special aspect or part of objective justice.

As it is not always possible to protect, give, or restore what belongs justly to a nation in a given case, the appraisal of an action committed, recommended, justified, or tolerated requires further the virtue of prudence which completes practically that of justice. *Prudence* takes into account all the particular and concrete circumstances of a definite case, and predisposes one to know, recommend, or do what is morally good or licit. Instead of estimating only the abstract conditions of the solution of a given case, it considers as well the possibilities of action and the limitations of the freedom of the parties involved. Hence prudence develops the ability to foresee a solution correctly, in the words of St. Isidore, through the uncertainty of events. It presupposes according to St. Thomas, the knowledge of the general principles of morality and of

the particular contingencies of human actions.³⁶ This is precisely the essential need of the casuist, especially when he passes judgment on the government of nations in the international field with respect to the common good.

To the different levels of the good, namely the personal, familiar, social and international good, there correspond different kinds of prudence,³⁷ all of which are ordained to the good as such. These types, which do not affect the characteristics of prudence as such, should be considered separately; the more so as they are not necessarily found in any one individual. But it will suffice here to analyze the prudence concerning the government and the reciprocal actions of nations considered in general.

The *prudence of government* coupled with justice, according to St. Thomas, is a virtue proper to a leader who should direct and command: "A special perfection of government is required for one who has to govern not only himself, but also a social community, a city, or a kingdom. Such a government is the more perfect if it is more universal, that is, if it extends to more men with a view to attain a higher end."³⁸ In this passage, as in the whole treatise on prudence, St. Thomas is concerned mostly if not exclusively with the common good of the nation. But the use of the characteristics and rules of prudence he gives could be very well extended to international relations.

As we deal here with a government which would "extend to a greater number of men in order to attain a higher end," we may identify the international good with that end. In framing his decisions, the head of a nation may have in view the good of his nation as a part of that universal good. And as he can not govern the whole world, he should at least adjust his political decisions to that international good.

³⁶ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 47, a. 30.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, a. 11. Cf. also q. 50, where the various species of prudence are analyzed.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 50, a. 1. This question is concerned with the guidance of others, in opposition to individual prudence.

Therefore, without being directly concerned with that higher end, he should be inspired by it in promoting the good of his nation. If every national leader adopts such a rule of action, then the international or the temporal common good would be respected in practice by each and all nations. Yet the understanding and acceptance of this precept by the leaders, executives, and citizens of nations, presupposes that they be given an accurate description of the common good, and eventually a system of definitions and rules generally approved.

The profound analogy between the character and practice of the special types of prudence required in national matters and in international decisions has its foundation in the unifying and diffusive nature of the common good. Just as national prudence is a special prudence required by the political head of a state, so we may speak of international prudence as having also a specific character. Yet both types are rooted in the single and true virtue of prudence, which is the enlightened servant of the common good. Unfortunately most statesmen are guided by the prudence of the flesh, which can not eliminate the fears, suspicions, and dissimulations which render the international atmosphere oppressive. This false prudence is only a transitory palliative, causing at most the national passions to smolder. Hence the further necessity of informing political leaders of the proper subjective conditions of the common good.

In this respect we must mention a potential part of the virtue of justice, which is particularly important for the statesmen in making decisions and for casuists in forming judgments. It is the gift of *epikeia* which permits one to decide in a given individual case that its special circumstances warrant an exception from a general law. In such a case, prudence leads one to do what is morally good with regard to these concrete circumstances, and not simply with reference to similar ideal circumstances. Hence the prudential judgement must conform not only to the appropriate general means required, but also to the particular means and to the immediate need of action

in circumstances which are not always good, and can not always be improved. Such a concrete decision is warranted by *epikeia*, but only insofar as it is not opposed to the universal common good and the law of love. Therefore, misuse and abuse of *epikeia* is not permissible. Similarly it is wrong to propose for it a general theory and practice, for that would eliminate the necessity of the general structural principles regulating national and international societies.

In concluding these remarks on the subjective conditions of International Casuistics, let us recall briefly the integral parts of prudence and some virtues connected with it, as they all help to judge and counsel efficiently in difficult situations. The former are: experience, intelligence, memory, readiness to take good counsel, shrewdness of mind, ability for clear reasoning, circumspection, and foresight. The latter are: good moral sense, moral perspicuity, and *euboulia* or ability to give good counsel. It is evident that the vices opposed to the various aspects of prudence should be known in order to be avoided, and should be taken into account in appraising any actions of governments.

We may now turn to the *objective phases* of casuistic judgments. They involve: (1) Acceptance of the material situation of a case just as given. (2) An objective analysis of all the elements of this material situation, attending particularly to those which may characterize the case, and tracing them back to their possible psychological or political motives. (3) An estimation of those determining motives, that is the intentions, interests, traditions, theses, objectives, means, circumstances, and precedents converging towards the case under consideration. (4) Individual and collective responsibilities must be brought out, by coordinating the various motives according to distinct centers of perspective, with regard to each person directly concerned and also to the nations concerned; in doing so due regard must be given to the universal common good, to the near and remote repercussions of the case, and finally to the conscience and influence of the casuist himself. (5) Appreciation of these different responsibilities, by confronting them

with the accepted criteria and principles, giving precedence to the strongest over the most immediate. (6) Balancing the general and special criteria on the axis of the twofold primacy of the law of love and of the universal common good, and placing all the centers of perspective in such a way as to permit a single conclusion; by reason of the aim of casuistics, probabilism in all its forms may be used here judiciously. Finally (7) one must make an exact synthesis of all those phases, and propose a decisive conclusion with certainty.

The use of prudence with its various elements and connected virtues, involves the *necessity of avoiding common errors* in the application of this method. For example: (1) One must eliminate personal feelings, which may affect the integrity of individual or particular judgments. (2) One must not be influenced by conflicts of opinions, for prejudice and sympathy affect the rectitude of the analysis and the conclusion of a case. (3) One must avoid judging a whole case with regard to one particular virtue: he must rather balance his judgment with a unifying synthesis of all the virtues. (4) One must avoid judging a whole case through a single center of perspective; he must rather consider the harmony and coordination of all such centers before drawing a conclusion. (5) On account of the higher certainty of direct deductions from fundamental principles, one must not use reflex principles unnecessarily or without connecting them deductively with the permanent criteria of the law of love and the common good. (6) One must avoid the use of *epikeia* habitually, as this gift is valuable only in solving exceptional cases.

Furthermore: (7) Principles of natural morality must not be used exclusively, as the more extensive divine plan requires recourse to theology. (8) Appeals must not be made to schools of history inspired by materialistic, utilitarian, idealistic or deterministic principles; for such systems reject the proper theological conception of creation. (9) Judgments unsupported by firm principles must be avoided, as they imply uncertainty of criteria, aversion to authority, relativity of conscience and vagueness of conclusions; and this remark

applies also to private interpretations of evangelic precepts.

(10) Excesses, chicaneries, and subtleties of dialectics must be avoided, as they blur the efficiency of criteria and the correctness of conclusions. (11) Special principles must not be transformed into absolutes; such a practice would eliminate their relativity with reference to the fixed criteria of the law of love and of the common good; it would make *epikeia* useless, and it would substitute opportunism for the strict ethics of the natural and the divine law.

Finally one must avoid a number of other errors such as: (12) Fallacies in reasoning, that is the various sophisms and the confusion of fields or spheres of thought. (13) The use of current maxims without having checked them against the particular and general criteria; otherwise the divine law is practically abandoned in favour of arbitrary and false absolutes, such as the "reason of state," the "need of living space," the "protection of national honor," and similar formulas. (14) A partial estimate of the parties involved in a case, when each is not wholly responsible for the events under consideration; for example, a party can not be blamed for a factual modification beyond its actual or remote control. (15) All forms of *laxism*, such as excessive indulgence, allowance for human weakness, or evangelical zeal, when postponing an obvious decision in the hope of obtaining conversions and reforms. (16) All aspects of *tutiorism* and *rigorism*, whether mitigated or absolute, especially when these teach that only the sure or safer alternative in a conflict must be chosen, that no distinction exists between sins and faults, and that all faults are grave, thus favoring asceticism or quietism, and destroying the object of casuistics. In conclusion (17) casuistics must not overlook or disregard the virtue of hope, without which one is driven to presumption or despair, or at least to indecision about the gravity of faults and responsibilities (moral relativism), thus vitiating the analysis of cases and the value of casuistic conclusions.

IV. THE DIFFICULTIES OF INTERNATIONAL CASUISTICS

The fundamental distinction between individual and nation, and also between individual and international morality, must be taken into account, when forming a judgment in International Casuistics. For a number of specific peculiarities may color decisions and constitute difficulties which must be faced by the casuist before his final decision.

1. As the responsibility of the individual is closely related to his eternal salvation, the *political responsibility* of a prince or his ministers involves supplementary qualifications concerning their duties of state, which clearly affect their salvation. But is the responsibility of a nation of the same kind? We may answer in the affirmative as regards temporal order; according to St. Thomas, a nation may be punished collectively for faults committed by its government with the express or tacit approval of the people. In the spiritual order, however, it can not be said that a nation has an eternal salvation to win. The immortal soul, which alone can be saved, is evidently individual. A nation as a collection of individuals has no individual or collective soul to save for eternity. It does not follow, however, that there are no spiritual elements in national acts. Since Providence affects the world distributively and collectively, group activities as well are judged before the divine tribunal. Thus St. Gregory says: "Every time the deeds of a nation, whether just or unjust, are brought before the celestial curia, Angels undertake lively debates about them. According to Scripture, the Angel entrusted with the interests of that nation may sometimes win and sometimes lose."³⁹ The supernatural judgment of a nation may be considered collectively; but its execution is distributive for the individuals of the group and proportionate to the active or negative participation of each in the common action. To be sure, the head of a nation as well as his subordinates and subjects have, in these capacities, obligations of justice and

³⁹ *Moralia*, Book xvii, chap. 8.

charity in the national and in the supernatural order. Their responsibilities, therefore, may be analyzed in both the temporal and in the spiritual order, with due regard for the pertinent distinctions already mentioned.

2. The supreme *responsibility of the mandating authority* is apt to confuse the subordinates and subjects about their own responsibility unless their respective fields of jurisdiction and interpretation are clearly defined. It is evident that a mandating authority who issues unjust decrees commits a grave fault, which becomes more serious if it indicates and imposes more or less licit means for their execution. But does the habitual obedience required of those who execute orders eliminate their responsibility in carrying out their orders? Certainly not, for the state is not an absolute and cannot transcend the eternal law, which must remain supreme. A decree of Pope Alexander XI condemns the servant who obeys his master in fear of punishment or dismissal, by holding a ladder for him when he visits his lover.⁴⁰ This condemnation means that the servant is bound in conscience by the moral law, which is higher than his contractual bond with his master. Similarly, the obligations of the moral law is higher and stronger than any arbitrary or improper injunctions imposed even by a legitimate authority. No problem arises when the injunctions and the obligations coincide, but in a conflict between them the moral law must necessarily prevail.

It may happen, however, that a ruler imposes licit decrees and licit means for their execution, though he keeps to himself his improper motives and though he may reap unjust results. In that case, his subordinates may obey him legitimately, and claim eventually an exoneration from guilt and punishment, as they are not bound to find out the real motives of their ruler, or even to analyze beforehand their probable consequences. But their responsibility remains, in the face of decrees and means which are clearly illicit. Similarly, the

⁴⁰ Decree of the Holy Office, March 2, 1679 (No. 51 *Famulus*), condemning laxism.

reason of state cannot be invoked against a strict moral law, or in the name of false principles concerning human freedom. But it can be used licitly only to permit or tolerate certain acts following the breaking of contracts or treaties, and also for the withdrawal of privileges granted by the ruler. In all these cases, nevertheless, the ruler who knows his improper motives and aims, and yet acts at their bidding, is entirely and gravely responsible for this initial fault and for its evil consequences.

In the sequence of acts proceeding from an initial fault of the ruler, the evaluation of the responsibility of all concerned must take the following elements into account: (a) the hierarchical relations of the subordinates, (b) their functions and their degree of freedom, (c) the nature of the means imposed or chosen for the execution of their mission, and (d) the results obtained by each one of them. Furthermore, this common moral rule must be taken into consideration for each action: A conscious act is good or licit, only when its motives, its means and its expected results are good or licit. It is proper to qualify this rule by stating that in a general plan of action, motives and results are estimated with reference to the relative knowledge each subordinate has of the general plan.

It remains to consider the value of certain acts performed by the people, without an order or a directive from the ruler. As the people has no supreme and unquestionable authority in fact or by right, it is wrong to maintain that whatever is done by the people is just. Strictly illicit or immoral acts do not become good or licit when they are committed by the people, who can not even claim exoneration from guilt in this respect. A decree of Pope Alexander VII bearing on this point condemns the principle: *Populus non peccat etiamsi absque ulla causa non recipiat legem a principe promulgatam*.⁴¹ The fault is grave when it carries a deliberate flouting of an explicit law forbidding certain acts, as this involves disobedience

⁴¹ Decree of the Holy Office, Sept. 24, 1665, condemning laxism.

to civil authority and violation of the moral law. The fault is also grave when it follows neglect of a moral law or ignorance of a positive law, whether promulgated or implied strictly. Thus lynching and assassination by a mob are never permitted. To be sure popular justice is right only when it agrees with eternal law.⁴² For these reasons, a ruler is partly responsible for any illicit collective acts of the people following his neglect to promulgate enlightening laws, or his eagerness to promote an ideology or set of laws tolerating or encouraging such illicit acts.

3. Individual morality considers real persons, with an individual will, a personal conscience, while international morality considers groups with a collective will or a national conscience. Because of the analogical or indefinite character of these last two concepts, it would seem that the obligations of nations are not as clear as those of individuals. Yet, a proper analysis of such collective duties should make plain the filiations and deviations of the individual conscience with respect to the universal common good. It is true that International Casuistics concerns the individual conscience also, inasmuch as such units are the substantial parts of a group, each having definite political obligations through it towards the common good. Yet, though some individuals may refuse to approve or to fulfil group decisions which they dislike, the casuistic judgment of a collective case has not for its subject any individual conscience as such, unless a person is entrusted with a responsible duty for the group.

Indeed, International Casuistics is concerned with the group as a whole, which accepts expressly or tacitly a common decision. In determining responsibilities in a collective act,

⁴² Hence collective punishment of a group or a nation is permissible or even desirable, if it is practically possible. But such punishment must be really collective and not individual, unless some definite individuals are directly responsible for acts imputable to the group. Because of its collective character, such a punishment must be lighter for each individual than the combined effects of the common act. That is why the execution of innocent hostages is unjust and illicit.

it is desirable to use discrimination and to judge more severely those whose actions, or prerogatives, mark them out in a definite case. This is a rule of justice supported by the common opinion of moralists, in particular by Vitoria⁴³ who reminds us of the classic quotation: *Quidquid delirant reges plectentur Achivi*. For him, the responsible members of a group must be punished justly for a collective fault. But the group as a whole should be exempted from a severe penalty, though it should not be exonerated in a fault committed by the ruler specifically, by invoking as an absolute principle either the good faith of the members of the group (including the ruler in certain cases), or their obligation of obedience to the sovereign. In many instances, the group as such participates to some extent in a collective wrong, as it can be ascertained by the nature and extent of its consequences. Even though it may be impossible to single out the guilty, justice calls for a collective punishment in proportion to the seriousness of the fault. Hence, it is difficult if not impossible to save the innocent from paying for the guilty, especially if they can not prove their innocence publicly, or if the circumstances and execution of the punishment make it impractical to mete it out exclusively to the responsible persons.

For that reason, the Scriptures warn that God will disperse the nations that do not follow His law. And in the history of the Church, we read of Sovereign Pontiffs pronouncing severe sentences against nations,⁴⁴ when the individual citizen has only a very remote share in the guilty actions of their ruler. Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas, Vitoria, Suarez, and other moralists admit the lawfulness of collective punishment, even when innocent persons are in the group. As Vitoria says: "Society could not subsist without a power or authority capable of discouraging the wicked and preventing them from

⁴³ *De Jure Belli*, N. 59 and 60.

⁴⁴ An example is offered by the action of Innocent III placing England under interdict, in order to compel King John to accept his demands. In the eleventh century, Alexander II had given permission to William the Conqueror to invade England and take the royal crown.

doing injury to the good and innocent.”⁴⁵ Consequently the political survival of a nation must not be presented or accepted as an absolute principle, in order to evade justifiable collective punishments, even if these have grave consequences for the political unity or independence of that nation.

As regards the material share of an individual in a collective penalty, Suarez says “reason demands that vindictive justice be meted out with the least possible inconvenience for the common good.”⁴⁶ Hence in the infliction of collective punishment, the share of each individual distributively should not be heavier than, or even equal to, the extreme consequences of the incriminating act, because of the unequal proportions in individual responsibility, and of the probable existence of innocent persons in the collectivity. It should be observed further, that the penalty suffered by the innocent in a collective punishment must affect their external goods only, and not their conscience; it may even result in their spiritual enrichment through the practice of fortitude and other virtues. But such motives of asceticism must not be invoked for the infliction or the tolerance of unjust punishments.

4. As experience shows that nations often take questionable decisions, the question arises as to the *means of pressure* to be used on such nations in order to bring them back to a normal situation. In the case of individuals, it suffices to appeal to their reason, to their conscience of the justice and love of God. Such casuistic judgments can be understood by the individual concerned, and can dispose him to act accordingly. In the case of nations it ought to be sufficient to make an impersonal appeal to the same principles; indeed, one should begin with them in all justice and end in all charity. The Popes gave edifying examples of such attitudes in the last two world wars; in this connection it would be well to meditate the moving exhortations made by Benedict XV to the belligerents.⁴⁷ However experience shows that the purpose

⁴⁵ *De Jure Belli*, No. 19.

⁴⁶ *De Virtutibus Theologalis*, Sect. viii, No. 3.

⁴⁷ Exhortation *Allorchè Fummo*, July 28, 1915.

of such appeals was not achieved in most cases, and that recourse to force is still the ultimate and decisive argument of nations.

This does not mean, however, that there are two incompatible means of solving individual and collective conflicts. To be sure, the conditions imposed by prudence, justice, and charity for the eventual use of force, always subordinate might to the defense and preservation of the common good. Hence, force is never an end in itself; it is only a means to be used, sometimes unavoidably in the sinful state of the world, to bring out the evidence of the common good. Therefore, concern for the common good and for its diffusive power for each nation presses distinctly or confusedly on the conscience of whoever must act on the national or international level. In individual as in collective cases, we rise to this one final cause of human acts. Their specific differences stimulate the virtues and talents necessary to form casuistic judgments with certainty.

5. Significant details for the correct appraisal of an individual case may become known under oath or under the sacramental secrecy of confession. But such is not the case with national acts, as *it is often impossible to have full knowledge of all their significant components*. Indeed, international actions involve so many disparate elements, that satisfactory verifications could not be made readily. In most cases, it is impossible to penetrate the conscience of all concerned, and to discover the fundamental motives which may affect casuistic judgments. Yet, on the collective level, it is always possible to find the *specific event which determines an international act as such*. The correlation or natural compensation of causes and effects, with all the aids of methods required by social science, should enable us to apply to a known case the superior universal principles taken as criteria, even if some secondary details remain unknown to the particular judge.

6. In an individual case, order can be preserved or reestablished by *occult compensations*. But at the national or international level, proper satisfaction requires exclusively *public*

compensations for unjust actions. Hence, the casuist can not approve a ruler or his agents who may offer occult compensations only for injury caused by them in the public order. Because a collective act is so extended in its manifestations and consequences that it can not be corrected indirectly through a secret individual decision, execution of the decision would reveal immediately the collectivity responsible for the deed. Consequently, an occult compensation is not practically possible from the collective point of view. Yet, it is not always necessary to name the person responsible for the unjust act or for the compensatory decision, especially if either custom or the constitution allows a collective responsibility on the part of the government and requires secrecy for the deliberations of its members. The parties to an unjust act can always satisfy the moral law, apart from any public redress, by penances imposed on them or voluntarily undertaken. From the collective point of view, however, what matters in most cases is the public material or moral redress of compensation for an unjust act, and not necessarily the public disclosure of the responsible parties. It is therefore evident that the individual as well as the public order are not satisfied ultimately by the mode of compensations, but rather by the fact of its realization. Of course, all this is done for the preservation of the common good.

7. The strength of the *analogies between the individual and the public order* varies according to the cases under consideration, and must be taken into account in establishing a casuistic decision. For example, the honor-preservation principle holds for both the individual and the nation, but the means to be used to force its respect are not always the same. In individual casuistics, maintenance or redress of the public order is safeguarded by the prudential clause *secluso scandalo*, which makes moralists cautious in counseling occult compensation and other indirect means of satisfaction. Nevertheless, this very safeguard for the public good makes it imperative sometimes to reveal the circumstances of an unjust

act. In International Casuistics, reasons for concealing or revealing a scandal are not always identical; and furthermore, there is no occult compensation in the collective order. Hence, the casuist must be most careful in applying to international cases conclusions formed on mere analogies from individual circumstances. He must always check his judgments by going back to first principles, and by applying them specifically to the circumstances of the case under consideration.

8. In many individual cases, the casuist may be helped by *existing juridical codes* which define the lawfulness of certain acts with precision. But *the absence of an international code* defining the obligations and sanctions binding all states and nations makes it most difficult to appeal to immediate specific criteria when judging an international event. This explains the insistence of Sovereign Pontiffs in asking the nations to codify international law.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, it is clear that International Casuistics must appeal more frequently to the general criteria already set forth.

Consequently, the procedure of the casuist is both complicated and simplified. It is materially complicated, because each case requires a specific analysis in order to recognize the principles involved. It is formally simplified, because it keeps the casuist in the immediate vision of the first principles. But whether he is helped or not by positive codes, the casuist must consider a given case under several immediate angles of vision. This is true for individual as well as for collective actions. But in all cases, the various angles of vision must be regulated in the sole perspective of the universal common good. Owing to the many differences between the actions of individuals and nations, to which the casuist must be accustomed, and to the absence of intermediary principles universally accepted as such, the practice of International Casuistics requires a greater amount of original reflection, and a humble recourse to the various virtues and the divine gifts.

⁴⁸ Cf. Pius XII, Response *Con la Mayor Satisfacción*, July 17, 1941, to the Ambassador of Peru.

9. In closing these remarks, we should like to discuss the *practical possibility of International Casuistics*. Considering the numerous criteria it needs, the practical conditions for the study of cases, and the specific difficulties imposed by their collective character, it may seem that International Casuistry can not reach conclusions with certainty. Yet, the complexity of its elements can not be properly invoked against its ability to reach certain conclusions. We have shown that International Casuistics uses all the positive criteria of moral theology, and we know, on the other hand, that the political activities of nations affect international life materially and morally. Hence, it must be possible to compare these acts with those criteria, and to judge them in themselves and in relations to the parties concerned. The practice of casuistics will show more precisely the strength of its special criteria, and the correlated stages of its method. Indeed, it is not enough to define it, to characterize it, and to establish its theoretical possibility; since casuistics is a practical science, it must be put into practice.

V. VALUE OF INTERNATIONAL CASUISTICS.

The collective perception of a universal common good becomes clearer, as nations experience the claims of their solidarity, which calls for a real cooperation reaching even beyond their deepest differences. This attitude is encouraged by the Sovereign Pontiffs⁴⁹ on the social level. But this intercredal cooperation implies neither a theological synderesis nor a moral eclecticism, which the Catholic Church can never favour. The unity of the eternal law in its twofold form of natural and revealed law, however, justifies the promotion of an active cooperation with nations of good will for the preservation of the common good for all people.⁵⁰ But as this secular cooperation is now extended to all nations, their different

⁴⁹ Cf. "Intercredal Cooperation in the Papal Documents" by the Rev. W. Parsons, S. J., in *Theological Studies*, June 1943.

⁵⁰ Cf. "Intercredal Cooperation: Principles" by the Rev. J. C. Murray, S. J., in *Theological Studies*, June 1943.

mental attitudes, incompatible ideologies, and clashing material interests involve a risk of injustice in many international decisions.

That is why Pope Pius XII has not disapproved the organization of a powerful group of nations for the defense of basic international interests, going even as far as to imply that armed resistance to evil forces sometimes becomes a moral obligation.⁵¹ This grim declaration on international matters was given its counterpart in the national field, when the Sovereign Pontiff affirmed that it is the moral duty of Catholics to resist iniquitous national laws.⁵² It is plain that the concrete application of these principles in this imperfect world causes situations calling for casuistic conclusions.

While hoping for a better and more effective organization of international life, it seems that *a concrete preservation of a minimum universal common good* is the most that nations can achieve at present. To this effect International Casuistics offers an important method of evaluation. But while insisting on a minimum rather than a complete common good, International Casuistics encourages the latter by demanding the former. Indeed, its conclusions and decisions concerning the minimum common good should be used in other ways for the improvement of unsatisfactory situations. In fact, individual casuistics has a similar aim.

Hence, International Casuistics is valuable, because it preserves a minimum common good and helps to avoid error in particular moral judgments. As it remains subordinated always to moral theology, it can neither weaken it nor be substituted for it. Though it respects the integrity of the Christian mind and the counsel of perfection, it may limit an obligation or a perfection by virtue of reflex principles in specific cases only, but always in the light of practical charity. In the general plan of theology, International Casuistics is a step towards individual and social perfection, in accordance with this divine

⁵¹ *Allocution to the College of Cardinals*, Christmas 1948.

⁵² *Consistorial Allocution*, Feb. 14, 1949.

counsel: "Be ye perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect," which can be fulfilled only through a series of trials permitted by divine justice and love.

EPILOGUE: WISDOM IN POLITICAL DECISIONS.

The establishment of the peace depends on the human will organizing properly circumstances pre-existing to its immediate activity. It requires the orientation of the human will towards the good, and the existence of circumstances favourable to its exercise for the common good. If the will is somehow evil, some accidental good may arise, provided that circumstances on the whole are favourable to this good. But the moral value of such a result can not be perfect; and this accidental good can not be lasting, unless it is confirmed by a subsequent good act. On the other hand, if the will is good and the circumstances bad, the results manifest varying degrees of good and evil dependent on the manner in which the will makes its decisions. This type of action occurs most frequently in political life. Hence the necessity of analyzing it with respect to the principles and practical applications of international ethics, and also to the common temporal good which is its ultimate goal and the condition of peace.

In the international order, the circumstances which beget problems of organization arise from common decisions and are caused by various agents having usually different moral conceptions. Temperament, education, national customs, political forms, and ideological or religious convictions, make these differences more specific and efficient. Further, agents may be bound by imperative mandates and determined by a moral or a physical fear of neglecting their mandate. Such, and similar, considerations bear indirectly on any discussions aiming at a common decision, and make it most difficult for the statesman to be satisfied with the morality of his actions.

The prudent statesman is not bound, however, to take into account the individual internal responsibility of each one of his colleagues, or even to discuss with them the value of their

actions. Diplomatic life as such offers numerous opportunities for this apostolate of mercy. The manner, method and occasion of this particularly delicate form of fraternal correction can be left in each case to the inspiration and prudence of the Christian statesman. Before furnishing him with practical directions in this respect, it is desirable to set up formally an apologetic and a pastoral system concerning international matters.

In the strict exercise of his diplomatic functions, the prudent statesman must allow his colleagues the benefit of being sincere and of believing their motives and purposes to be good, even if such is not truly the case. For his official functions do not compel him to convince them of malice, or to make them acknowledge the falsity of their principles. But this imputation of sincerity should not eliminate or attenuate for the others the malice or falsity of any such principles, end, or means. He must also allow for any unfavourable circumstances as well as for the personal malice of his partners, because he has to cooperate with them, and because he is responsible only for his own actions, which must avoid all malice in order to be good or at least licit.

In short, the prudent statesman has to act in an imperfect world, which causes his decisions to have partly good and partly bad consequences. Hence his situation involves the use of the indirect voluntary and of a material cooperation. Both principles have been debated generally by moralists and theologians with regard to their application to individual cases and social politics,⁵³ but not yet formally with respect to international decisions. Yet, the moral obligation of Catholics to further peace makes it opportune to establish some precise rules governing human acts at the international level. Hence our present endeavour to state the common thesis concerning the moral value of external acts,⁵⁴ and especially of their external

⁵³ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, On Human Acts; Merkelbach, *Summa Theologiae Moralis*.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, q. 19, a. 8; q. 20, a. 1-6.

effects⁵⁵ which involve the use of the indirect voluntary and of material cooperation.

As is well known, it is not permissible to posit a cause when its sole effect is evil and is foreseen as such. The effect being measured by the cause, its malice is imputable to the agent. But the statesman can act with a clear conscience, when his act has two effects, either independent of the other, provided that he wills the good and that he has no obligation to avoid the evil which is foreseen but not willed. The two effects must be independent, in the sense that the good one is neither produced through the evil effect, nor caused by it directly and exclusively. In individual actions, the good effect must be immediate, simultaneous or at least equal to the evil one.⁵⁶ We do not believe it necessary to insist on this stipulation for historical events: it is sufficient that the good effect comes within a reasonable time, or at least appears prearranged in the series of events pointing towards its appearance. However in both cases, the act requires a just and proportionate reason.

Of equal importance is the remark that one is not compelled to avoid the unwilled evil effect. Such an obligation can not be made universal, for no man is capable of fulfilling all the particular conditions of an act. Furthermore the morality of an action depends on the value of its objective, of its motives, and of the means involved. It is independent of contributing elements which are unintentional or accidental to the act itself.⁵⁷ If one insists on any particular obligation, it is always possible to waive it with reasonable motives or proportionate reasons.

With regard to positive cooperation, it is an effective participation in an evil act posited by someone else at the moment of cooperation. The analysis of its various forms shows that cooperation is directly imputable, if it involves formal acquiescence to an evil action. However, the prudent states-

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 20, a. 5; q. 21, a. 5; II-II, q. 64, a. 7-8, q. 79 a. 3, ad 3um.

⁵⁶ Merkelbach, *op. cit.*, I, "De Actibus Humanis in Se," q. 3.

⁵⁷ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 64, a. 7. It is also the unanimous opinion of moralists,

man can properly and materially cooperate in a bad act, by using the rules of the indirect voluntary which determine the licitness of the cooperation, according to the following principle: "If the evil effect of an action is truly indirect in relation to the act of cooperation, as when the latter involves an activity which could be legitimate in other circumstances, a proportionately grave reason could make this cooperation licit."⁵⁸ In the international field, the application of this principle is often delicate and requires prudential considerations for each angle of a particular act.

A Christian statesman can not avoid its use, when dealing with other statesmen who do not share his moral or religious convictions. This is especially urgent today, when international life favours what is now called "Intercredal Cooperation" or the cooperation of men of good will. But statesmen should never consent to participate materially in an evil act, nor exaggerate the use of the indirect voluntary, nor manifest a general passivity in political matters, nor generalize a particular casuistic judgment in order to permit an indifferent action, or to favour a lesser good or to attain a minor good out of proportion with concurrent evil effects. Because they have often confused analogies with specific cases, Christian statesmen have been the partial cause of tragic and regrettable events.

Indeed, the Christian statesman has the strict duty to work for the perfection of the world. For this reason, he must always inculcate the maximum good into a decision or an action which imply doubtful elements. While avoiding the dangers of laxism, he can help society positively by placing it on the way to progress and perfection, through the practical actualization of the common temporal good which gives us the peace of this world.

As His Holiness Pius XII said, "Only a clear understanding of the ends assigned by God to all human society, coupled with a profound realization of the sublime duties of social

⁵⁸ J. B. Vitrant, *Théologie Morale*, p. 26.

work, can induce those to whom power has been conferred, to accomplish their proper obligations in the legislative, judiciary, or executive order with that impartiality, loyalty, and incorruptibility, which a democratic government needs in order to obtain the respect, confidence and obedience of most people.”⁵⁹

To be sure, this orientation towards the common good is motivated ultimately by charity; the supernatural thus penetrates into the establishment of peace. It is true that all nations do not have the same political philosophy and the same social ideal. Hence their different or even irreconcilable claims. Yet, it is to be hoped that their aspirations will be reconciled and fulfilled according to the norms of justice. For if each receive its dues, that is its reward or punishment according to its merits, and if all the decisions are made in the perspective of the common good visualized in the concrete, then the supernatural would affirm itself even in those fields where satisfaction is usually sought in an egoistic manner as no attention is paid to international justice and charity.

The organization of international life in peace appears thus as the concretization of a *theological view of the universe*. In other words the reconstruction of the world basically requires a theology. If Christian statesmen may be versed in the theology of the particular good, they must also cultivate the theology of the common good of nations. Further, since the proper function of the wise is to order all things to God, the concretization of this value must be established in the triple perspective of the immediate good of each nation in particular, of the collective good of human society and finally of the supernatural good of man. It is understood also that each of these perspectives entails various aspects of the fundamental virtues as taught by natural law and Christian precepts.

Any attempt for peace motivated solely by the first of these goods would be selfish; it would contain the seeds of a conflict of egoisms leading to war, and it would thus sin against charity

⁵⁹ Broadcast Christmas message *Benignitas et Humanitas*, 24 Dec. 1944.

and justice. Any solution favouring exclusively the supernatural good would be utopian, for we live in a world manifesting inevitable imperfections due to sin. The order of creation requires that man attain his supernatural good through this life, a task which implies conditions and obligations for him as an individual and as a social being.

Finally, any decision caused by the first and second of these goods only would be artificial and illusory, for it would appeal to the false principle of the natural goodness of man and of society. Without the indispensable corrective of supernatural life, human passions would undermine internally a purely humanitarian peace, and they would stir up social conflicts and civil wars often worse than purely military conflicts. On the other hand, any immediate and relative success obtained eventually by an imperfect solution inevitably follows or is based on a unifying vision of creation. Hence, it is improper to sacrifice the supernatural good to other goods, or even to dissociate the latter from the former. Only a correct integration of the specific elements of the three perspectives of the good and their subordination to the supernatural could help normally and practically to establish the rules of international life.

The problem is pressing in the present circumstances of the world. To be sure, if natural morality and Christian teachings give us the precepts to follow in international decisions, the resistance put up by human nature vitiated by sin forces the wisest statesman to accept compromises as the ransom of the concrete order. In this imperfect world where good and evil are actually intertwined despite his wishes, the wise statesman is usually obliged to choose the lesser evil among the alternatives which confront his will.

The statesman conscious of the call of the supernatural is thus compelled to deal with matters mostly beyond his direct responsibility and affected by the blemishes caused by human passion. Yet, despite the imperfection of his decisions, he escapes all blame if he accomplishes his duties honestly and with due regard to the Christian rules of justice and charity.

For this reason a wise statesman conscious of the primacy of the common good and capable of exercising an influence upon the turn of events has the obligation to participate efficiently in the organization of a better world and to utilize prudently the rights and privileges he may possess. Though it is naturally impossible for each man to foresee exactly the course of events, it is desirable for a statesman to familiarize himself with Christian principles on the one hand, and with the complex contemporary problems on the other. For only then will he be capable of judging the various alternatives presented to him, and of choosing eventually the best immediate good in the perspective of the true common good.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Théologie des Réalités Terrestres: Tome I—Prélude; Tome II—Théologie de l'Histoire. By GUSTAVE THILS. Bruges: Desclée De Brouwer. Pp. 200 & 144.

"In the vast stirring of ideas that affect temporal life—ideas concerning the reform of the state, the purification of family life, the organization of professional life, the orientation of cultural spheres, the evolution of work and technology, the ennobling of the fine arts—Christian theology ought to have a word to say in the name of the Most High." That Christian theology has a word to say, that it has a right and a duty to say it, what, in part, it says, are the preoccupations of Gustave Thils in his *Théologie des Réalités Terrestres*.

While he is not the only one so preoccupied today, he is the first to attempt a systematic study of the theology of created reality. Hence, his work deserves an extended consideration.

Following a brief introduction, Thils considers, first of all, the demands of contemporary thought in regard to a theological judgment on created reality. He then considers what such a theology should be, in itself and in its basic principles. Lastly, he sketches some applications of theology in the various spheres of created reality. The second volume contains a more detailed consideration of the relation between theology and history.

* * *

The Introduction is devoted to a rapid justification of the whole project. The standard objection is raised: Catholicism is a supernatural, transcendent religion, whose essential task is to lead men to heaven; it has no concern with the perfection of natural things, which would necessarily be the object of a theology of such things. Especially in our day, when men are almost totally devoted to the things of this world, theology should be trying to turn their minds to God and heaven, instead of investigating the transient things of this world. At this point, Thils relies on several quotations from authority to justify his work. He might have quoted from a more authoritative and unexpected source, Pope Pius X, the enemy of modernism, who wrote: "The times are indeed greatly changed. But, as we have more than once repeated, nothing is changed in the life of the Church. From her Divine Founder she has inherited the virtue of being able to supply at all times, however much they may differ, all that is required, not only for the spiritual

welfare of souls, which is the direct object of her mission, but also everything that aids progress in true civilization, for this flows as a natural consequence of that same mission."¹ Here is ample justification for the task of bringing home to men "the Christian meaning of the world." (p. 10)

There are some, who, moved by the past history of the Church, maintain that the effect of the faith on the world and its institutions is implicit, hidden, and slow-moving.² For centuries, the Church preached the gospel to slaves and serfs, without ever preaching against slavery or serfdom. The Church, they maintain, has never attempted to form a Christian civilization. If one existed (and medieval civilization was very imperfect from a Christian point of view), it was not the result of conscious effort on the part of the Church or churchmen.

Granting the lesson of history (although considerable reservations could be made), we may ask: during the long centuries cited as examples of this relation of the Church and the world, was there any one else explicitly, openly, and with revolutionary rapidity, trying to form a non-Christian civilization? Can the Church continue her quiet way when there is such urgency as exists today?

Besides, the lessons of history are not all on one side. The manichean movement, for example, was strenuously opposed by the Church, not only as a heresy, but as a natural blight. Another example: for centuries, the Church and churchmen quietly learned from pagan philosophers whatever was true and useful in them. But in the thirteenth century, an influx of new writings and Arabic commentaries on Aristotle endangered the balance of Christian thought. Intellectuals began toying with the idea of a double truth, of reason and of faith. Much of St. Thomas' scholarly life was devoted explicitly to preventing such a breach; and he succeeded.

The contemporary similarities are obvious; yet our situation is much worse, for it is more generalized and more deliberate. Furthermore, men are more conscious of it and are looking for an answer. In fact, as the author points out, there are numerous thinkers both in the West and in the East who have been trying to formulate an adequate response.

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The first part of Volume I is given over to a consideration of the various thinkers who are calling for a theological synthesis of modern life. With brief quotations, the author passes in review Catholics, Pro-

¹ Encyclical "Iucunda sane," March 12, 1904.

² Cf. E. Mounier, "Foi Chrétienne et Civilization," in *Foi in Jésus-Christ et le Monde d'aujourd'hui*. Editions de Flore, 1949.

testants, and Orthodox Orientals. Maritain, de Lubac, Davenson are among the Catholics; Banning represents a section of Protestant thought; Berdiaeff, Boulgakor, Fédotov, and Soloviev are cited among the Easterners.

The representatives of the West are beginning to see what has happened over the past few centuries to cause the breach between religion and life. Despite the imperfections of the Middle Ages, there was a unity of outlook in the West. There had been a long struggle against paganism and barbarianism in order to achieve this unity and many, especially among the upper classes, wished to preserve it without change. Yet changes were bound to come about, for we are still on earth. The changes could have been directed by Christian theology, but even the theologians were opposed to change. So it took place without them.

We are the heirs of the vast changes that took place under the inspiration of the Renaissance, the Protestant revolt, the scientific and industrial revolutions. Spurning the direction of unsympathetic theologians, the leaders in every field of human effort went forward, at first, indifferent to the inspirations of Catholic faith, gradually, in direct opposition to it. Today we Catholics have to live in two spheres—the religious, which has become ever more vital under the attacks of enemies, and the temporal, which is almost entirely in the hands of those same enemies, or, at least, has grown under their inspiration. No wonder then, that we find it difficult to lead lives that are integrally Catholic.

Commenting on this situation, Thils makes a remark that might well be a profound and consoling truth. He describes the world of the past few centuries as "that great big kid who is at an age when he must prove that he is 'somebody'" (p. 19). Are the revolt against authority, the self-conscious assertions of human independence and supremacy, the ungainly attempts to coordinate the results of rapid development, all merely signs of a "crisis of adolescence" that is affecting the Western world. It might well be, for the Middle Ages bore many of the characteristics of childhood. Thus, we should look forward to a period of maturity when the world would at last realize that the authority against which it rebelled, if a bit old-fashioned at times, was really acting for its own good, that the Christian ideal has retained all its validity.

The Orthodox East has its contribution to make to the maturation of the West, for it has never lost its sense of the divine; in turn, it can learn from the West a better appreciation of this world and its legitimate needs. "The East, let us say, possesses God, but has neglected the world; the West has given so much place to the world that it has lost the sense of God; let us then unite the riches of the East and the West, and create a theology that will terminate in a Christian vision of the world and the universe, a liturgy that will overflow from the Churches and reach the extremities of the earth. This would be an enrichment for both East and West" (p. 26).

The efforts of the religious thinkers who have tried to respond to this call for a Christian view of temporal realities have been directed, according to Thils, to three principal ends, or rather to three aspects of the same end. These are: 1) to bridge the chasm that has grown between God and the world; 2) to reestablish a new and healthy harmony between Christ and humanity; 3) to restore the union of religion and life.

Men certainly need such an integral view of their life if they are to be Christians in the midst of the world; and how else are they to be Christians? The Church needs a theology which will clarify such a view so that she may preach the way of holiness in the world to men of the world. Yet, we may still doubt that this is God's will. What of the opposition between the City of God and the City of Man? Is this to disappear eventually? What of the effects of sin on human happiness here below? Are we to look for a paradise on earth? That would seem to be the aim of any effort to order all things under the light of revelation.

The author's answer to these doubts is quite balanced: "Prudent and persevering effort in the direction of progress, without ever hoping to obtain here below more than an incomplete good: such is the meaning of Christian activity in the world. The Christian certainly does not want to find a lost paradise or to create an Eden on earth. . . . Yet he desires to install in whatever degree possible the order willed by God, both in public and cultural life as well as in private life and the consciences of men" (p. 44).

In confirmation of this view, he quotes an extraordinary text from St. Augustine: "Certainly we should never desire for men to be unhappy, that we may do our works of mercy. You give bread to the hungry; it would be better if there were no hungry, no one to give bread to. You clothe the naked; but what if all were clothed and no such need existed? . . . Would the fire of love die out? The love you bear for a happy person, whom you cannot place under obligation, is a truer, purer, more sincere love. For if you put an unhappy person under obligation to you, you run the risk of feeling superior to him, of wanting him, who has given you the chance to do good, to be inferior to you. Desire rather that he be your equal: together submit yourselves to Him Who is obliged to no one."³

A desire, no matter how vehement or widespread, is not a sufficient basis for asserting the possibility of a theology of terrestrial values. Justification for such an extension of theological science must come from theology itself. Can it supply the answer to the requests of modern thinkers? In the second part of his first volume, Thils presents a brief justification of a theology of wordly values.

³ *Retractationes*, VIII, n. 5.

Theology is the science of faith. It moves always under the light of divine revelation, seeking to know what God thinks about the realities that fall under its consideration. The principal reality is, of course, God Himself. The secondary object of theology embraces all other reality in its relation to God. A theology of creatures would fall under this secondary object. But are there indications in revelation of God's thought concerning technology, science, art, politics, culture, and so forth? As the author points out, the formally revealed principles need not be many; theological tracts on the angels, on the Mother of God, on St. Joseph, have been developed from very few revealed principles. The theological task is to penetrate the virtualities of formally revealed principles.

There is another important aspect of which the author treats. While theology of itself is sufficient to judge of all things, in practice, because of our imperfect grasp of it, uses all the subordinate sciences. Of these, philosophy is the principal instrument in the hands of the theologian for judging and ordering all human values. It should be pointed out, however, that philosophy as it is possessed today, even Thomistic philosophy, is not as apt an instrument as it might be. Logic is only a pale reflection of what it should be and is obviously incapable of penetrating the processes of modern mathematics and the experimental sciences. Natural philosophy, the bridge between physical reality and metaphysics, has been withdrawing "from the senses," which, according to Aristotle and St. Thomas, is a fatal mistake. The philosophy of Plato, which could be an invaluable aid to the modern theologian in questions of culture, is practically unknown to him and unappreciated.⁴

A further point should also be made clear: not all the conclusions in a science need be demonstrably necessary. There is always a wide fringe of the probable in any organized science. This is especially true in theology; but even the slightest knowledge about God and divine things is worth having. We may not be able to say with absolute certitude what God thinks, for example, about art or technology, but we can arrive at a "good opinion." While there will always be a movement towards certitude even in these probable conclusions, the certitude itself may not always be obtainable.

* * *

Coming closer to an actual working out of a theology of terrestrial reality, the author points out that the focal point of such theological consideration will naturally be man, for there is sufficient indication in revelation that man is the center of the visible universe. It will be a consideration of the concrete man, such as he is intended by God—a

⁴ Cf. *Plato's Philosophy of Man*, by J. Wild. Ch. 1. Harvard University Press, 1946.

spectator of the whole universe (through his sciences), a lord of lower creation (through his technology), an imitator of the Creator (through his arts), a child of God (through his morality and supernatural religion). Furthermore, man in the concrete cannot be known or judged apart from the God-Man, Jesus Christ, who is predestined by God to be the first-born among many.

A theology of the world man lives in would therefore be an extension of the theology of man. Its general part would parallel the great theological tracts that have already given us a clear knowledge of the relation of man to God: the creation and conservation of all things by God, the government of creatures and their destiny according to the plans of God; Providence and Predestination. Then would follow a consideration of the effect of man's fall on sub-human creatures and on the manifold activities of man himself. Then the Redemption as wrought by Christ and what effects it has on all created reality in and through man. A final section would deal with the ultimate transformation of all creatures at the last judgment. Only then would the theologian be in a position to turn his attention to the various special tracts that should be included in this theology. We feel that the reader might be interested in the tracts that Thils suggests.

1. Theology of the sciences and of culture
2. Theology of human sentiments and 'mystiques'
3. Theology of the family and of educational groups
4. Theology of civil society or the state
5. Theology of the professional and working groups
6. Theology of the human body and of sports
7. Theology of matter and of the universe
8. Theology of technology
9. Theology of the arts
10. Theology of material goods and money
11. Theology of work
12. Theology of play
13. Theology of leisure and pastimes.

* * *

The author wisely points out that when we speak of the redemption of creatures, which presupposes in some sense their fall and implies their elevation to the supernatural, we are using concepts that formally belong only to men, rational creatures; hence we are using analogy. Which type of analogy? The author prefers the analogy of proper proportionality. This is questionable. Later, he admits that art, for example, is not formally supernatural. But here again, a return to the delicately complex

teaching of St. Thomas on analogy is needed, before one can give a clear-cut answer to the question.

A further distinction must also be kept in mind. It is, in fact, mentioned by the author, though not all its implications are developed. Under the term "created reality," or "terrestrial reality," we find all the creatures below man on the scale of being. These are products of God and nature and are essentially good in themselves, though they may be misused by men. But there are also included other products of God and *man*—sciences, arts, social, and political institutions; here a much sharper judgment must be made. These are not simple creatures capable of being included under the general principle—all creation is good. There is a human element in each one of them; they are produced by man and may carry hidden germs of man's corruption. Thus the effect of original sin on sub-human creatures and on art is quite distinct and distinct judgments must be formulated about them.

* * *

In the fourth part of Volume I, the author considers (sketchily, he admits) some particular fields where the theology of terrestrial reality needs to be developed: these are—human societies, culture and civilization, technology, the arts, work. As an example of his procedure, we shall consider the chapter on art, in which he aims to show how art is in contact with the supernatural world of revelation (p. 174 ff.). There are two sections to this chapter; one considers creation and art, the other, the Redeemer and art.

In the beginning God created heaven and earth. The earth was a chaos, no fit place for man, until it was organized by the Spirit of God. Man, the technician and the artist, continues this work of the Spirit under the direction of the Spirit. The work of the artist depends on God both in its matter and in its form; for the artist must presuppose his material, and the formal perfection he adds is an accidental being that is reducible to God as first cause. The faculties of the artist are gifts of God, the activity that flows from these faculties and enriches the world of matter is also under the dominion of God and of Christ. Of course, men may be so fascinated by their power over matter as to forget the influence of God. Nevertheless, God is the author of the talents that some men use so happily.

Passing from the artist to his work, Thils points out that the work of art, in the judgment of the theologian, has a twofold supernatural finality: to render glory to God and to be of service to the baptized.

The work of art contains, as it were, an "ontological" glorification of God; art clothes matter with human and spiritual values, which are pure rays of perfections that are divine wisdom, order, harmony, clarity.

The artist makes the world more like God, more an image, an icon, of God. The artist fulfills God's command to men: subject them. Thils suggests as an example a violin in the hands of a Kreisler.

The work of art is also at the service of the Christian in so far as it contributes to the full terrestrial realization of one who is to be, later, an elect. As St. Thomas noted: "All sciences and arts are ordered to one thing, the perfection of man, which is his happiness."⁵ By way of explanation, Thils adds: "Everything that a man assimilates—material, spiritual, intellectual, supernatural goods—should be ordainable to his fulfilment, his development. On the other hand, this man, of whom we speak, is baptized, affected in his whole "christian" person by all the goods he makes his own. That is why even artistic values bring their contribution to the flowering of a "christian." That is their supernatural finality and their theological explanation. And that is a new aspect of the divine and christian meaning of a work of art" (p. 178).

The author immediately becomes concerned lest he be misunderstood and so he adds: "When one says that a work of art should be at the service of the Christian and that it imbues an original beauty from this finality, it does not mean that art should take for its subject matter only religious and sacred values. This would be to confuse christian and sacred. A work of art is at the service of a Christian when the value of its beauty and all other values it may have can be assimilated by one who is baptized and can become in him a source of true growth. It is the "ordainability" of artistic beauty to the total formation of the baptized that counts most in judging it to be "christian." A "sacred" art—some statue of St. Joseph, for example—could contribute very little to the growth of the baptized and hence be only slightly "christian" in the temporal sense. While a fugue that had no connection with a sacred place could have a very spiritualizing effect on its hearers and constitute a marked "christian" value" (p. 179).

Later, in the section on the Redeemer and the arts, the author adds another point to the "christianity" of art. Quoting G. Bernard, who writes that in every order there exist arts that are more or less pure and that a Bach is saner than a Debussy, Thils asks: "Could we not say, transposing the sentiment of Bernard, that 'there exist in every order arts that are more or less purified, immaterial, spiritual, and "christian": a Bach is more "christian" than a Debussy'" (pp. 182-183).

Granting that the author had a limited amount of space at his disposal for this sketch of a theology of art and admitting that many of his principles are valid, we must say that in our opinion this is not the way to work out such a theology. The following are some of our difficulties.

⁵ *In Lib. Metaphysicorum*, prooemium.

1) The author mentions just in passing that some men use the artistic talents given them by God "happily." Only some men. Does that mean that other men have artistic talents and do not use them at all; or use them "unhappily." If the latter, which is the logical meaning, then we have a central problem from the theological standpoint of determining what is a happy, what an unhappy use of artistic talents.

2) Should not a theology of art above all try to determine what is the distinction between a "sacred" art and a "profane" art? How can one make a theological judgment about the relative value of a mediocre statue of a saint and a brilliant musical composition without first determining their relative finalities? From the tone of the passage quoted, one is almost led to place all great "profane" art above "sacred" art. What constitutes "sacred" art is certainly a question of vital interest for a theologian. There is even the delicate question of whether a great work of "sacred" art can be great in the same formalities as a great work of "profane" art. St. Thomas' distinction between the use of symbols in theology and in poetry would be of assistance here.

3) Plato warned that similarities were difficult things to handle. This does not, it seems, succeed in handling them very well. What does it mean to say, as Bernard is quoted as saying, that Bach is saner than Debussy? One person may be saner than another, without being insane; yet one insane person may be called saner than another. Put the two groups together and we have a hierarchy of sanity; of course, somewhere along the line we pass the great *difference* between insanity and sanity. What then about Bach being more "christian" than Debussy? A Protestant is more "christian" than a Moslem, who in turn is more "christian" than a Buddhist. But what of the differences? We have here the most fundamental fallacy of modern thought—the ignoring of differences, the selection of ever more generic likenesses. If such a technique is used by the theologian, he will fall into the error of "theologism," and will never formulate a true theology of art or any other created good.

It is especially unfortunate that we do not have a well-developed theology of art. Perhaps of all the fields of human endeavor, the field of art is best disposed at the present time. Modern art has reached its nadir; it can scarcely go further in unintelligibility. Even the artists bear testimony to this in some fields. Writers have allowed Stein and Joyce to remain in their dead-end illiteracy; painters have about abandoned their contrived kaleidoscopes; Matisse is now engaged in decorating a Dominican Sister's chapel and Dali has flamboyantly announced his return to his religious faith; modern music can hardly get duller or more dissonant; and even the architects bemoan the condition of their art; after all, one can't get beyond a straight line. When there is nothing for the technique of art to express, the artists start experimenting with

the technique to see how far it can be pushed. Fortunately, the technique of art cannot be pushed much further. The artist is bound to start looking for something worth while to express by his art. That is why he needs a theology of art.

* * *

G. Thils' second volume is concerned with a theology of history, that is, with a theological interpretation of temporal duration. The early section is reminiscent of the dialectical approach of an Aristotle. Thils presents various contemporary opinions and works through to his own presentation.

He affirms that human history has a meaning and that it is intelligible in the light of divine revelation. He utilizes the contrast, Flesh-Spirit, familiar to the student of St. John and St. Paul, as the basic revealed insight into human history. Having explained its meaning according to modern exegetes, he shows how it may be used as a criterion for judging the phenomena of human history, as a guide for human action in the temporal field, and as a prognostic of the future development of the human struggle. He finds numerous reasons for optimism and they are well founded. There is no reason to think, he says, that the battle between good and evil here below will end in a tie.

While here again we would prefer much greater philosophical analysis, the author has succeeded in presenting an excellent example of what should be a theology of terrestrial reality. We hope that he will continue his studies along these lines. We especially hope that others will come to his assistance; a thorough study of the Fathers of the Church on all these questions would be invaluable.

There can be no doubt that in the traditional instruments of divine revelation and sane philosophy we have the efficacious means to establish a theology of the world we live in and thereby lead every intellect captive to the truth and restore all things to Christ, which are the obligations placed upon us by St. Paul.

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The Commonsense Psychiatry of Adolph Meyer. Selected papers edited by Alfred Lief. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948. Pp. 677. \$6.50.

When Adolph Meyer died on March 17, 1950, he received what this reviewer believed to be quite inadequate obituaries in both *The New York Times* and *The New York Herald Tribune*. Here was a man who was certainly one of the most outstanding thinkers psychiatry has had. He was the man who by nature and training was able to integrate much of

the knowledge of his time about people, knowledge formerly walled off in medicine or education or sociology or philosophy which he was able to put together in a total "science of man." The obituaries did not recognize this; rather both of them mentioned him as the man who in 1933 "made a nine month's study of Giuseppe Zangara, the assassin who fired at the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt and killed Mayor Anton Cermak of Chicago instead. 'We should decline the idea of a criminal brain,' Dr. Meyer said afterward." (New York Herald Tribune, March 18, 1950). This last statement implies that the answer as to why Zangara was a criminal is to be found not in a study of the brain but his whole life. To be sure, Dr. Meyer was a very careful student of neuroanatomy and neuropathology. He undoubtedly studied this brain very thoroughly because he had, prior to this time, been interested in the assassins of President William McKinley and of President James Garfield. He had thought then that these assassins were poorly handled by the psychiatrists who failed to take into consideration the total life history of these men. Certainly, if he spent nine months on the brain of the 1933 assassin, he did it chiefly in order to answer those people who would attempt to overlook a study of the facts of a man's life and offer false but apparently scientific explanations based on brain anatomy and brain physiology. Dr. Meyer was interested not only in the structural functions of a person's brain; he wanted to know all the facts about that person: his ambitions, his opportunities in life, his misfortunes, the personality of his father and mother. All of the facts which helped to shape the man were of interest to Adolph Meyer and to him a fact was "anything that made a difference."

Adolph Meyer, the son of a Zwinglian minister, was born near Zurich, Switzerland, on September 13, 1866. As a young boy he was undecided whether to follow his father's career and go into theology and philosophy or whether to follow the career of his mother's uncle and become a physician. He decided on the latter course. After receiving his medical education in Switzerland and part of his psychiatric orientation in England, he arrived in 1892 in Chicago where a new university had been opened. There he met John Dewey who was a life-long friend and who encouraged him in a pluralistic approach to all of the problems of science. From Chicago he went in 1895 to the Worcester State Hospital. Here he emphasized that the pathologist should not be working downstairs in the laboratory but rather should be working on the wards with the patients to learn as much as possible about them. In 1902 he went to the New York Institute of Pathology, the predecessor of the present Psychiatric Institute of New York, in which he continued his work, begun at Worcester. He encouraged his young men to seek a completely thorough life history of the patients, for he insisted that these were the

real facts with which the doctor should work. It was said later that one could always tell a Meyer trained man by the thoroughness of his history. Undoubtedly, even as a young man he was the outstanding psychiatrist in America. Whenever a new important position opened, Dr. Meyer was the man selected to fill it. This happened in Worcester, again in New York, and when Johns Hopkins Hospital, which was already favored by having great men such as Halsted, Osler, and Kelly, decided to have a psychiatric division, Dr. Meyer was chosen to head it. From 1908, when he first started working with Henry Phipps, the steel magnate, on the plans for the new clinic, until 1941, when he retired at the age of seventy-five, he made the development of the Henry Phipps Psychiatric Clinic at the Johns Hopkins Hospital his life work. Under his guidance, the Phipps became one of the leading psychiatric institutions in the world. Doctors came from everywhere to study at the Phipps under Meyer and went back to become professors and leaders in their own countries. He brought a thoroughness, a good sense, and a dignity to the study of psychiatry which it had seldom previously had.

What are some of the leading ideas that Dr. Adolph Meyer developed? When psychiatrists think of Adolph Meyer, they immediately think of psychobiology—a term which to most of them is still a mystery. Actually, Adolph Meyer was hoping by this term to break up the old dualism between mind and body. He wanted people to realize that the mind was not something mysterious but that rather it was something that could be observed in action, particularly if one considered the total behavior of the person: what he said and what he did. Meyer said that the mind in particular had the function of dealing with symbols—pictures, words, sounds that stood for external facts which the mind could then use to store as memories or to manipulate in reasoning. He emphasized in particular that the brain was the bearer of mental life and that it was through the brain that symbolization and the functions of the mind were made possible. He was always very careful to distinguish between mind and soul and to state quite clearly that the soul was ultra-biological and not, therefore, an object for biological study. He was in no sense a disbeliever in a soul, but he was a very clear thinker who was able to distinguish between brain, mind, and soul in a way that most people cannot. Brain to him was an organic reality, mind was a kind of functioning of the total person, soul was something ultra-biological or supernatural that was not to be studied with the objective methods of science, but that, nevertheless, could be equally real. The present day term of psychosomatic would be disturbing to Dr. Meyer, because again there is this distinction between mind and body which he thought was so useless and which he thought had too long been continued. Psychobiology, then, to him was a study of the total person,

a study of "a living body in action." He considered that one could very carefully and accurately observe what a person did, record his life history, and thereby come to an understanding about his life which would make possible the prediction and control which are so necessary to science. He was highly critical of the scientists of the past who had taken the methods of physics and chemistry and who seemed to think that by subdividing man's nature into smaller and smaller parts they could come to understand it. He thought scientists had made two mistakes, (1) that of "atomizing" and (2) that in attempting to avoid mysticism so that they had gone too much toward materialism. He stated clearly that the functions of science are to observe, formulate, and test, and he thought that by taking the person's total life one could perform all these functions of science in a perfectly real, simple manner. He went also toward pluralism because he thought that isolated particles could not tell us all that was to be known.

Meyer regarded empiricism as being a practical, common-sense way of learning what works. His psychiatric treatment was based on this thorough study of the individual from which he hoped not only to learn the problems which had defeated the person but also to discover the assets and strengths which the person possessed that might aid in his recovery. He thought that a person with a mental illness must be removed from the surroundings which had played a part in the illness. He did not favor particularly drugs and was, as a matter of fact, surprised that Americans so much wanted drugs because the Germans did not. He taught that certainly drugs should not replace simple obvious necessities such as food and rest. He held that the patient should be taken to a small hospital near the community in which he lived so that the doctors could understand the kind of life problems which that particular patient had had to face. His psychotherapy aimed toward action. He did not believe that he had really achieved results in psychotherapy until the person went through to effective action. He was impressed that there were not simple causes for mental illness but rather that mental illness very frequently had, in fact in all cases had, a multiple causation. He was critical of those psychiatrists who had particularly, following the Germans and Kraepelin, gone very much toward diagnosis. He considered that this diagnosis was often intending to try to find an organic basis for the condition, and he thought that it certainly didn't help better to understand the person; in fact, he would rather work with the facts as he found them than attempt by means of a diagnosis to make an uncertain prediction about the future. He maintained that psychiatry had "too much verbiage" and that many psychiatrists had made the mistake of attempting to "neurologize" and explain on neurological bases

things which really they could only understand by considering the total life picture.

When Freud first developed his psychoanalysis, Meyer was very receptive as he was bound to be to any new contribution to the field of psychiatry. He felt that Freud had done a real service in emphasizing the sexual factors, in bringing them out in the open, and particularly in noting that there were early sexual manifestations. Later Meyer became very disappointed to see that the new psychoanalytic theories led to quarreling rather than to an attempt by various psychiatrists to understand one another. He could not accept really that there was an unconscious, but rather he thought that within the mind there were leading activities and other activities which were less leading. He thought that the psychoanalysts were placing too much emphasis on a part of the picture and considered that psychiatry was really much broader than psychoanalysis. He believed that psychoanalysis presently became over-dogmatic and developed mechanistic theories which he could not accept. One does not get the impression in reading Meyer that his opposition to psychoanalysis was based on what the analysts would call "resistance," but rather that his opposition was based on his own knowledge of the facts about people.

The interesting thing about reading Adolph Meyer is to find the very sound and helpful ideas which he had on a great variety of subjects. In mental hygiene he thought that the effort should be toward people of those families in which there had been mental illness. He thought that these people would be more receptive to the ideas of mental hygiene and that they would be more in need of them. He was not an outright advocate of heredity as all important in producing mental illness. He considered it one of the factors, but he believed that by the proper application of the principles of mental hygiene it would be possible to prevent mental illness in the families of those whose parents or grandparents had been sick. As a matter of fact, his own mother had a depression after he came to this country, and one gets the impression that his knowledge of his mother's past life helped him a great deal to understand the kind of factors which may lead to mental illness. This knowledge kept him from thinking that it was some kind of a purely organic difficulty. In mental hygiene he emphasized the development of sound habits and recognized early that schizophrenia might really be a "habit deterioration." Recently there has been certain emphasis in psychiatry on a theory by Bellak called "The Multiple Factor Psychosomatic Theory of Schizophrenia." Adolph Meyer forty years ago had a pluralistic psychobiological theory of schizophrenia which included all and more than is stated in this "new" theory.

In the field of education he felt that psychiatry had much to contribute

and he thought further that psychiatry had much to learn from education. The following are some simple examples of the kind of thing that he believed: that homework was bad for a child and that the child should really complete his work while he was in school so that he could go home and take part in the life of his family; that school work should go much beyond the formal lessons which were taught and should go more toward helping a child actually to live life; that part-time students made a better adjustment to life than full-time students. He was opposed to learning by rote memory as a special activity in school and said that scientific studies did not show that this really improved one's memory. As for discipline, he went back to the Latin root of the word to show that it meant a person who followed a leader, and he thought that there could be this kind of discipline which was highly desirable and which would not necessarily include punishment.

In the field of religion we see that all of his life he recognized that this was a need of man and he showed proper respect toward religion. He was, however, opposed to any dogma of religion which would tend to obscure or make useless or prevent the propagation of a known fact. He fought against dogma in religion just as he fought dogma in science. He was opposed really to theories of "exclusive salvation" but he did think that it was very unfortunate that in the school system the religious would probably proceed to paying more attention to the here and now and to helping men to live in this world more successfully. He held that it was very unfortunate that in the school system the religious ethical values had been dropped, and he could see that their elimination from the public school system increased the need for parochial schools. He believed it possible to develop a "biologically sound idealism" which would include all of the biological facts of man including religious supernatural nature and thus make man a happier, more effective, person.

What position may we as Catholics take toward psychiatry in general and psychobiology in particular? In the reviewer's opinion, Adolph Meyer's teachings offer one of the best bases on which the Catholic or any other person can approach psychiatry. His understanding of the field was so broad that he included all of the possible factors that may play a role in a person's life. He was humane. He was understanding. No evidence exists that he was at any time in opposition to the Catholic Church although he may well, on certain issues, have taken a position different from that of the Church since he was the kind of person who opposed dogma of any kind. He would have been as much against the dogmas of science as he would have been against the dogmas of the Church, but his opposition to the dogmas of the Church would have been present only when they extended out of the field of theology and of morals and into the field of scientific facts where he thought there was an evidence

which contradicted the Church's position. As a matter of fact, as thinking intelligent people, we have a very definite obligation to assume an attitude not unlike that of Dr. Meyer's: constantly curious for new information and yet very cautious about accepting information until scientifically proven. Our own obligation extends beyond making certain that the new fact is properly proven to seeing that this new fact is properly integrated and synthesized into the already known knowledge which again was a function that Adolph Meyer so often performed. As Catholics we have, however, two further obligations toward new facts about man such as may be discovered by psychiatry and related sciences. One of these is to see that these new facts are properly understood in relation to the teachings of the Church and that they are not misused by the materialists in attempts to disprove spiritual beliefs. The second obligation is for each of us to acquire all of the new knowledge that we can so that we may find Christian solutions from the many problems in relation to man of our own generation. By giving our psychiatric approach a broad base such as that of psychobiology we will be able to integrate all of the new knowledge and be able to have a total picture of man such as we could not possibly have if we took up only one special division such as biochemistry, neurophysiology or psychoanalysis.

The reviewer has withheld his evaluation of the actual book until now because he did not want to discourage the reader in the first paragraph. This book, *The Common Sense Psychiatry of Adolph Meyer* by Alfred Lief, is a collection of fifty-two papers by Adolph Meyer. Dr. Meyer was a very thorough, conscientious person who found it very difficult to express his thoughts in such a way that they satisfied him and that they would be understandable to another person. Many of his students did not understand his lectures, and in many of his papers the thoughts are difficult to grasp. Because Adolph Meyer never wrote a textbook Mr. Lief thought it would be wise to collect his outstanding papers. This book does that. It is really a source book of the principal papers of Adolph Meyer. Most of these papers are extremely worthwhile but as an English friend of mine, who had pleasantly anticipated reading the book said, "It is profoundly dull." However, it is only dull if one tries to hurry through it or if one tries to use it as other than a source book. The material in it is a necessity for all people in the psychiatric field who must know what Adolph Meyer thought or they will find themselves developing a new theory which Dr. Meyer had long before them. Mr. Lief has made a contribution which has made the reading of the book easier in that he has introduced twelve chapters of his own which summarize the material that follows each of these chapters. A suggestion in reading the book would be to read through these twelve chapters and then go back to the particular papers of Dr. Meyer

which are of interest at that time. The book is one which each of us should own and to which we should turn repeatedly to understand the intelligent, scientific, and complete approach to psychiatry and therefore to the understanding of man which Adolph Meyer developed.

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Citizen Thomas More and his Utopia. By RUSSELL AMES. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949. Pp. 238. \$3.50.

Citizen Thomas More and His Utopia offers a new and important historical perspective on Thomas More and the *Utopia*. A number of exceptions may be taken to the book's main thesis, and there is room for controversy about semantic implications in some of Dr. Ames's evaluations. But these matters do not lessen the general value of the work.

Dr. Ames's main contribution is historical. He places the *Utopia* in its concrete historical context, and, in so doing, he illuminates the life of More in a way that could profitably be pursued by professional hagiographers. Dr. Ames generalizes his thesis in these words:

Though it is true that the *Utopia* is somewhat anti-capitalist, both from the idealist-medieval and embryonic-socialist point of view, the core of the book is republican, bourgeois, and democratic—the result of More's experience as a man of business, as a politician, and as an Erasmian reformer.

Nearly all the words in the quoted statement have a wide range of connotation for different readers, and we shall illustrate their meaning as Dr. Ames uses them. The term bourgeois might at first alarm an admirer of the Saint, but the word has quite a different implication for Dr. Ames than, let us say, for Leon Bloy. In leading to his thesis, the author follows the type of investigation that is to be found in Lily B. Campbell's *Shakespeare's "Histories"—Mirrors of Elizabethan Policy*. Such investigation is founded on the historical fact that Renaissance social critics frequently wrote about their times under conditions of analogy. Thus Shakespeare is not writing his "histories" because of any passionate regard for the past, but rather because he wishes to comment, for those who have eyes and ears, upon the political conditions of Elizabeth's day. The Essex conspirators did not attend Shakespeare's *Richard II* because of medieval antiquarianism; they attended such a play because it was a political manifesto in terms of analogy. *Richard II* was turned toward Elizabethan policy and away from medieval history. More's *Utopia* was turned away from "Utopia" and faced very vividly the present state of

England. Dr. Ames shows how concrete a book the *Utopia* is; even its vision of a better world is strictly related to the historical facts and possibilities of the time. *Utopia* is not Utopian.

It is reasonable to assume that every item of criticism in *Utopia* recalled to well informed readers precise events in current history, many of which may not be easy to identify today.

I

What was More's position in regard to capitalism? From the viewpoint of Dr. Ames, More's position was complex. More strongly criticized decadent feudalism "in the interests of the 'best' aspects of rising capitalism, medieval and Renaissance." Capitalism is an ambivalent word. Obviously the medieval economic system, following in theory but not in practice Roman Canon Law, had been superseded by More's time. More's close relationship with the Mercers' Company (thoroughly investigated by Dr. Ames), his ambassadorial duties and missions were concerned with contemporary trade and economics. More knew too much about business to be a simple anti-capitalist doctrinaire. But a number of his observations show how far-sighted he was in this matter; he could foresee one direction that capitalism might, and did, take. Like Maritain in our own day, More was not interested in salvaging historical forms but rather in elucidating principles that could be implemented in their respective individuated historical contexts. As Dr. Ames points out, the Guilds were on their way out; More was not interested in Guild *forms*, but in Guild *principles*. Capitalism as a means of creating and exchanging wealth was an improvement technologically over the feudal system. Capitalism, however, as a religion and system of morality ultimately denies Christian principles. It does not require much intellectual subtlety to approve of the one aspect of capitalism and to condemn the other. I have often thought that in some ways, More's economic thinking and that of Henry George (*Progress and Poverty*) offer profitable parallels. Both think of capital in terms of the creation of wealth through labor and natural increase; neither thinks of capital in terms of usury, of differentials by deliberately stimulated fluctuations in the value of money, by deficit financing, by the arbitrary creating or extinguishing of credits. They are both opposed to the use of capital for the purpose of creating money wealth at the cost of real wealth, the "economics of scarcity" or monopoly. Both are equally concerned with taxation, its meaning, and proper social forms that would encourage, rather than militate against, productive labor. As Dr. Ames points out, much of More's parliamentary activity was concerned with taxation. Dr. Ames summarizes More's view of mercantilism as indicated in the *Utopia* in these words:

He differs from later and more fully developed mercantilists in basing his objections to luxuries on moral and philosophic grounds rather than on purely commercial ones. His circulation of a capital has a charitable rather than a selfish character; and in this, too, his thought is genuinely medieval and international rather than mercantilist and national. It would be wrong, however, to say that in these things More stood for medieval collectivism and order against capitalist individualism and laissez-faire. Mercantilism demanded its own kind of order, and regulation was its dominant characteristic (p. 158).

The *Utopia* presents a controlled economy. It is not, however, a socialist society in the Platonic sense. More does not say that the citizen exists for the state or that there are no rights anterior to those of the state. *Utopia* is most definitely a "social welfare" state, and contemporaries frequently misapply semantics here and would call such a state "socialistic." The Utopians are well situated in terms of basic needs and of security, because of their soundly conceived state. But their society is anti-capitalist in its rejection of luxury and of superfluity; supply and demand are not related to money concentration but to social needs; in *Utopia* a diamond is not the equivalent of several years of a professor's life, nor a fur coat as valuable as a man's house. More insists on the dignity of the worker—not merely on his dignity, but on the social superiority of his function:

Not only does More show the poor man to be superior to the rich and mighty in individual morality but he also, as some of the above quotations suggest, extends the superiority into social values and economic theory. Following medieval scholastic theory, in a rough way he anticipates the labor theory of value which Benjamin Franklin and Karl Marx later developed; and his statements on the primacy of labor have the quality of those made by Abraham Lincoln. Near the end of *Utopia*, in a place of final emphasis, Hythlodaye asks what justice is this, that "poore labourers, carters, yronsmaythes, carpenters, and plowmen, by so greate and continual toyle, as drawing and bearinge beastes be skant hable to susteine, and againe so necessary toyle, that without it no common wealth were hable to continew and endure one yere, should yet get so harde and poore a lyving . . . ?" (p. 175-176)

Dr. Ames stresses More's emphasis on the responsibility of society for the evil doer. It is a demension which was lacking in the thought of many contemporaries, who smugly accepted the Late Augustinian thesis of the essential perversion of man and whose social consciences were consequently anaesthetized. But Dr. Ames seems to suggest that More finds the *only* cause of evil in social compulsion, rather than the *main* cause in the England of Henry VIII. Dr. Ames seems to stretch a point otherwise basically sound.

II

By *bourgeois* Dr. Ames implies the interests of the middle class in the economic sense. He does not mean the spiritual attitude so thoroughly

and rightfully condemned by contemporary Catholic writers. More was bourgeois in the sense that he was legitimately devoted to the legitimate interests of the London middle class. Dr. Ames states:

Citizen Thomas More had little patience and little in common with the landed aristocrat, the hunter-warrior. Like his Utopians, he was thoroughly bourgeois—unchivalrous, peace-loving, intellectually aggressive. Whereas the slave-owner Plato made the ideal citizen of his republic a soldier first, and a philosopher second, the Utopian is a scholar first and a soldier only when he has to be. In our time this same contrast has been noted—between the fascist and democratic ideals—and in this, as in many matters, the thought of Thomas More remains a living force (p. 114).

More insists on electoral processes in Utopia, together with many and specific safeguards against any conspiracy to seize power from the top. The King's power is thoroughly restricted and representative. Nor is there any place for a feudal nobility or the new capitalist nobility that were to enclose the lands of England:

And perhaps the chief characteristic of *Utopia* is its complete elimination of the land-owning nobility, while the merchants, priests, and scholars remain, and the peasants and citizens are merged into one city-country class. The age-old conflict and inequality between city and country is here resolved, not by turning backward to primitive village communism, but by urban socialism. The lives of the equal citizens center in the towns in an atmosphere of culture, relative luxury, social responsibility, and mutual helpfulness (p. 99).

Dr. Ames particularly stresses various continental movements, particularly those of the Swiss Federation, that gave More his basis for the league of cities in *Utopia*. More's vision of the well-ordered city in which poverty (in the sense of deprivation) and wealth (in the sense of luxury) were absent, in which work was performed with moderation and decorum that allowed time for contemplation, study, and social life, was historically approximated in the Flemish towns so well known both to him and Erasmus. Both More and Erasmus, from Dr. Ames's evidence, were not monarchists, and preferred a middle class city-republican government.

The policies of kings and nobles, especially their wars and the taxation which accompanied war, met with the consistent opposition of the Erasmian reformers and their friends (p. 109).

More in a letter to Erasmus, just before the printing of the *Utopia*, points out that it would be a greater honor for a prince to rule over *free men* than over *subjects*. In the *Utopia* itself, "the anti-democratic point of view is represented from time to time by a lawyer who provides Hythlodaye with ample opportunity for anatomizing the English ruling class":

The lawyer begins by praising the rigorous justice which has brought so many thieves to the gallows, and he wonders why, then, there are so many thieves. Hythlodaye says that, rather than the extreme sentence of death, thieves should be given a chance to make a living. But the lawyer insists that "the matter is wel ynough provided for already. Ther must be handy craftes, there is husbandrye to gette their livynge by, if they would not willingly be nought." In reply Hythlodaye begins his surgery on the sick body of English economy, describing the material causes of unemployment, vagabondage, theft, and vice—and these are the maintenance of idle serving men by the nobility, monopoly in sheep, neglect of the breeding of beef cattle, price-fixing, and, above all, the destruction of the peasantry by enclosing land for sheep pasture (p. 169).

As Dr. Ames points out, More clearly understood "the kind of inflexible and stupid conservatism that he was up against."

Hythlodaye describes the behavior of conservatives confronted with unfamiliar proposals: "If all other poore helpes fayle, then this is their extreame refuge. These things (say they) pleased our fore-fathers and auncestors; would God we could be so wise as thei were: and as though thei had wittely concluded the matter, and with this answer stopped every man's mouth, they sitte downe againe" (p. 168).

There is something peculiarly delightful about *Citizen* More, hard-hitting and hard-headed social critic. The facts bear out the picture well, a dimension equally important as that of humanist or Lord Chancellor or Catholic apologist:

The English middle class had, of course, its leaders and spokesmen. Particularly at the time of the writing of *Utopia*, Thomas More had become not only a practical spokesman for sections of the middle class but an exceptionally advanced social theoretician who "went beyond his own class" to champion the interests of the peasant and the worker (p. 76).

Of More's capacity in regard to social justice, Dr. Ames observes toward the end of the book:

Such pity and indignation, such social analysis, is the triumph of Thomas More's humanity and intellect over irrationality, prejudice, personal convenience, and fear (p. 177).

III

What kind of picture did More present of Catholicism in its existential sense at this historical period? From Dr. Ames's analysis, the viewpoint of More is identical with that of Erasmus:

The basic harmony of More's and Erasmus' views had been ignored, minimized, or denied by the hagiographic tradition of More scholarship, no doubt mainly because Erasmus is "a dubious character from the point of view of the counter-reformation" (p. 105).

Erasmus has suffered at the hands of polemical scholarship because he was an intellectual, dispassionate and universal, who had to thread his way gingerly amid the mediocre and the bigoted. He cannot be made to follow a "Catholic line" or a "Protestant line." His, like More's, was the type of mind that accepted the complexity of the real. Erasmus, who advised Pope Adrian to call a general Council and who refused in his late years to accept a Cardinal's hat, was not a "dubious character" from the point of view of the counter-reformation. He is simply a dubious character from the point of view of a handful of unintelligent and narrow-minded propagandists who have mistaken themselves for Catholic historians. In a letter dated July 14, 1532, More absolves Erasmus from the censure that was attached to his *In Praise of Folly* for its picture of decadent clericalism. Erasmus is not more to be reproached for the misconstruction put upon his words than the early Fathers were to be blamed for the similar fate that befell them:

He who would wish to attribute this to you as a fault will labor hard doubtlessly before he will find satisfactory way to excuse the very holiest doctors of the ancient Church; for surely, if they saw this age of ours as they beheld their own, they would have made many statements each to his own age more cautiously and more clearly. Now, since they failed to do so, because while they were ministering to the evils which confronted them future evils did not enter their minds, the same thing happened to them, forsooth, that these people are now blaming you for.

More in the *Utopia* gives scathing criticism of the existential Church. This criticism was in the Catholic tradition; it was designed to make the Church more Catholic rather than less. It is uninhibited and does not pussyfoot:

The chief economic crime which More describes in *Utopia*, enclosure, is partly laid to the account of the clergy. As was noted above, there are "noblemen, and gentlemen: yea and certeyn Abbottes, holy men" who "throw doune houses . . . plucke down townes, and leave nothing standynge, but only the church to be made a shepe-howse." Indeed, these "holy" men are rather emphasized among the scoundrels who drive husbandmen and their wives and children into vagabondage by "fraude, or by violent oppression," in order that "one covetous and unsatiable cormaraunte and very plague of his natyve countrey maye compasse aboute and inclose many thousand akers of ground" (p. 140).

It is well to remember to what depths the Renaissance Church, in spite of its outward splendor and vast land holdings, had sunk, not only on the Continent but also in England. Many of the higher ecclesiastics were primarily interested in politics and in war:

The humane and peace-loving conduct of Utopian priests during battles was surely a serious reproach to popes like Julius II and to those English bishops and abbots who fought at Flodden Field in 1513 (p. 149).

It is largely due to the defalcation of these responsible clergy that England was lost to the Catholic Church. Belloc's thesis that the Faith was stolen from the people of England is only one aspect of the problem. It would be truer to say that the Bishops and Abbots of the time (with a few notable exceptions) surrendered the Faith without a battle. The Bishops acknowledged in Convocation Henry VIII as head of the Church with the proviso, "as far as the law of Christ allows." The only arguments that can support this equivocation were pragmatic; but the equivocation, in fact, did not work. The clergy submitted in May, 1532. Eight years later there was not a house of religion left in England. As Dr. Ames points out, "there is good evidence from records of the time that the clergy took a large part in the great wave of landgrabbing that was sweeping England." The evidence indicates that the clergy, with a few notable exceptions, lacked the spiritual resources to be aware of the historical crisis of the time. They were too much part and parcel of the contemporary environment. They profited for a brief period on a pragmatic level and were then extinguished.

More was an adult, unsentimental Catholic. He had to face issues in the light of his intellect and of his conscience. He was asked in prison why as a layman he was taking a stand not shared by the Bishops of England. He replied that he was following the Universal Church, not the decisions of the national bishops. He realized that the clergy were weak and "lacked grace constantly to stand to their learning."

Dr. Ames overlooks the complexity of Catholic thought in one inference he makes:

There is no point in trying to prove by involved reasoning that More was conservative, orthodox, and medieval. The organic impact of *Utopia* is not at all of that quality.

Within the Church there is a wide range of intellection and fulfilment. There would have been an enormous range between one of the Bishops who fought at Flodden Field and More himself, or between, let us say, a Maritain today and a member of the Action Française. Perhaps the Church is not so conservative in the sense that Dr. Ames's semantics imply. After all, it is people like Thomas Aquinas, Thomas More, and Joan of Arc who have been raised to Her altars, not Torquemada, Cardinal Wolsey, or a Queen Isabella. The saints are those who gave themselves, who contributed to God's "great blaze of being," not those who attempted to possess and to retrench.

Dr. Ames in another section of his book modifies this estimate:

The *Utopia* is, then, neither libertarian nor conservative: it is uncompromising against atheism but extremely tolerant of religious differences, discussion, and improvements. More feared that if people were forced "by violence and threat-

enings, if contention and debate in that behalfe should continuallye be used . . . the best and holiest religion would be trodden underfote" (p. 143).

In my article, "The Conception of Society in More's *Utopia*," (*Thought*, September, 1947), I presented what seems to me to be More's view on religious toleration which, I pointed out, was analogous to Maritain's "pluralism." In Appendix A of Dr. Ames's book, the subject matter is "Religious Toleration in Utopia vs. More's Persecution of Heretics." While I do not believe this subject has been investigated along legal lines, it is possible that the solution of this ambiguity is to be found there. A judge has to decide according to the written law of the land, even if he personally questions its wisdom. I have not read a good paper on the extent to which law at this period is mandatory or discretionary. It would seem that this matter is worth looking into. More's "liberal" view was not indicative, of course, of that of all Catholics. Lord Acton in his essay on St. Bartholomew's Day reveals what the "strong arm" approach to ideological error could ultimately mean in a complete travesty of transcendent Christian principle. But More had anticipated according to Roper in his *Life* the day we "wold gladly wishe to be at a league and composition with them (heretics), to let them have their churches quietly to themselves; so that they wold be contente to let us have ours quietly to ourselves."

It is also significant that during the last years of More's life, till the end of his chancellorship, there was not one death sentence pronounced in the diocese of London (Chambers, *Thomas More*, p. 275).

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Psychologie et Morale aux XII^e et XIII^e Siècles: Tome 11, Première Partie.

By ODIN LOTTIN. Louvain: Editions de l'Abbaye du Mont César, 1948. Pp. 597.

In an age when Christian civilization is experiencing violent upheavals even from within its own family of nations and when American democracy, one of its children, is no longer completely sure of itself and its origins, the understanding of the foundations of Christian ethics assumes great importance. In earlier ages, perhaps, Christian men could take for granted the principles and values which they possessed in common. Our American forefathers, for example, were satisfied in calling some of these truths "self-evident" and letting it go at that. Now such basic concepts as the dignity of man and fundamental rights no longer seem self-evident to many and are openly rejected by not a few. In such a time, published

research such as that of Abbé Lottin, on the origin and development of moral principles, is not simply a matter of historic interest but of prime, immediate concern and practical value to all thinkers in the Christian tradition.

It is impossible to appreciate not only our Christian ethical tradition but our political and legal democracy if we have not in some measure retraced the tortuous path by which the essential moral principles governing law and conscience, rights and duties, reason and instinct were gradually unfolded, clarified, and defined. Much as we may be dazzled by the material successes of Christian civilization and democracy and astounding as each further advance of the physical sciences is, such physical achievements might well have been impossible had it not been for the earlier, less spectacular but more necessary advances in the clarification of fundamental moral concepts. Roscoe Pound has recently said,

It is not an accident that jurisprudence and ethics and politics grew up and reached what may prove their maximum before there was much development of the physical sciences. The latter, indeed, could not have arisen nor gone far had it not been for the stability and security brought about and maintained by the former. If not so striking to the eye at first glance, the subjection of human behavior to the exigencies of civilized life by ordered application of the force of politically organized society which has developed in the western world since the chaos of the earlier Middle Ages, is quite as significant as anything which has been done in the same time toward the harnessing of external nature to man's use.¹

For these reasons especially, the work of Abbé Lottin in his second volume, *Problèmes de Morale* (Première Partie) will be of very special interest to American scholars. The first part of this series deals with the development of psychology in the 12th and 13th centuries. Here, in this second volume, is presented a series of researches in law and moral principles. It is a thorough and painstaking work. With a facility that belies the intense research that went into it, the author takes us, on each point, through the whole scholastic tradition which preceded St. Thomas and shows us the delicate process by which changes in phraseology and understanding gradually found their full expression in the precise definitions of the 13th century and especially of St. Thomas.

The volume takes up in order the question of law in general, and the relations of the eternal and natural law. It then considers the associated concepts of synderesis and of conscience. This is followed by a study on the nature of conscience and by two chapters on the normative value of

¹ Roscoe Pound: "The Future of American Law," *Seminar*, Annual Extraordinary Number of *The Jurist*, Volume IV, published by the School of Canon Law, The Catholic University of America, 1946, p. 3.

conscience and on the manner in which, in the 13th century, doubts of conscience were resolved.

One of the most helpful things about Abbé Lottin's study on the problems of morals is the way in which he gathers together the opinions of significant medieval writers around the different points treated. In a series of two or three short paragraphs, the reader gets an overall picture. The following short excerpt illustrates this:

La première propriété attribué à la loi naturelle par les théologiens du XII^e et du XIII^e siècles est son innéité.

Les règles fondamentales de la loi naturelle, dit-on dans l'école d'Anselme de Laon, sont inscrites au cœur de l'homme. Ainsi parlent les théologiens, Hugues de Saint-Victor et tous unanimement.

Guillaume d'Auxerre insiste longuement sur cette propriété, à la manière de saint Augustin: en voyant Dieu, l'âme connaît la souveraine bonté et en celle-ci toutes les règles de la bonté morale.

Saint Albert le Grand, on l'a vu, intègre dans la loi naturelle les conclusions les plus proches qu'on en déduit; malgré cette concession, il revendique l'innéité de la loi naturelle, parce que celle-ci se constitue avant tout des premiers principes qui nous sont innés.

Saint Thomas lui-même suit son maître: tout en faisant consister la loi naturelle dans des jugements de la raison pratique, et donc dans des actes de la raison, il conserve la formule consacrée par un usage séculaire, *praecepta prima et communia sunt scripta in ratione naturali quasi per se nota.*" (p. 97)

Again on the question of the immutability and the universality of the natural law, the same easy scholarship leads us rapidly from the views of one medieval writer to the other:

La seconde propriété de la loi naturelle est son immutabilité. Dans quel sens la loi naturelle est-elle immuable? Si elle est immuable, elle est du même coup universelle; mais au surplus n'est-elle pas indispensable? Et dans ce cas, Dieu peut-il en dispenser? Autant d'aspects d'une même propriété fondamentale.

Gratien souligne cette immutabilité, *nec variatur tempore sed immutabile permanet.* Mais une difficulté surgit: le même Gratien, après Isidore de Séville, affirme que l'indivision des terres est de droit naturel; comment la propriété privée peut-elle aussi être de droit naturel? Rufin trouva la formule: l'indivision des terres de l'humanité primitive n'était pas un précepte strict, mais une simple *demonstratio*, variable selon les circonstances. L'explication de Rufin fit fortune chez les décrétistes, mais eut peu d'écho dans le monde théologique.

Guillaume d'Auxerre reprend cependant la formule de Rufin, mais il en change le sens: l'indivision des terres est une *demonstratio* qui était obligatoire dans l'état de justice originelle; la propriété privée est, dans l'état de l'humanité déchue, une tolérance, ou si l'on veut un mal nécessaire.

La formule même de *demonstratio* disparaît avec Albert le Grand, c'est la *ratio naturalis* qui dictait l'indivision des terres aux temps primitifs; et c'est cette même *ratio naturalis* qui dicte le régime de propriété privée dans l'état actuel de l'humanité.

C'est à peu près dans le même sens que saint Thomas d'Aquin fait relever le

régime de propriété privée du *ius gentium* d'Ulpien, entendez le droit naturel spécifiquement humain, relevant de la *ratio naturalis*." (Pp. 97-98)

In this way the reader is saved the labor of going through many of these writers. Abbé Lottin gives him the precise contribution which they made to any one particular moral principle or theory. Most of us do not have libraries immediately at hand which would contain the works, especially of the little known medieval writers. Even if such works were available, it would be very difficult to cull out from their many writings, as Abbé Lottin has done, the gist of their position on any one phase of moral science. It is extremely helpful to have such a volume as this which unfolds in so concise and orderly a way the vast sweep of medieval thinking.

In his treatment of particular writers, especially St. Thomas, the author is also precise, brief, and at the same time accurate. One of the great difficulties in reading St. Thomas is that he sometimes develops his ideas about a particular question in a variety of places. One has the same problems of the need of a library which contains these different writings of St. Thomas and the great amount of time and labor involved in paralleling the different texts. Again Abbé Lottin does this for us admirably, first giving us the references in St. Thomas where we may find statements of his position and then giving a resume of Thomistic thought on the question. We notice this in the following excerpt on synderesis:

Saint Thomas D'Aquin a étudié la syndérèse et la conscience a trois reprises: dans son *Commentaire des Sentences* (1253-1255), dans le *De Veritate* (1256-1259) et dans la *Somme théologique*.

I. Le *Commentaire des Sentences* n'offre pas les cadres du traité de la syndérèse tels qu'on les a vus chez Albert le Grand; les questions y sont toutefois suffisamment abordées.

La syndérèse est-elle une puissance ou un habitus? Saint Thomas apporte pour et contre la thèse maintes raisons dont plusieurs n'ont pu être empruntées qu'à Albert le Grand.

Dans la nature, répond saint Thomas, tout mouvement procède d'un moteur immobile; et tout ce qui présente des variétés se fonde sur un principe invariable. Il en sera donc de même de la raison. Car la raison, elle aussi, est en mouvement, puis qu'elle conduit les principes jusqu'aux conclusions; dans ce processus d'ailleurs elle présente une grande variété d'allure, qui l'expose à bien des erreurs. Il faut donc un premier principe de connaissance, immobile, invariable, qui garantisse la rectitude de ses démarches. Aussi bien, dans l'ordre de la connaissance spéculative, y a-t-il à la source de tous nos raisonnements quelques principes évidents par eux-mêmes, et dont l'habitus s'appelle "intellect." Et dès lors, dans l'ordre de la raison pratique, il faut à l'origine de ses démarches quelques principes connaissables par eux-mêmes; tels ceux-ci: il faut éviter le mal, obéir à Dieu. Or, l'habitus de ces premiers principes directifs de l'action n'est autre que la syndérèse.

La syndérèse ne se distingue donc pas de la raison pratique, comme une faculté se distinguerait d'une autre faculté puisqu'elle n'en est que l'habitus.

Cet habitus est-il inné? Oui, d'une certaine manière, *quodammodo*. La

connaissance des premiers principes de la raison pratique, comme celle des premières vérités de la raison spéculative, a son point de départ dans la connaissance sensible ou la mémoire; mais dès que les termes sont connus, le rapport qui les rélie entre eux est évident par lui-même, par la seule lumière de l'intellect agent, sans nul recours aux industries du raisonnement.

La conclusion semble donc bien s'imposer: la syndérèse est un habitus inné, et non une faculté." (Pp. 222-223)

One of the most important sections of the book is the rather long part on the obligation of conscience. Here the author goes through the development of the thinking of the early moralists on the question of conscience and particularly on the problems of the erroneous conscience. In his usual manner he makes a concise, accurate survey of St. Thomas's predecessors and contemporaries and then he presents the position of St. Thomas, which, in the author's opinion, hinges on the question of ignorance:

On devine que la solution dépend d'une doctrine sur l'ignorance, cause de la conscience erronée. Si cette ignorance est coupable, sa malice ne peut que se communiquer à l'acte qui en dérive." (p. 404)

There follows an excellent delineation of the position of St. Thomas on ignorance where St. Thomas divides universal ignorance or ignorance of law and particular ignorance or ignorance of an individual fact. In explaining this point there is a detailed discussion of three questions: *utrum conscientia errans obliget, utrum conscientia erronea excuset, utrum voluntas concordans rationis erranti sit bona.* (p. 405)

The essay entitled "La Moralité Intrinsèque" contains a particularly clear and coordinated discussion of what St. Thomas added to the clarifications that went before him, especially those of Albert, Peter Lombard, and the Chancellor Philippe on the question of goodness:

C'est le jeune Thomas D'Aquin qui a recueilli et rédigé le Commentaire d'Albert sur l'Éthique que nous venons de citer.

Comment, laissé à la liberté des ses mouvements, saint Thomas va-t-il définir les formules en cause?

Nous nous bornerons à l'exposé qu'il fit dans son *Commentaire sur les Sentences*, notre but étant ici, avant tout, de rattacher saint Thomas à ses prédécesseurs.

Le saint Docteur se propose d'examiner le bien-fondé de la classification établie par Pierre Lombard, du *bonum in genere, ex fine et causa*. Mais il saisit cette occasion pour discuter les deux définitions courantes du bien *in genere*: *id quod potest bene et male fieri*, et celle vulgarisée par Philippe: *actus cadens supra materiam debitam*. La première de celles-ci a-t-elle un sens? Si une perfection convient à un être *ex suo genere*, aucune différence spécifique ultérieure ne peut la lui enlever: comment donc un acte bon *ex genere* peut-il devenir mauvais? La définition du Chancelier vaut-elle mieux? Car qui dit bien dit fin, or le concept de fin est entièrement étranger à celui de matière par lequel on prétend définir le bien *in genere*. La classification du Lombard semble à son tour déficiente: on y parle de bien *in genere*; mais à tout genre correspond une espèce; ou trouve-t-on dans cette classification une

bonté *ex specie*? De plus—et ce reproche s'appuie sur la définition de Philippe—la matière d'un acte n'est autre que son objet; or l'objet se définit par la fin; comment alors le Lombard peut-il distinguer le bien *in genere* du bien *ex fine*?

Il faut d'abord, répond saint Thomas, distinguer une bonté inhérente à l'acte en tant qu'acte, c'est-à-dire en tant que cet acte procède de son principe efficient, la faculté, enracinée elle-même dans la nature de l'être: saint Thomas visiblement songe ici au *bonum essentia* dont avait parlé le Lombard. Mais, pour suit-il, quand il s'agit d'acte humain, il faut noter que cet acte, procédant d'une volonté libre, est déterminable en sens divers. La détermination lui viendra donc d'ailleurs, c'est-à-dire de son objet, et si celui-ci est convenable, l'acte en recevra une bonté nouvelle. Comment la dénommer? La première détermination d'un être lui vient de sa forme générique; on dira donc que la bonté acquise à l'acte par son objet est une bonté *ex genere*. Cette bonté *ex objecto* ou *ex genere* peut, à son tour, se revêtir d'une bonté ultérieure, de même que la forme générique se détermine par la forme spécifique; cette bonté dérive des circonstances de l'acte, entre autres de la fin; et finalement l'acte sera parfaitement bon, s'il procède d'un habitus vertueux.

La doctrine est limpide, enrichie de cette equation nouvelle: le *bonum ex genere* est le *bonum ex obiecto*.

La doctrine étant posée, saint Thomas n'éprouve aucune difficulté à admettre les formules courantes. La définition: *id quod potest bene et male fieri* peut être maintenue; mais elle signifiera, non pas que la bonté *ex genere* puisse être enlevée à l'acte, mais que, subsistant, elle est privée de la bonté ultérieure que pourraient lui conférer les circonstances." (Pp. 460-461)

For those especially interested in the widely discussed question of indifferent acts, there is a detailed review of the historical development of that question and St. Thomas' position on it, entitled, "L'Indifférence Des Actes Humaines Chez Saint Thomas D'Aquin et Ses Prédécesseurs."

The final section of the book which covers over 100 pages and is therefore one of the longest, is entitled, "Les Mouvements Premiers de L'Appétit Sensitif de Pierre Lombard à Saint Thomas D'Aquin." Here Abbé Lottin takes up the problem of the effects of original sin in relationship to ignorance and concupiscence. He raises a number of questions:

Mais toute ignorance de la raison, tout mouvement dérègle de l'appétit sensitif sont-ils pour autant des péchés? On le voit, cette double question rentre sous la rubrique générale du péché de négligence: l'homme est-il coupable du seul fait d'avoir négligé de dissiper son ignorance; l'homme est-il coupable du seul fait d'avoir négligé de réprimer les mouvements désordonnés de sa sensibilité? Nous touchons au problème fondamental de la responsabilité humaine; et il sera utile de pénétrer la mentalité des théologiens du moyen âge concernant une des questions les plus graves de la morale." (p. 493)

In a long survey he unfolds for us the gradual development of the thinking which found expression finally in St. Thomas. This survey includes such writers as Pierre de Poitiers, Pierre de Capoue, Prévostin de Crémone, Etienne Langton and others of whom the general reader not

trained in medieval scholarship will not have heard. Abbé Lottin does not however neglect the better-known writers and there is a rather complete treatment of the opinions of St. Bonaventure and St. Albert the Great as well as St. Thomas on this question.

St. Thomas's position comes from his distinction of three types of "mouvements premiers":

Dès le *Commentaire des Sentences* (1253-1257), la doctrine de saint Thomas est fixée.

Le saint Docteur prend d'abord soin de définir le terme de "mouvement premier." On peut, écrit-il, distinguer trois espèces de mouvements en nous, parce qu'on peut y discerner trois espèces de tendances: L'appétit naturel l'appétit rationnel, et, à mi-chemin, l'appétit sensitif. L'appétit naturel résulte des dispositions organiques, entièrement indépendantes de toute connaissance; de lui relève tout ce qui se rapporte à la vie végétative, tels les phénomènes de l'assimilation, de l'évolution embryologique. A l'extrême opposé, l'appétit rationnel résulte de la représentation intellectuelle ou la raison, connaissant la fin et la proportion des moyens à la fin, dirige la conduite de la vie. Entre ces deux extrêmes vient s'insérer l'appétit sensitif qui, lui aussi, procède d'une connaissance préalable, mais sensitive, perception des sens externes ou imagination.

Or, poursuit saint Thomas, quand nous affirmons que les mouvements premiers sont péché veniel, nous n'entendons point parler des mouvements désordonnés résultant de causes naturelles, entièrement soustraites à l'empire de la raison, mais uniquement de ceux qui procèdent d'une représentation sensible préalable. Nous retrouvons ici la distinction introduite par Guillaume d'Auxerre." (pp. 579-580)

The book has another valuable feature. At the end of each section there is an integrating chapter called *Vue d'Ensemble* wherein one can get a quick view of the development of each question. This aids in going back and checking the quotations of particular writers especially in relation to St. Thomas.

This volume spreads a vast panorama of medieval thought. Ample treatment is given the better known writers like Abelard, Peter Lombard, Albert the Great, and St. Thomas without neglecting many of the less known whose contributions on a particular point are sometimes surprising. The author mentions many seldom quoted writers such as Hannibald et Romain de Rome, Jean Quidort, Godefroid de Fontaines, Pierre D'Auvergne, and Bernard D'Auvergne. He also treats the positions of different schools. Thus, on the question of moral problems relative to conscience, he treats first the position of the Franciscan masters, then the secular writers, and finally St. Thomas and his contemporaries.

To the present reader the most interesting section of the book was the treatment of law in general. This section, too, best illustrates the method of the author as he explains himself on this question of law:

Jusqu'ici nous avons interprété saint Thomas par ses prédécesseurs; et nous avons vu dans la définition thomiste une synthèse originale de données antérieures.

Mais la valeur et l'originalité de cette synthèse apparaîtra mieux quand nous aurons considéré la plénitude de sens que saint Thomas attribue à chacun de ses éléments.

Pour pénétrer le sens de la formule thomiste, nous allons dorénavant, interpréter saint Thomas par lui-même, en recourant à ses écrits. Sans doute, le Docteur angélique n'a jamais traité *ex professo* cette question, avant la rédaction de la *Somme théologique*: nous pourrions cependant recueillir au cours de son oeuvre quelques données instructives.

Nous avons d'ailleurs une autre source d'information: la comparaison attentive de la loi, acte du législateur qui oriente l'activité de ses sujets vers le bien commun, avec *l'imperium*, acte par lequel l'homme oriente sa propre activité vers le but qu'il s'est proposé." (p. 25)

In our time the established ethical concepts of the Christian tradition are meeting on the one hand a Marxian dialectics and on the other a pragmatism, both of which are destructive of the philosophy of natural rights. It is therefore extremely important that the reasoning of St. Thomas and his predecessors on these matters be brought consciously to our attention and understanding. In the light of all the confusion which exists even on the highest levels of jurisprudence, it is a most satisfying experience to follow Abbé Lottin's unfolding of St. Thomas' thinking on law as the Angelic Doctor says with his characteristic clarity:

Quatre éléments concourent à constituer la loi. La loi est oeuvre de raison, *lex est aliquid rationis* (I^e II^{ae}, q. 90, a. 1). La loi est toujours orientée vers le bien commun, *ordinatio ad bonum commune* (art. 2). La loi est créée par celui qui a en mains les intérêts de la communauté, *ab eo qui curam communitatis habet* (art. 3). La loi enfin n'a force de loi que par la promulgation, *promulgata* (art.4)." (p. 25)

These four simple statements of St. Thomas contain one of the finest contributions of Western civilization. They express the highest dignity of man as a reasonable being, who can live together in peace with his fellows provided he subjects himself to what is the reasonable determination of the community. Seen in this light, law is in no sense a violation of man's freedom but is the preservation of what is highest in human nature and the guide to aid him in knowing what actions are the fulfillment of his reasonable nature and rightly orientated emotions. The historical questions like these which the mind of St. Thomas, his contemporaries, and his predecessors groped with and delineated with remarkable clarity and precision, are not merely historical but are of intense immediate practical application. The Thomist today must know the origin of the ideas and principles which he propounds. He needs to be aware of the chaos which awaits our nation and perhaps civilization itself if he fails to bring to the modern mind the tremendous deposit of learning which is his. For these

questions which tested the minds of the medieval writers are still with us today and demand of us an even greater concern.

To aid us in our task, we are indeed fortunate to have at hand the scholarship of Abbé Lottin.

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Power and Morals. By MARTIN J. HILLENBRAND. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949. Pp. 231 with index. \$3.25.

The author is characterized, on the jacket, as a career diplomat and political scientist; in his first quality he has had the opportunity to collect first hand evidence in many parts of the world, among which are Germany and India. His scholarly training he received at Columbia University from which he graduated in 1939.

In his preface, the author disclaims the intention of offering a solution of the fundamental problems of politics and social organization; but he hopes to contribute to the clarification of these problems, and justly remarks that a problem must first be envisaged in perfect clarity before a solution can be attempted. "What will emerge, I trust, is the outline of a political philosophy in terms of which power may become the servant of man rather than the master of his destiny." The political philosophy on which the reflections of the author rest, is that of Scholasticism, particularly the notion of natural law.

The first part of the work posits the Problem of Power and points out that modern theory has failed in face of the totalitarian challenge and that, therefore, a new and valid theory must be found. The second part deals with The Ordering of Power under the headings: Natural Law for the Twentieth Century, The Function of Violence, and The Power of Authority and Liberty.

Power of force can be controlled by greater power; but this ought to be controlled in turn, since it can be misused. Hence, the solution cannot be found on the level of physical power. If a solution is possible at all, it requires the general recognition of criteria for the use of power and the obligation to observe these criteria. Without the acknowledgment of some influence of theory an intelligent discussion of the problem of power is impossible. Though the acceptance of an ethical code does not guarantee that it will not be violated, its abandonment has been the cause of political catastrophes in the past and in the present. The philosophies back of the totalitarian movements of the last quarter of the century arose because the current philosophies or ethical theories lived on the tenuous heritage

of an ethical past and, at the same time, repudiated the philosophy on which this ethics was founded. The same situation prevails to-day. "The victory of the United Nations could not in itself make modern thought less ethically bankrupt."

Politics, like all other human activities, rests on evaluations. These cannot be limited to the sphere of politics alone; they have no validity unless they are linked with assumptions outside of the political sphere. In other words: without a comprehensive metaphysics and a general ethics no system of human action can be given a sound theoretical foundation. The problem of power, too, can be solved only within such a general frame. The current, "essentially secular lines of approach" have proven insufficient to supply such a frame. Of these, there are three types: the positivistic, utilitarian, pragmatistic conception, which the author justly calls "birds of one feather," the contractualist, and the legalist theories. It is not possible to render here the penetrating analysis to which the author subjects these conceptions. It is worth while reading; some passages are highly stimulating, as that dealing with the overt and hidden influence of Hume's ideas.

To establish any valid theory in ethics, one must admit certitude of knowledge as attainable; secondly, maintain that man possesses free will and is capable of self-determination; thirdly, recognize the unique value of the human person. A valid theory, the author contends, may be found "in the traditional concept of the natural law, revitalized and cleansed from the dross of misrepresentation." The misrepresentations are indeed numerous, and some rather amazing; one is grateful to the author for doing away with them. Law involves a norm of conduct for free and rational men, and must be found where the philosophers of old found it: in human nature itself, taken in the fullness of its being and relations. A tentative definition is proposed: "the natural law is a moral norm of action which reason discovers by examination of the functional order that exists objectively in the nature of man and his relation to other men and to the external world." The law is not "felt," but cognized by means of observation and reasoning. The author emphasizes that to human nature as the norm of morality, there is "added the act of a higher Legislator speaking through the medium of the natural law."

Although appreciative of the moral background of the theory of "non-violence," the author realizes that this idea is based on the hypothesis of the fundamental unity of all being, and thus "exposed to the same basic criticism as any monistic concept of reality." The absolute condemnation of all use of force or violence cannot be justified in terms of a positive code deriving logically from a basic philosophy of values. Conflicts between individuals, between an individual and an association, or between associations, may lead to the use of physical violence. Use of violence

is, of course, never good in itself, it is justifiable only in defense of a superior right. In fact, the advocates of non-violence concentrate on group and mass actions and do not consider the ethical problem of the individual faced with great and immediate danger. The state has the function to maintain order and to carry out all those activities which are directed towards the achievement of justice and general happiness; to fulfill this function, violence is necessary and, therefore, justified. It is also in international conflicts. Violence can protect right against counter-violence; but its function is essentially negative and non-creative, nor can it convince.

The last chapter, of more than fifty pages, is the longest; it is devoted to the discussion of authority and liberty and their relation to power. Here too, the author relies on the notions developed in Scholastic philosophy; in regard to the problem of authority he refers to Aquinas, Bellarmine, and Suarez, whereas he makes his own the fourfold division of liberties as proposed by Don Sturzo. (*Inner Laws of Society*). Throughout this discussion the emphasis is on the necessity that an ethical system be derived from a coherent philosophy of values. To stress this is undoubtedly important; no student of our times can fail to discover that it is here that modern man has suffered the most severe losses. It is true, as the author says, that the threat to-day is not the "unprincipled man," but the one who fanatically proclaims an unsound morality. It is equally true that the all-pervading relativism has shattered man's confidence in the meaningfulness of the world and his life, and that without a return to a "realistic" philosophy and a correlated axiology there is no way out of the present entanglements.

This book is well written and extensively documented; the author's sources range from the great treatises of the Schoolmen to the works of contemporary sociologists, philosophers, and politicians. Where he criticizes, he shows a remarkable ability to lay bare the basic fallacies and their consequences; and in the positive or "constructive" part of his work he is not less clear and definite.

The discussion moves throughout the chapters strictly on the terrain of philosophy and of empirical analysis of political problems. The extensive use of Scholastic texts notwithstanding, no reference is made to theological questions. This attitude makes for a particular cleanliness of thought and presentation. The line dividing philosophical from theological argumentation is so carefully observed that this reviewer did not find out whether the author belongs to the Church or not. Whatever his position be, his scholarly, sober, and objective work is a valuable contribution not only to the clarification of our present confusion but to the *philosophia perennis* too.

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BRIEF NOTICES

The Ethics of Ambiguity. By SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1949. Pp. 163, with index. \$2.75.

In his *L'Être et le Néant*, Sartre promised a tract on ethics which has thus failed to materialize. Perhaps this book by Madame de Beauvoir, a disciple of Sartre, is a sketch of what an existentialist ethics must necessarily be. Man is a failure; shot through by negativity, he can never coincide with himself, and it is by living and acting in this consciousness that man comports himself most humanly and realistically. Such is the thesis of this book.

Novelist, essayist, and philosopher, Madame de Beauvoir has a dialectical virtuosity which compares favorably with that of Sartre. By a skillful play on the oppositions encountered by man, she attempts in the first part of her book to establish the essential ambiguity of human existence where man is presented as a perennial combination of being and negation. But the difficulty with her argument is the failure to attain anything like an adequate elaboration of being *quod primum cadit in intellectum nostrum*. It is obvious of course that the beings of experience are limited and that man himself is a finite creature. But limit, finitude, potentiality, and even privation do not mean absolute non-being. An attack upon the metaphysics of existentialism would demolish its ethics.

Freedom, alleged as a concrete witness of man as cut off from being and formed by an "internal negation," is a prominent theme in *L'Être et le Néant*. It looms equally large in this work on ethics. Freedom must keep itself free. It must act only to increase itself and accept whatever content can guarantee that end. This is the ethical imperative in Madame de Beauvoir's system. We are urged not only to further our own freedom but also to enkindle and enhance the liberty of others.

Sartre has used his journal *Les Temps Modernes* to develop the political aspects of his metaphysical premises. The present book also touches upon such issues in opposing any political oppression, on the one hand, and Marxism on the other. But Marjorie Grene successfully confronted the political conclusions of existentialism in her book, *Dreadful Freedom*, showing that if man is essentially revolutionary there must be a revolution, eventually, of his own revolutionary tendencies of the present.

Another interesting thesis of *Dreadful Freedom* was the parallel drawn between existentialism and Dewey's naturalism. There is supporting evidence in *The Ethics of Ambiguity*. Thus it is said that technics "escapes all criticism if one admits that, through it, existence, far from wishing to repose in the security of being, thrusts itself ahead of itself in order to

thrust itself still farther ahead, that it aims at an indefinite disclosure of being by the transformation of the thing into an instrument and at the opening of ever new possibilities for man." (p. 80) What could be more Deweyite than this analysis?

The latter part of this book is a catalogue of various types of men, the sub-man, the serious, the adventuring, the passionate, and there is a chapter occupied mainly with the various antinomies of life. Madame de Beauvoir poses existentialism as the only philosophy that could have an ethics since there is constant emphasis on man, the agent, and on the dangers and difficulties and failures that never cease to menace his being.

Existentialism at times shows a dim perception of the dualism in our world. The mistake is to take dualistic structures for contradictory ones.

World Philosophy: A Search for Synthesis. By OLIVER L. REISER. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1948. Pp. 136. \$2.50.

The "world philosophy" here presented with a Boy Scout enthusiasm is scientific humanism. "Planetary planning" of thought, science, economics, education, freedom, religion, and every aspect of human life is the great desideratum. That mechanical uniformity is a thin kind of culture, remarkably close to *rigor mortis* never seems to occur to the secularistic "do gooders."

The appalling arrogance of these creatures is indicated by citing at random two of six projects which Dr. Reiser proposes for a projected "International Institute of Scientific Humanism." Number four reads: "Provide the universal theory and system of education, administered so far as possible by local personnel, thus spreading our new social concepts and freeing men's minds from prejudices calculated to warp their judgment . . ." (p. 42). Notice three things: there is to be a single "planetary" system and theory of education; it is designed to spread "our," i. e., the scientific humanist's, new social concepts; it is to free men's minds from all prejudices, except the controlling prejudice of scientific humanism. The fifth reads: "Set up an order of priority in introducing new social changes. After establishing a method of testing the validity of any project by its code of principles, it will be possible to promote any intellectual or social movement which is humanistically sound and discourage any proposal which is deliberately anti-humanistic in its tendencies" (p. 42). The picture is clear: A committee of Reisers, Lamonts, and other humanists controls every intellectual and social movement, suppressing what does not fit the prejudices of the naturalistic humanist.

Morals, of course, are exclusively relative to society. "Morals do not come from 'higher' sources, but from man and they are evolved socially;

therefore, these codes and customs are not sacred, absolute, final, and perfect, but rather stand in need of constant criticism and revision" (p. 106).

Organized religion is characterized as "institutionalized and calcified; authoritarian and inflexible; organized churchianity; self-righteousness arising out of the idea that salvation is a reward for obeying the laws of God; scientific facts available to organized religion are ignored when they interfere with dogmatic theories or the property rights of the members of the Church" (p. 112). To replace this monster "We (the scientific humanists) are making a 'religion' of the pursuit of truth, and man's religious development is related to his increasing access to universal natural laws and moral ideals" (p. 115). "This coming religion, a synthesis of man's scientific thought and his esthetic urges, is designed to search out and reveal the nature of man, his potential powers, his place in the universe, and the type of society best suited to evoke his self-evolutionary possibilities" (p. 116).

Maritain's *True Humanism* pointed out years ago that any anthropocentric humanism must, by its very anthropocentricity betray what is deepest in man—his spirituality, his liberty, his personality. Dr. Reiser's intellectual totalitarianism is one of innumerable examples of the accuracy of Maritain's observation.

Man as Man. By THOMAS J. HIGGINS, S.J. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1949.
Pp. 607, with index. \$3.75.

At one time or another in his academic career every professor dreams of writing his own textbook—a book that will avoid the pitfalls into which others have fallen and which will be the perfect answer to his professorial ideal. Yet no two ideals are alike. Father Higgins is one of those rare persons who has achieved the realization of his intention. In *Man as Man*, he has produced an excellent work on the science of ethics. Designed to give college students the philosophical principles for human conduct, it represents a rather exhaustive treatment of morality in its general and specific applications. While this comprehensiveness makes the book an ideal text for those professors who can devote a year's study to this very important science, it renders it rather impractical for the professor who is limited, by the curriculum, to a course of three (or even two) hours a week for one semester.

Father Higgins has included in his work numerous references to different opinions concerning the matter at hand. Thus the student is given something of the historical background of each moral problem. These references will also enable the serious student to judge the relative worth of another's opinion. As, for example, when Father Higgins disagrees

with St. Thomas on the essential nature of beatitude, the student can find ample refutation in the articles of the *Summa Theologica* cited by the author.

The organizational ability of the author is reflected in his work. The various divisions of the text are readily discernible—an important factor for the ordinary college student. It is especially evident in the presentation of proofs for the moral principles and in the corollaries which are drawn from these principals. Suggested reading at the end of each chapter add to the merit of this work.

The Philosopher's Way. By JEAN WAHL. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948. Pp. 348, with index. \$5.00.

In his introduction, the author proposes this work as a textbook. It is organized according to the various categories of reality studied by philosophers—substance, quality, soul, and the like—and each chapter portrays the various ideas on the given subject in ancient and modern thought. Wahl takes no cognizance at all of medieval philosophy. He frequently injects his own philosophical comments, and in the last chapter entitled "Dialectics," he seems to think that philosophy proceeds by oscillating between the polarities like subject and object, idea and existence. The book, judging also by the introduction, seems to hold that the real problems of philosophy have only been stated but not solved. "We shall not be too unhappy if, not completely seeing the solution, we at least see the problem and, going the philosopher's way, maintain faith in our human enterprise" (xiv).

As it is not very thorough, this work is not likely to be satisfactory as a textbook for beginners. When a student is advanced enough to read it, he will find numerous errors of commission and omission; and he certainly ought to resent the personal philosophy of Wahl which here appears as a combination of Hegel and existentialism. Certainly misinterpretations of Aristotle are the usual modern opinions of those who have never read, or at least never seriously studied, such works as the *Physics* (especially Book I) and the *Metaphysics*. Blunders in portraying modern thinkers are less excusable. For instance, (p. 5) it was really Spinoza and not Leibnitz who emphasized the idea of substance; and (p. 178), Bergson did not acknowledge that mathematical physics touched the absolute in matter, if only because he would not admit that matter was anything like an absolute.

Wahl's own philosophy is even more questionable than his interpretation of some of his predecessors. It is a philosophy of "feeling" since the author accepts the verdict of modern anti-intellectuals and puts himself

in the tradition of Kierkegaard. Man lives in "tensions." His tool is dialectics, and the process that is life grinds on and on except in such experiences as that of art where "we no longer separate the inner and the outer, the infinite and the finite, and the unceasing dialogue comes to its conclusion, in silence" (p. 324). This, of course, is not the silence discussed by mystical theologians. It is more akin to the self-experience which is a point of departure and, usually, a point of arrival for existentialism. What we call "God" is "a force, a strength-giving as well as crushing force, and a force that is in man himself." (p. 296). This sounds like the humanism of a Sartre.

Wahl does not believe that philosophy can be presented in a systematic way, and the order of his chapters and their various subjects is rather difficult to follow. Where everything is a problem and there are no full and satisfying solutions, it is difficult to see how anyone could think or write; even a philosophy of denial requires some ultimate certitude if only as a standard to appraise the views of other men and present one's own.

The author supplies a selected bibliography but no footnotes. The index of names is impressive.

The Ramparts We Guard. By R. M. MACIVER. New York: Macmillan, 1950. Pp. 152. \$3.00.

There is probably no subject, save love, about which more is said and written than democracy. And, with the exception of love, there is probably no subject about which there is such general misunderstanding. Practically every American thinks he knows what democracy is but, according to Professor MacIver, there are few who really understand its true nature. To correct this general misunderstanding, Professor MacIver thought it incumbent upon him to write a book. The book, alas, after a good start, succeeds only in adding to the general confusion.

Doctor MacIver loves democracy, but that is putting it incorrectly; he adores it, and in a strict theological sense, for in the last chapter of this strange little book the author actually proposes democracy as the new religion, the only religion in which the people, in these days of diversity of cults, can be united. This strange proposal is shocking, coming at the end of a book which up to that point had lauded democracy because it could not only tolerate a diversity of opinion, but actually thrived upon it; had condemned the Nazi and Soviet regimes for their religions of state worship. It is shocking for the reader to be faced with a proposal that statism, under the brave name of democracy, be instituted in our own country.

But this is only one of the book's myriad contradictions. Professor MacIver either has forgotten the rules of consistency, or he is so convinced of his philosophy of the subjective character of truth that he believes that he can deny on one page what he stated on a previous page. Lack of consistency in argument is one of the glaring weaknesses of the work. For example: filled with indignation against those (including Plato and Aristotle) who do not agree that democracy, as interpreted by MacIver, is the best of all possible governments, the author is provoked into making an attack upon Doctor Fulton Sheen whom he cites, along with Irving Babbitt, as a spokesman for the modern authoritarian school of thought:

There is another and more subtle way in which the aristocrat, especially the moral aristocrat, misapprehends the service of democracy. The aristocrat is a poor psychologist. His aloofness, his sense of superiority, prevents him from sensing what would be the reactions of the people to the rules he would impose on them. Thus he misjudges the conditions on which their well-being depends. He wants "good government" but the only good government is one the rules of which are made by him or by his kind. Like Plato, he knows where everybody belongs in the scheme of things—and that is where they ought to belong, according to his standards. He himself would be happy and would feel free under the system of authority he approves. So he fancies that everybody ought to be happy and feel free under that system and he easily slips, poor psychologist that he is—into the persuasion that because they *ought* to be they *would* be.

This misapprehension is revealed in many ways, but we shall be content briefly to refer to one of them. It consists in the identification of liberty with acceptance of the moral or cultural code of the aristocrat. If they are free in obeying the law they approve then everybody is free who obeys it, even against his desire or his will. Liberty, says Father Sheen, is not the right to do as you please but the "right to do whatever you *ought*." True liberty, said Irving Babbitt, "is not liberty to do what one likes but liberty to adjust oneself to law."

Yet a few pages after this indignant outburst, Doctor MacIver is fervently engaged in arguing that while even in a democracy laws restraining the more violent human passions are necessary, these laws are not destructive of liberty but rather are of the essence of liberty. This work is so full of such contradictions that the reader begins to wonder about the soundness of the author's scholarship.

There is lacking also consistency in style. After writing the greater part of the book in a clear untechnical language, language albeit a bit too florid, too given to superlatives, and too easily given to rhetorical flights the author, in the ninth chapter, suddenly turns professor and transcribes a few pages from his lecture notebook. It takes three readings of this chapter to discover what he is trying to say and, after you have figured it out, you find that he says exactly nothing—that is, nothing pertinent to the subject of the book.

The publishers of this book proclaim: "Robert M. MacIver's name

means as much to modern sociology as John Dewey's to philosophy." With this statement this reviewer thoroughly agrees. He may even do as much damage to democracy as Dewey did to education.

Religionsphilosophie mit Theodizee. By HEINRICH STRAUBINGER. Freiburg i. B.: Herder, 1949. Pp. 272 with index.

This volume is one in the series of *Theologische Grundrisse*, primers in theology, published by Herder. The first edition appeared in 1929. It is primarily a textbook—the author teaches theology at the University of Freiburg—but wishes also to make the student acquainted with the basic facts of the history and ethnology of religion; the historical part is, therefore, longer than usual in such works. The 87 pages of this section make, indeed, good reading and will prove helpful to the student. One misses, however, references to the Celtic and Etruscan religions which, though little known, might have deserved mentioning.

The first chapter reports on the methodology of the philosophy of religion; the historical, psychological, ethnological, phenomenological approaches are analysed, and then that of Kant and what the author calls the rationalistic-speculative approach of pantheism and theism. The critique is everywhere to the point and the various methods are given credit for what they are able to achieve. The procedure adopted by the author is, in general, not an apologetic but a systematic one. He has succeeded well in furnishing a clear and readable text. There are many references which will be useful to the—German—student; apart from the great classics, the works mentioned are mainly in German.

Besides the methodological and historical chapters there are two more; on the nature of religion and its place in spiritual life, and on the truth of religion. The latter deals with the proofs of God's existence. Here, too, the criticism on the part of non-Scholastic philosophers is carefully presented, analyzed, and met. The objectivity of the statement of the opponent's argument is remarkable, so that the reader is given a clear notion of what the other side has to say; this is particularly the case with the philosophy of Kant.

There is no discussion of atheistic philosophies. Perhaps, the author felt that this topic does not belong to the philosophy of religion. However, not to have considered these ideas is a lacuna. Just as scepticism must be discussed whenever the problems of certitude and knowledge are examined, so the denial of God's existence is a legitimate problem in the philosophy of religion. An analysis of the philosophical conception underlying the various atheistic systems would have been in place also in view of the attempts to construct a system of ethics within the frame-

work of an atheistic metaphysics, as it is done in "naturalism" or in the great work on ethics by Hartmann.

Destined as a textbook, this volume contains little of original research. It is, however, an especially readable and clear exposition of the various forms of the proofs for God's existence and, in the last sections, of the questions of evil, pessimism, and allied problems.

The Unitary Principle in Physics and Biology. By LANCELOT LAW WHYTE.

New York: Henry Holt, 1949. Pp. 185, with index. \$3.50.

Scientists are so often inclined to bring their specialized methods with them when they deal in philosophy that their efforts sometimes further confuse the profoundly cosmological problems they attempt to solve. Whyte's book is a delightful and welcome exception and represents that rather rare combination of thinking which can satisfy the scientist and stimulate the philosopher.

The unitary principle is phased thus: "Asymmetry tends to disappear, and this tendency is realized in isolable processes" (p. 8). This appears at first sight like a restatement of the second law of thermodynamics, the law of entropy, and actually entropy would be evidence for the unitary principle. Whyte, however, extends his argument to living systems which are generally regarded as ectropic. He holds out the hope that his principle might be extended to psychology, and in view of what can be said on the subject of integration alone, his hope does appear well founded.

Whyte cites Curie's view that the world is in a process of going from asymmetry to symmetry. However, he shows no acquaintance with other French scholarship like the view of Lalande and Meyerson and even the principle of Le Chatelier, as this is applied in physiology. Additional argument for Whyte's thesis ought to examine the wealth of literature on the notion of economy in Mach, Russell, and even Freud.

This book, nevertheless, is more notable for what it says than for what it leaves unstudied. The author regards it in fact as a pioneering adventure that should be followed by further research and reflection. As it stands, the book certainly inspires both.

The arguments for the unitary principle in the physical order are rather easily followed. Changes in the world tend to produce more symmetry, homogeneity, and, one may even say in Aristotelian language, rest in the subject being moved. How the principle can apply in biology may not seem readily apparent. Here it is important to follow out Whyte's definition of the living world. Thus he writes: "An animal organism is a continuous normalizing process stabilized by hereditary units and an outer boundary" (p. 104). The author uses "outer boundary" as a limit associated with environment.

This whole definition must be taken as a purely biological one, and the author adduces evidence in its favor from modern biological research. The emphasis should be laid not so much on boundary or heredity as on the normalizing process which, according to Whyte, continuously struggles to overcome different polarities in the life of the organism.

The unusual scientific background of the author, especially in mathematics and physics, should recommend his book all the more for scientists, who want an overall view of their work, and for philosophers, probing into the ultimate meaning of both the work and the view. This is a book that should get high priority on the reading list of the philosopher of nature and the philosopher of science.

Whyte leaves one big question. There is dissymmetry in the world which matter and life struggle to overcome. It is real and challenging, and when it is thought through, it turns up as a way of describing prime matter, just as symmetry means form. This is another reason why the present book is important.

Socratic Method and Critical Philosophy: Selected Essays. By LEONARD NELSON. Translated by Thomas K. Brown III. Foreword by B. Blanshard. Introduction by J. Kraft. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. Pp. 233 with index. \$3.75.

Leonard Nelson (1882-1927) taught philosophy at the University of Göttingen and also founded a Philosophical-political Academy for the education of responsible political leaders. Prof. Kraft reports that out of this Academy and connected circles came many who fought the Nazi regime and today work on the rebuilding of Germany. Nelson, however, did not achieve any great influence on the philosophical public at large, either in Germany or abroad. He was, according to the introduction, a "philosophical heretic" in his times, first because he was convinced that there is one and only one philosophical truth, an idea incompatible with the relativistic trends of his time, and secondly because he represented a variant of critical philosophy which was, though going back to Kant, contrary to the customary interpretation of Kant's ideas. Nelson had come across, when still a youth, the practically forgotten works of Jacob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843). Fries taught at Heidelberg and Jena, was dismissed from this university because of political reasons, reinstated 1824; he lectured then on mathematics and physics to which sciences he contributed some valuable studies. These studies and the philosophy he professed won Fries the following of the famous mathematician Schlämilch, of the discoverer of the plantal cell Schleiden, and of some other men; his influence on philosophy, however, remained insignificant,

the more since his most gifted pupil, E. F. Apelt, died young, having taught but two years at Jena.

Fries considered Kant's philosophy as the final outcome of philosophical endeavor and believed himself to be the true pupil and continuator of Kant's work. Fries is usually said to have interpreted Kant in a "psychologistic" manner. His psychologism is, however, peculiar and not to be confused with the tendency commonly given this name. Nelson adopted the fundamentals of Fries' philosophy. Like his master, Nelson possessed a solid knowledge of mathematics and science, and his interest embraced all fields of philosophy and their relation to the practical, social, political problems of his day. The men who came under his influence, philosophers, biologists, mathematicians, psychiatrists, and others, appear to have been deeply impressed by his personality as well as by his doctrine. The introduction by Prof. Kraft is thereof a testimony.

The present volume is meant to introduce Nelson's work to the English speaking countries; other larger works are being translated. The selection of essays to be reviewed here gives a good picture of Nelson's thought, although a rather incomplete one, since among his works there is a three-volume treatise on ethics and an important work on the epistemological problem, the content of which the essays give but an imperfect idea. The introduction by Prof. Kraft makes up somewhat for this defect, but is more apt to arouse than to satisfy the curiosity of the reader.

The essays are partly popular, partly strictly philosophical. The former bear the titles: The Socratic Method, The Scientific and the Esthetic Conception of Nature, The Worldview of Ethics and Religion, The Art of Philosophizing. The diversity of subjects does not allow for a report on all these studies. It seems best to limit the review to the three essays on The Critical Method and the Relation of Psychology to Philosophy, Critical Philosophy and Mathematical Axiomatics, The Impossibility of the "Theory of Knowledge."

Metaphysics is defined as the system of all judgments not based on either empirical or mathematical intuition, hence of synthetic *a priori* judgments evolved through mere concepts. It is asked to what extent metaphysics is in need of a critique of reason and what method the critique has to adopt to satisfy this need. There are certain principles which form the basis of all our judgments; this means philosophy as "a natural disposition." It is another thing to discover these principles and to fit them into a system; this is philosophy "as a science" and it is only here where controversies arise, since there is no dissension on the principles as long as they are presupposed in other judgments. The principles are discovered by a regressive method, starting from judgments and evaluations on which there is agreement, proceeding by a regressive method. One does not obtain proofs, because proofs are possible only

for secondary and derived judgments, but unnecessary and impossible for basic principles.

There are three kinds of verification: by demonstration, as in empirical and mathematical sciences, by means of pointing out the intuition on which their judgments are grounded; by proof, which applies only to mediate judgments and whose possibility presupposes principles; by "deduction"—this taken in the sense of Kant. The latter has to be "psychological," based on our inner experience. Here we even find a proof, not indeed of the metaphysical principle, but of the psychological proposition, that the knowledge enunciated in a metaphysical proposition is immediate knowledge from pure reason. Ultimately we rely on the self-confidence of reason, without which no thinking whatsoever is possible. There exists an immediate knowledge of a non-sensory kind which is not intuition but reaches our consciousness solely through reflection, without being reflection itself. The dogmatic thesis that all knowledge is either intuition or reflection must be abandoned. From this fallacious alternative of logical dogmatism springs the conflict between empirical skepticism and neo-Platonic mysticism. Therewith also the dilemma of Hume, which, as Nelson endeavors to show, can be resolved critically by following the path opened in the inquiries of Fries.

The essay on mathematical axiomatics is dedicated to an explanation of this approach to the philosophy of mathematics and the proof that Hilbert's axiomatics are basically, in principle and method, the same set of ideas which Fries had proposed long ago.

The last essay takes up a question which had been dealt with incidentally in the one on Critical Method and which Nelson has treated extensively in a separate work on epistemology. This essay is a paper read at the Fourth International Congress for Philosophy, Bologna, in 1911. Nelson's position, mostly in his own words, is this: The problem of knowledge is that of the objective validity of knowledge. This validity is supposedly tested by a "theory of knowledge." One needs, therefore, a criterion by the application of which we could decide on truth or falsity of a proposition. This criterion would itself be either cognition or not. If cognition, it falls within the area of what is problematic, of what is to be solved by means of the same criterion. It cannot be, accordingly, cognition. If it is not a cognition, it still must be known, i.e., we should know that it is a criterion of truth. To gain this knowledge, we would have to apply the criterion. Here and there, we encounter a contradiction. A validity criterion is impossible and hence also there can be no "theory of knowledge."

This volume may mediate the acquaintance with an original thinker whose influence has made itself felt in many fields outside of that of philosophy proper. One looks forward with interest towards the publication of further translations which are promised. Nelson and his followers, who

were not very numerous, but outstanding in several regards, published many studies in the *Neue Abhandlungen der Friesschen Schule*, of which there are several volumes. Among these studies are some on matters of psychology and psychiatry, others on questions of general biology, on mathematics, and other subjects. The ideas proposed in these volumes, be it by Nelson himself or by others, are to a notable part, quite actual. It is, perhaps, not feasible, that all this be translated. But one would like to hope that we may be given an authentic and exhaustive presentation as well of Fries' philosophy as of that of Nelson and his pupils. To judge from the introduction he wrote, Professor Kraft would be the man to make the American students of philosophy acquainted with this particular school he knows so well.

Précis de Logique Mathématique. Par I. M. BOCHEŃSKI, O. P. Collection Synthèse 2. Bussum, Pays-Bas: F. G. Kroonder, 1949. Pp. 90.

Thomists who are interested in modern logic will welcome Father Bocheński's latest work, a concise presentation of the fundamentals of symbolic logic. It is a very handy complement to his *Nove Lezioni di Logica Simbolica* (Angelicum, 1938), hitherto the best introductory manual in the field. The only defects in the latter work are its being written in Italian, a language not widely read by American students, its exclusive use of Lukasiewicz's notation, also not widely employed in this country, and its expository character, which makes it unwieldy for reference use. These short-comings are remedied in the *Précis*. The great majority of symbolic expressions in the new work are reproduced in parallel columns in both the Russell-Peano and the Lukasiewicz notations, and the entire presentation is developed along formalistic lines with concise definition and development. The manual is printed in a neat format designed for convenient reference, and is equipped with complete indexes of symbols and terms. Clarity is not sacrificed for brevity of expression, however, and numerous examples, explanations, historical notes, and references to the literature are inserted in the development. These are set off from the text in small type, so as not to impair the book's value for reference use.

In content, the work is more extensive than the *Nove Lezioni* and is modeled along the lines of Carnap's *Abriss der Logistik*. Father Bocheński's interest in philosophical and theological applications of symbolic logic affects his emphasis of subject-matter, and he has, therefore, given considerable development to the theory of propositions, including many laws that might be used in non-mathematical applications. He has also given an adequate treatment of predicates, classes, and the logic of relations. The only lacuna is occasioned by his having refrained from any consideration

of the philosophical foundations of modern logic; while most desirable in themselves, such considerations were evidently not consonant with the nature of the work and were omitted.

The reviewer has made no attempt to check the numerous symbolic expressions for typographical accuracy. There is a minor error on p. 64, where the explanation for the expression representing the field of a relation is placed under the expression for the domain of a relation. In general, however, the *Précis* leaves little to be desired, and is a most welcome addition to the sparse Thomistic literature on logistics.

Von Dionysos zu Appollon. By FRITZ JOACHIM v. RINTELEN. Wiesbaden: Metopen Verlag, 1948. Pp. 138 with index.

The author, once of the University of Munich, teaches philosophy at the University of Mainz. He is well known because of prior works, among which is a larger study on the Idea of Value. His newest small volume is part of a series of treatises dealing with philosophical problems related, more or less, to the actual situation of Western civilization. This circumstance, together with a certain denseness of presentation, renders a report not quite easy. Dionysos and Apollon stand for two fundamental tendencies of life and interest neither of which may be disregarded if man is to achieve the fullness of his being, although the two do not possess equal dignity. The Dionysian trend cannot fulfill what it promises or seems to promise. However much man may try to merge into nature, to live in unity with cosmic forces, to find the completion of his existence in the intensity of vital forces, he does not cease to be more than a living being. In short, but interesting, half incidental remark the author comments on the basically juvenilistic attitude in this Dionysian interpretation of man's existence. Such a pure vitalistic conception, which tries to ignore spiritual values is in itself contradictory, because the necessity of making use of symbols points beyond mere vitality. Since things spiritual cannot be overlooked, since they simply are, the mere Dionysian conception is forced to devalue these things, and thus to destroy the unity of the human being. This unity cannot be preserved unless it be envisaged from "above." Man's self is, as Kierkegaard stressed, spirit. The spirit cannot manifest itself without the means furnished by the living organism; but this does not permit either an identification or a denial of the spirit. The fact of order is inexplicable in terms of mere life. The order is one of superiority of the spiritual. There is an objective order of values. By means of this idea one can interpret the relation of "nature" and "spirit" not merely as one of conflict and unreconcilable antagonism, but as one of objective order in which nature exists to lead to and to serve

the objectively higher values. These ideas, which are barely indicated by the foregoing remarks, are illustrated by numerous analyses of older and contemporary writings, in philosophy and poetry as well as in other fields. There are many brief, but penetrating, critical comments on certain anti-spiritualistic philosophies which may apply generally and not only to the German instances of which the author speaks. There is also a succinct discussion of the limits of pure "science" and the inevitability of evaluation as soon as human affairs are considered. Of particular interest may be found to be the criticism of the ideas of Nietzsche and some of those who were influenced by him. The necessity is stressed of a final synthesis in a comprehensive metaphysics and in faith.

Because of the limitations of its references and examples mainly to German literature (apart from some older authors) this little book may appeal to but few readers outside of Germany. However, it deserves attention; the basic ideas are free from the limitations referred to; they are of general "anthropological" and philosophical relevance. They point out dangers and fallacies which are not specifically German or European. Whoever is concerned with the spiritual situation of today, or the situation of the spirit today, will profit by pondering on the author's words.

Humanism as a Philosophy. By CORLISS LAMONT. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949. Pp. 369. \$3.75.

This emotionally generous and intellectually shoddy book "constitutes an expansion and revision of a lecture course entitled 'The Philosophy of Naturalistic Humanism' given by me at Columbia University, 1946-1949" (p. 3). It is, in spirit, faithful to the *Humanist Manifesto* of 1933.

Humanism is defined as "a philosophy of joyous service for the greater good of all humanity in this natural world and according to the methods of reason and democracy" (p. 18). It is later described as "the viewpoint that men have but one life to lead and should make the most of it in terms of creative work and happiness; that human happiness is its own justification and requires no sanction or support from supernatural sources; that in any case the supernatural, usually conceived of in the form of heavenly gods or immortal heavens, does not exist; and that human beings, using their own intelligence and cooperating liberally with one another, can build up an enduring citadel of peace and beauty upon this earth" (p. 21). How the Hitlers, Stalins et al. are to be persuaded to the life of reason and liberal cooperation is not made clear.

On the side of ethics, Dr. Lamont offers the following: "Humanism without hesitation sets up the service of one's fellow man as the ultimate moral ideal" (p. 22). "This life is all and enough" (p. 100). "The

emphasis of Humanist and naturalistic ethics is *positive*, recommending the greater and more frequent enjoyment of earthly goods on the part of all men everywhere and unendingly" (p. 274). Dull Christianity, of course, is very wicked. "A central proposition in that (Christian) ethics is the original sin and inherent wickedness of man; and one of its special stresses is that the sex impulse in human beings is essentially base and bad; Adam's original sin being transmitted from generation to generation through the act of procreation. Thus the Christian Church, in order to establish the complete purity of Jesus, felt obliged to assume that he was born of a virgin in violation of ordinary biological laws" (p. 276). On sex, we find this: "Sex love (is) a democratic value *par excellence* in that it can be experienced by everyone" (p. 303). One should think sneezing would be even a higher value, inasmuch as it can be enjoyed even by the very old, the very young, and celibates, voluntary and involuntary. A little pepper may help. (How democratic can one get?)

On the subject of God, Dr. Lamont approaches genius. The existence of an Uncaused Cause is proved by the principle of casuality, But "if everything has a definite cause, then God, too, must have a cause and so on *ad infinitum*" (p. 154). "Furthermore, the argument from (yes, *from*, not *for*: reviewer) a First Cause takes for granted that there must have been a beginning of the cosmos" (p. 154). "Today the prevailing tendency in a culturally advanced country like America, regardless of what formal tributes may be paid to traditional faiths, is to retire the almighty from his former role in these earthly affairs and to look upon him as a sort of Honorary Chairman of the Universe" (p. 162). Dr. Lamont has, presumably, been appointed secretary of same.

The concluding punch line is "Humanism assigns to man nothing less than the task of being his own savior and redeemer" (p. 349).

The book is not blasphemous; the author is too adolescently ignorant to be capable of blasphemy. It is too shallow and ephemeral to merit any criticism.

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